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Abstract 
Mergers and acquisitions of European utility sectors subsequent to privatisation and 
deregulation triggered widespread concern. This is primarily due to the crucial role 
played by utility sectors in a country's economic and social development for being 
providers of essential services. The general political consensus is that the utility 
sectors should be economically regulated. So there is limited scope for the investors in 
utility sectors to cam supernormal profits. This calls for a need to examine whether 
M&A of utilities create value for the shareholders. In addition given the continuing 
trend of M&A in European utility sectors it is also vital to understand the motives 
behind such large scale M&A in utility sectors. So the objective of this thesis is to 
examine the causes and consequences of M&A in European utility sectors from a 
finance theory perspective. 
From the study of a sample of 156 cases of M&A within utility sectors in Europe 
between 1990 and 2006 this thesis provide mixed evidence on the performance of 
utility sectors following M&A. On one hand the findings suggest that economic 
regulation of utilities acted as a good safeguard for the utility sectors from suffering 
losses following M&A. This is evidenced from the lower level of losses accrued to the 
acquirer shareholders. Evidence of synergy motive behind M&A of European utility 
sectors also suggests that effective regulation prevented M&A of utilities that are not 
motivated by synergy. From an economic policy perspective this result bears 
important policy implications as it suggests that M&A in utility sectors should be 
passed through effective regulatory scrutiny. On the other hand the fact that acquirer 
shareholders in the short run and the combined shareholders in the long run have 
suffered losses triggers a negative signal for the investors in utilities. This also has 
policy implications as it suggests that investors should be careful to adopt the strategy 
of M&A. 
This thesis also finds that the short run changes in shareholder returns are not 
explained by any explanatory variables. However in the long run post merger period 
the shareholder returns of the utility companies that were subject to privatisation 
earned higher returns compared to those firms which were in private sector since their 
inception. One likely reason for this outcome is that privatisation has led to increase in 
efficiency of the utility companies as reported by the extant studies. In addition 
evidence from this thesis indicates that in the initial post merger period the 
shareholders under cross-border M&A faced some barriers to entry but as the length 
of the post merger period increased they had overcome these barriers to entry in a 
foreign land. 
Taken together this thesis provides significant contribution both in the area of 
research on utility sectors as well as finance literature on M&A. 
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Chapter 1 
Motivation, Objectives and Outline of the Thesis 
"When we deal with great public services like electricity which affect every home, 
business and industry in the country, governments must be sure beyond doubt that 
their actions are beneficial to all the people of the country and not just to a sectional 
interest..... electricity, gas, water and telecommunications are great and essential 
public services. It will be a bad day for Britain if they fall into the hands of remote 
and inaccessible managers whose eyes are mainly fixed on making a profit ". 
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, speaking on Electricity Privatisation Proposals in the 
House of Lords, as quoted in Hansard, 20 May 1988. 
1.0 Introduction 
Since the widespread introduction of privatisation as a tool of central government 
policy in the mid-1980s, changing ownership of utilities has provoked considerable 
concern both in the UK and the rest of Europe. This is largely due to the centrality of 
the utility sectors at the heart of the social and economic life of a country as 
demonstrated in the above quote. 
Utilities are essential services that play a vital role in economic and social 
development and they are expected to serve the public interest whether they are 
provided publicly or privately. No other sectors are so involved in the day-to-day life 
of all citizens while simultaneously being a key player for a country's economic 
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wellbeing. Utility sectors are also capital intensive and involve huge investment 
(Armstrong et al, 1994). Moreover these sectors constitute a major share of a 
country's GDP (Coen and Doyle, 2000). About 20 percent of household consumption 
expenditures in Europe are comprised of expenditures on utilities (Eurostat Yearbook, 
2009, p. 6). These are strategic industries whose role in the wider economy cannot be 
overstated. 
In addition utility sectors are also guided by social welfare considerations. So the state 
has an obligation to ascertain reliable universal access and continuity of service under 
transparent and accountable regulatory frameworks (Armstrong et al., 1994). All these 
factors contribute towards a need to fully understand all strategic and financial 
mechanisms associated with these industries, and the potential impact that any change 
in ownership can have upon performance, from financial, strategic and economic 
viewpoint. Hence study of these sectors requires serious consideration. 
Increased competition and globalization in the utility sectors in recent years has 
forced changes in regulatory frameworks, ownership structures and diversification of 
businesses of these companies. In Europe utility sectors were subject to privatisation, 
liberalisation and deregulation in the early 1990s. Deregulation was introduced in 
order to curb utility sectors from using their monopoly power and to promote 
competition. Deregulation of these sectors might be politically motivated as 
distribution of gains is a sensitive issue (Coen and Doyle, 2000). Hence the policy of 
privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation of utilities by the governments across 
different countries in Europe has been subjected to extensive public policy debate 
(Jones, 2001). 
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One of the consequences of privatisation of utilities was that it created the market 
for 
corporate control'. Europe-wide regulatory reforms and the creation of markets 
for 
services as well as markets for corporate control created a dynamic market 
environment in different utility sectors. As a response to this deregulation utility 
sectors in Europe embarked on mergers and acquisitions2 (M&A) on a significant 
scale (Nestor, 2005). 
Mergers and acquisitions is a mechanism by which two companies are combined to 
achieve certain objectives. There is a multitude of business and academic studies that 
have examined M&A over the last two decades. But most of these studies have found 
little definitive evidence that these deals create value. In fact as Bruner (2002) 
documented only 20 percent of mergers have increased shareholders' returns and most 
mergers typically erode shareholders' wealth. Despite this fact industries across the 
globe continue to grow, consolidate and restructure through M&A. 
The M&A activity in European utility sectors started in the early 1990s but it peaked 
from the mid to late 1990s. I will discuss the reason for this trend in M&A further in 
Section 1.1 below. In fact the M&A data on utilities revealed that the total value of 
utility deals from 1990 to 2006 was 12 percent of total value of M&A deals in Europe 
(SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database). 
1 The market for corporate control is an extension of free market in products and services to a free 
market in corporations (Sudarsanam, 2003, p. 55). 
2 The definition of merger, acquisition, and takeover following Sudarsanam (2003, p. 2) is given as 
follows. In a merger two companies come together and share their resources to achieve certain 
objectives. In an acquisition the acquirer firm purchases the assets or shares of the target firm such that 
the shareholders of the target firm cease to be the owners of that firm. A takeover is a specific form of 
acquisition where the acquirer is much larger than the target. So while in a merger a new entity is 
formed in an acquisition the target firms become a subsidiary of the acquirer firm. In this thesis the 
term M&A will be used to refer to any strategic decision of mergers, acquisitions or takeovers. 
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Several reasons behind these M&A of European utility sectors have been put forward. 
For instance according to Financial Times (December, 28,2009) "The wave of 
consolidation in the utility sector in Europe through the decade was driven as much 
by a political imperative to create strong national champions as by any sound 
industrial logic". Moreover it has also been argued that given the small size of many 
European markets, mergers outside the national boundaries would allow the utility 
companies to become a significant player in the utilities market and thereby remain 
competitive (Global Energy Business, 2001). In addition generation of economies of 
scale is also deemed to be another important factor behind consolidations in European 
utility sectors (Becker-Blease et al, 2008). 
The M&A of European utility sectors raises some important issues that help explain 
my interest in this area. First the general political consensus is that utility sectors 
should generate a stable rate of return. This is because the regulators of utilities would 
tend to keep prices down so that these essential services can reach to customers at 
affordable prices. So there is limited scope for the investors in utility sectors to earn 
supernormal profits by engaging in M&A. Hence the question that arises is whether 
M&A of utilities create value for the shareholders. Second as utility sectors are 
indispensible and bear significant social welfare characteristics, so it is vital to 
examine whether the market's perception of M&A within such sectors is any different 
from that in non-regulated industries3. Third, there was a surge of M&A in utilities 
across Europe which started in the mid 1990s (following the removal of golden 
shares). This is the first time when utility sectors in Europe, as a response to 
3 All companies are subjected to some form of regulation. Here non-regulated industries refer to those 
industries that are not subjected to any economic regulation like price-cap regulation in the UK and rate 
of return regulation in the US in the context of utility sectors. 
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deregulation embarked in M&A on such a significant scale. Therefore it is also 
important to understand the reasons behind such large scale M&A in utility sectors. 
Moreover the continuing trend of M&A of European utility sectors also makes it 
timely to examine the M&A in these sectors. 
The aim of this thesis is to determine the causes and consequences of M&A in 
European utility sectors from a finance theory perspective4. In particular this thesis 
will examine whether the erosion of shareholder wealth as reported by most M&A 
studies in non-regulated industries also holds true for M&A of European utility 
sectors. This thesis also intends to study the determinants of shareholder returns and 
the motives behind M&A of European utilities. 
The rest of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 documents the 
characteristics of utility sectors and the privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation 
activity that were witnessed by these sectors in Europe. Section 1.2 discusses the 
different theories and rationales behind M&A. Section 1.3 documents the motivation 
and objectives of this research. Section 1.4 reviews the research questions and 
provides an outline of the chosen methods. In Section 1.5 1 present the contribution of 
this thesis. Finally Section 1.6 provides an outline of the thesis. 
41 shall elaborate on this further in Section 1.2. 
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1.1 Utility sectors in Europe 
In this Section I will briefly discuss the distinct characteristics of utility sectors and 
highlight the significant changes that have taken place in these sectors in Europe prior 
to their embarking in M&A. 
1.1.1 Characteristics of utility sectors 
Utility sectors are marked by some distinct economic characteristics (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988; Armstrong et al, 1994). Most of these sectors supply their end product 
through a fixed network and are often labelled as network industries. Therefore some 
aspects of these sectors like transmission and distribution have natural monopoly 
conditions. This is because the costs of wires (for fixed line telephones and electricity) 
and pipelines (for gas and water) are sunk costs and it would be inefficient to have 
competing networks. Moreover duplication of these networks would be a wasteful 
expenditure for the economy (Armstrong et al, 1994). Furthermore since utility 
sectors provide essential services so their demand is very low price elastic. All of 
these factors make utility sectors quite distinct from any other sectors. Hence these 
sectors need to be studied separately. 
1.1.2 Privatisation, regulation and introduction of competition 
The UK pioneered the privatisation process of utility sectors in Europe by first 
privatising British Telecom in 1984. Subsequently continental European countries like 
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Italy, Spain, France and Portugal also engaged in large-scale privatisation 
programmes in the 1990s (Parker, 2003). 
The privatisation of utilities in the UK and continental Europe was accompanied by 
deregulation and the introduction of competition. Proponents of privatisation believed 
that competition would work as an incentive mechanism to promote productive and 
technical efficiency as well as allocative efficiency. The theory of contestable markets 
postulated that competition would have a disciplining effect on the incumbent utility 
firm (Yarrow, 1986, Baumol and Willig, 1986 cited in Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
However it has also been argued that strategic entry deterrence by dominant 
incumbent firms could prevent effective competition (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
Therefore it was accepted by policy makers that liberalisation should be accompanied 
by regulation in order to benefit from competition but at the same time to protect 
consumers (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
The role of regulation is to create a balance between the interests of the producers and 
the consumers (Parker, 2003). The regulator needs to guarantee that services are 
universal and affordable (Coen and Doyle, 2000). So as discussed earlier regulation is 
likely to be politically charged as views about competition and structures of regulation 
differ across political parties and other vested interests. 
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In the UK all utility companies were subjected to price cap regulation5. In continental 
Europe utility sectors are regulated in accordance to the new Utilities Directive that 
was adopted by the EU Council of Ministers and the European Parliament 
in 2004 
(Coen and Doyle, 2000). This encompassed the utility regulation in all the EU 
countries. The deregulation of utility sectors in Europe led to major restructuring of 
these sectors. As a part of this restructuring activity several utility companies adopted 
a strategy of acquiring other utility companies. 
1.1.3 Mergers and Acquisitions of utilities in Europe 
After the liberalisation and deregulation of utilities market in the UK and continental 
Europe the governments in most European countries retained some control over utility 
companies by holding golden shares in the privatised companies. Under the principle 
of golden shares the government had a right of veto in case of a post-privatisation 
transfer of control by shareholders (Dnes et al, 1998; Nestor, 2005). The golden 
shares principle therefore limited the possibility of M&A in European utility sectors. 
In the UK and in continental Europe the golden shares were abolished in 1995 and 
2002 respectively (Dnes et al, 1998; Nestor, 2005). Direct state controls on European 
utility sectors were therefore removed. This allowed the utility sectors in Europe to 
adopt the strategy of M&A. The utility sectors subsequently witnessed a significant 
number of M&A. Hence although the M&A in European utility sectors started in the 
s Under price cap regulation utility sectors can make any changes in its price provided that the average 
price of a specified basket of its goods and services does not increase faster than RPI - X, where RPI is 
the Retail Price Index (i. e., the rate of inflation) and X is an expected increase in efficiency that this 
sector is expected to achieve. X is specified by the government or regulatory body for a specified 
period of four to five years. At the end of the specified period, the level of X is reset by the regulator 
and the process is repeated (Beesley and Littlechild, 1989). 
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early 1990s the M&A activity accelerated in the mid to late 1990s after the removal of 
golden shares. 
1.2 Theory and rationale behind M&A 
The M&A literature provide different rationales behind mergers. For instance mergers 
might occur in order to gain competitive advantage through reduction of costs or 
increase in market power. Cost reduction can take place through economies of scale 
and scope (Andrade et al, 2001). There are also strategic motives where M&A might 
be motivated to acquire products, technologies and businesses that complement core 
competencies (Sudarsanam, 2003, p. 47). Other rationales behind M&A are to bring 
about market discipline leading to the removal of incompetent management in target 
companies, and diversification motives (Andrade et al, 2001). 
Some M&A literature also considers the merger decisions of firms within the 
framework of its various financial stakeholders, their different motivations and 
conflict of interests. These M&A studies are broadly classified as having a finance 
theory perspective on M&A. The aim of this thesis is to focus on M&A of European 
utility sectors from a finance theory perspective. 
Specifically the finance literature on M&A examines the change in shareholder wealth 
creation following M&A. Since the shareholders are the residual owners of the 
company so examination of shareholders' wealth provides an effective evaluation 
criterion (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Finance theory applied to M&A also 
rests on the conflict of interest between principals (shareholders) and agents 
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(managers), and in particular what is known as agency problems (Sudarsanam, 2003, 
p. 52). Agency problems refer to situations where managers pursue their own interests 
at the cost of the interests of the shareholders. In particular where M&A are motivated 
by agency, the acquirer managers embark in M&A to maximise their own welfare at 
the cost of the acquirer shareholders. 
Two other motives behind M&A have also been identified (Goergen and Renneboog, 
2004). These are synergy and hubris. The synergy hypothesis suggests that M&A 
takes place due to the economic gains that emanate from merging the resources of two 
firms. The hubris hypothesis suggests that acquirer managers make mistakes in 
evaluating the target firms and undertake M&A presuming that their valuation of the 
target firm is correct. So under hubris, M&A take place due to the overconfidence of 
the acquirer managers in assessing the potential synergy from an acquisition. The 
number of studies that have examined the motives behind M&A are few and all of 
these studies are based on non-regulated industries (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; 
Seth et al, 2000 and Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). 
Given these different rationales and hypotheses behind M&A, in Section 1.3 1 will 
present my hypotheses surrounding M&A of European utility sectors and in doing so 
I will outline the motivation and objective of this research. 
1.3 M&A of European utilities - Motivation and objectives of this research 
Privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation are policy-driven interventions that have 
taken place in European utility sectors. These structural changes have brought utility 
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sectors into the hands of the market forces. Following any industry shock6 the market 
has a natural tendency to restructure and consolidate in order to have a more efficient 
allocation of resources (Becker-Blease et al, 2008). In fact some studies like Mitchell 
and Mulherin (1996) and Andrade et al (2001) have documented that mergers strongly 
cluster by industry as a response to industry shock. In addition Andrade et al (2001) 
indicated that the M&A of the 1990s were largely due to the result of deregulation. 
Hence following these studies it can be deduced that the significant surge of M&A in 
European utility sectors since the mid 1990s is an industry shock caused by 
deregulation. 
M&A in both regulated and non-regulated industries need to pass the hurdle of getting 
approval from the competition authorities. In Europe the European Community 
Merger Regulation (ECMR) which came into effect in 1990 is responsible for 
approving all M&A (Sudarsnam, 2003, p. 416). In addition the UK has its own M&A 
regulatory bodies which are the Office of Fair Trade and the Competition 
Commission. But M&A in economically regulated sectors like utilities require further 
approval from the specific regulators of these sectors. In fact getting regulatory 
approval for M&A is one of the largest uncertainties and risks that are faced by utility 
sectors. This clearly affects the economics of any deal (Boston Consulting Group, 
2007). 
One of the key objectives of privatisation and deregulation was to promote 
competition (Armstrong et al, 1994; Parker, 2003). However consolidation of utilities 
can shift the market power in the hands of a few large utility companies. Therefore 
6Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) attribute industry shocks to any exogenous changes that lead to 
alterations in industry structure. 
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following M&A, the utilities market may well shift from a competitive market to an 
oligopolistic one. Given the importance attached to utility sectors such deviations 
from competitive market structure might prove detrimental for the society in general 
and the consumers in particular. Hence regulators of utilities are very careful in 
approving mergers as it might prove to be anticompetitive. This point has also been 
raised by Leggio and Lien (2000) in the context of the US electricity sector. Moreover 
since the role of the regulator is to balance the interests of the producers and 
consumers, so the regulators through their actions would aim to prevent the investors 
in utilities from earning supernormal profits. 
Existing research however does not provide any evidence as to whether this 
requirement for regulatory approval has acted as an impediment towards value 
creation from M&A in utility sectors. So, given the increasing number of M&A that 
have taken place in European utility sectors following deregulation it is imperative to 
examine whether these M&A have proved to be value enhancing for the investors. 
This result will have important implications from an academic, an investment and a 
policy standpoint. 
M&A research has attracted the attention of researchers for a long time. However 
there is little empirical evidence of M&A in utility sectors. The data based on my 
sample selection consist of 156 utility companies in European utility sectors from 
1990 to 20067 (Thomson SDC database). With the significant rise of M&A in utility 
sectors following deregulation, several studies have attempted to examine various 
aspects of M&A in these sectors. I have reviewed these studies in Section 2.2 of 
7 The criterion for sample selection is described in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 2. However this existing body of literature does not answer a fundamental 
question of interest; what are the causes behind these M&A? This thesis examines the 
motives of utility sectors behind adopting an M&A strategy. It is also appropriate to 
address this question given the growing trend of M&A in utility sectors since the mid 
1990s. 
These M&A also have significant economic importance - the value of some of these 
M&A deals in utility sectors has been substantial. For instance, the data from my 
sample reveal that in 1999, U. K. 's Vodafone acquired Germany's Mannesmann for 
$200bn8. This is so far the largest M&A deal in Europe not only in utility sectors but 
also taking all other sectors into consideration (Sudarsanam, 2003, p. 1). Some other 
prominent M&A in European utility sectors in terms of deal size as evidenced in my 
sample are the merger between Vodafone of the UK and Airtouch Communications of 
the US for $67 billion; merger between Viag and Veba of Germany in 1999 to form 
Eon (deal value $14 billion) and the acquisition of Scottish Power of the U. K. by 
Iberdrola of Spain in 2006 (deal value $26 billion). Given the size of some of these 
M&A deals in utilities one issue that arises is whether this M&A will lead to an 
increase in shareholder value. 
The integration of the national markets towards a single European market also made it 
possible for utility firms in Europe to embark on both domestic and cross-border 
M&A following deregulation. "The extent of M&A activity indicates that European 
utilities are keen to gain a niche in other markets, whether it be by acquiring a new 
business at home, or expanding operations abroad" 
8 The data on deal value is obtained from SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
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(http: //www. globalbusinessinsights. com/content/rbenOI34m. pdf; 26th May, 2010). 
From this quote it is apparent that M&A of utility sectors following deregulation 
included a rise in both related as well as diversified M&A. 
In addition ABS Energy Research (2006)9 has shown that the level of deregulation in 
different utility sectors across Europe is different. This is also evident from the 
following quote. "For more than a decade the European Commission has been trying 
to enable energy producers and distributors to compete freely across national 
borders. The final deadline of the EU's bulky legislative programme to liberalise the 
market is July 2007. By then member states are supposed to have implemented all EU 
energy directives" (The Economist, December 2,2006). Given these different 
characteristics associated with M&A in European utility sectors this thesis aims to 
examine whether these different deal characteristics have an impact on value creation 
following M&A. 
The issues surrounding the M&A of European utility sectors that I have discussed in 
this Section along with the growing trend for European utility sectors to adopt the 
strategy of M&A are the motivation behind this research. Therefore as indicated 
earlier in Section 1.0 the objective of this research is to address the causes and 
consequences of M&A in European utility sectors. I now present in Section 1.4 the 
specific research questions that this thesis aims to study. 
9 For a detailed overview of the level of deregulation activity in different utility sectors please see Table 
4.3 of Chapter 4. 
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1.4 Research questions and outline of the chosen methods 
Due to the importance attached to utility sectors as a consequence of their economic 
regulation and social welfare characteristics, research in these sectors has attracted 
attention from various sides. Hence theoretical and empirical studies on utilities are 
diverse. But only a few of these studies have examined M&A that took place in 
European utility sectors subsequent to deregulation. 
The literature related to M&A of European utility sectors is informative. However 
most of these studies have focused on M&A in electric utility sector. In addition all of 
these studies are country specific. For instance Ghobadian et al (1999) and Ghobadian 
and Viney (2000) have examined M&A in the U. K. electricity sector. Freytag et al 
(2005) have examined M&A in the German energy market. Clearly there is a lack of 
evidence of M&A across all utility sectors in Europe. In addition deregulation and 
subsequent M&A in utility sectors has taken place almost simultaneously in all utility 
sectors across Europe. So it would be extremely timely to undertake a comprehensive 
analysis of M&A across all utility sectors in Europe. 
Moreover in Section 1.2 above I have outlined that finance theory on M&A rests on 
the value creation following M&A and the motives behind these M&A. However 
none of the previous literature on M&A of European utility sectors has attempted to 
examine the M&A of European utility sectors from a finance theory perspective. An 
objective of this thesis is to address this gap. 
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Specifically this thesis will examine whether deregulation allowed managers to pursue 
value-enhancing mergers. This thesis will also examine the motives behind utility 
sectors to implement the strategy of M&A. I will particularly examine the motives in 
the light of the three hypotheses on the motives behind M&A as postulated by the 
finance literature. These are synergy, agency and hubris. 
Finally this thesis will also analyse whether value creation (or destruction) following 
M&A are related to some specific characteristics of M&A. In particular I will analyse 
whether the mergers created value for a diversified shareholder, whether domestic 
mergers created more value compared to cross-border mergers and whether 
privatisation and the level of deregulation has any impact on value creation following 
M&A. Furthermore this research will also explore the impact of acquirers' glamour 
status1° and relative size of acquirer to target firm on shareholders' returns. A detailed 
discussion of the possible implications of these deal characteristics on shareholders' 
returns are discussed in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. 
The specific research pertaining to these objectives are given in Chapter 3. To address 
these objectives this thesis will examine the M&A that has taken place between 
European utility companies who had acquired other utility companies from 1990 to 
2006. The reason behind examining a sample of M&A within utility industries is first 
to determine whether changes in shareholder wealth as reported by non-regulated 
industries also holds true for regulated utility sectors. A second reason behind this 
10 The definition of glamour and value acquirers is given in Footnote 30 of Chapter 2. 
16 
sample selection is to examine whether the operational synergy" that 
is likely to 
emanate from these within industry mergers has actually taken place. 
The rationale for inclusion of the sample period 1990 to 2006 is as follows. Since 
M&A of European utility sectors started as a response to market liberalisation and 
deregulation in the early 1990s therefore in this thesis I have taken the starting period 
of the sample year as 1990. In addition since this thesis has examined long run post 
merger returns 3 years following the completion of M&A therefore ending date of the 
sample has been taken as 2006 so that all the utility companies in the sample can be 
incorporated in the long run analyses. 
Methodology to calculate shareholder wealth creation 
In this study I aim to examine the shareholder value creation following M&A both in 
the short run following the announcement of M&A as well as in the long run post 
acquisition period following the completion of M&A. The short run and the long run 
abnormal returns12 will be examined using event study methodology. Market 
efficiency theory suggests that in an efficient capital market stock prices will 
incorporate any new information almost instantaneously, such that the stock price of a 
company at any time will reflect the market's best estimate (Fama, 1970). 
The long run event study methodology will gauge the actual gains or losses accrued to 
the shareholders in the post acquisition period. Both the short run and long run 
tl Source of operational synergy for this within industry merger is through economies of scale and 
scope. (Sudarsanam, 1996). 'Z The abnormal returns are the returns in excess of normal returns. The normal returns are the returns 
that the firms are expected to earn in the absence of an event. The normal returns are calculated with 
respect to some benchmark model. This has been discussed in details in Chapter 4. 
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analyses have been used by a number of studies in the finance discipline. The 
rationale behind applying these methods to determine shareholders' wealth creation 
following M&A is discussed in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4. 
The event study methodology entails the calculation of abnormal returns accrued to 
the shareholders. In the short run I have analysed the abnormal returns for both the 
target and acquirer shareholders over a few days surrounding the announcement date. 
Various benchmark models that are popular in the existing empirical literature such as 
the OLS market model, the mean adjusted model and the world market model have 
been applied. Three different benchmark models have been employed in order to 
ensure the robustness of the abnormal returns across different model specifications. 
In the long run post acquisition period the abnormal returns are analysed 1 to 3 years 
following the completion of M&A (Loughran and Vijh, 1997). Two different 
abnormal performance estimators have been applied. These are the Buy and Hold 
abnormal return (BHAR) and the Calendar time abnormal return estimators (CTAR). 
Methodology to examine the determinants of short run and the long run 
shareholder returns 
To examine the determinants of shareholder returns I will analyse two regression 
models each pertaining to the short run and long run shareholder returns. The 
objective of these regressions is to identify whether the different characteristics of the 
M&A deals can explain the change in shareholders' returns in the short run and long 
run following M&A. 
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Specifically the regression models will look into the short run and the long run 
abnormal returns with respect to six different characteristics of M&A. These six 
variables include privatisation, deregulation, degree of relatedness of utility mergers 
(for instance gas-electric merger or electric-electric merger), domestic versus cross- 
border M&A, the glamour status of the acquirers and relative size of acquirer to target 
firms. Detailed discussion of the hypotheses pertaining to the impact of these 
explanatory variables on shareholder returns is given in Chapter 3. 
Methodology to examine the motives behind M&A 
The motives behind M&A of European utility sectors will be examined on the basis of 
three different hypotheses on the motives behind M&A as postulated in the finance 
literature. These are synergy, agency and hubris. This research intends to employ two 
different methods to examine the motives behind M&A of European utility sectors. 
In the first method the motives will be examined by analysing the combined gains 
accrued to the shareholders of the target and acquirer firms in the short run following 
the announcement of M&A. In the second method the motives will be determined by 
the correlation between target gain and total gain and the correlation between target 
gain and acquirer gain. The purpose of applying this second method is to determine 
the simultaneous presence of two or more motives behind M&A. Both these methods 
have been applied by a number of studies in the context of M&A in non-regulated 
industries (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al, 2000; Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004). A review of these studies can be found in Section 2.4 of Chapter 
2. 
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1.5 Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis offers the potential to make two major contributions to knowledge and a 
number of smaller contributions. It also has the potential to outline my future research 
agenda. Firstly this research represents an important contribution in the area of 
research on regulated sectors, and particularly the utility sectors. Secondly this 
research offers a key contribution in the field of M&A literature in finance. 
The major contribution of this thesis lies in an empirical examination of M&A of 
European utility sectors from the finance theory perspective. From the literature 
survey conducted as part of this thesis, it appears that this is the only empirical study 
that provides a comprehensive analysis of M&A of European utility sectors by 
incorporating traditional finance methodologies. 
A large body of empirical research on M&A is available in the area of finance. The 
bulk of these studies have examined M&A in non-regulated industries. Only a few of 
these studies are based on regulated utility sectors. There is, however, extensive 
research on the deregulation of European utility sectors. The reasons for so many 
studies on utility sectors is firstly due to the importance attached to these sectors as 
providers of essential services and secondly for contributing a major share of a 
country's GDP (Newbery, 1997). But none of these studies have particularly 
examined M&A in European utility sectors subsequent to deregulation. Therefore this 
research attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis on the causes and 
consequences of M&A in European utility sectors from the finance literature 
perspective. 
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From a methodological perspective, this research examines shareholder value creation 
following M&A both in the short run following the announcement of M&A and in the 
long run, following the completion of M&A within European utility sectors. This 
research therefore supplements the growing body of finance literature on long run 
post acquisition performance. 
In addition, this thesis is one of the few M&A studies that uses a broad analytical 
framework to examine the motives behind M&A. Particularly in this study I use 
combined gains method and regression method to determine the motives behind 
M&A. This is the first study that analyses the motives in the context of M&A of 
regulatory sectors, and specifically utility sectors. 
In order to understand the determinants or sources of short run and long run 
shareholder returns I conduct multiple regression analyses. This is the first study that 
incorporates the explanatory variables `privatisation' and `deregulation' in the 
regression models to examine the sources of shareholder wealth creation following 
M&A. Moreover from the review of literature it also appears that this is the first study 
that examines the determinants of shareholders' value creation following M&A in 
utility sectors. In the beginning of this Chapter I have discussed the importance 
attached to utility sectors. Therefore analysis of shareholder value creation following 
M&A of such regulated industries is an important contribution of this thesis. 
Detailed discussion on the main findings of this thesis will be undertaken in Chapters 
5 and 6 but briefly the key results of this thesis are as follows. 
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The findings of this study on shareholder value creation following M&A reinforce the 
existing evidence on wealth losses from M&A. However the interesting observation 
documented in these results is that the level of losses is quite low in comparison to 
that documented by the M&A literature in non-regulated industries. Detailed 
discussion of these results is given in Chapter 5. 
The findings on the determinants of shareholder returns suggests that in the long run 
post merger period the shareholder returns are higher for those utility firms which 
were under state ownership and were subject to privatisation. This is in comparison to 
the utility firms that were in private sector since their inception. Another observation 
obtained from the long run multiple regression analysis is that the shareholder returns 
are higher for domestic mergers in the 1 year post merger period but in the 3 years 
post merger period the shareholders of cross border mergers have earned higher 
returns. The detailed interpretation of these results is given in Section 5.4 of Chapter 
5. This is a significant finding for all organisations contemplating cross-border M&A 
in the utility sector. 
Moreover it is also evident from the results in Chapter 6 that synergy is the 
predominant motive behind M&A of European utility sectors. But some presence of 
agency motive is apparent from the combined gains figure. These findings have not 
been documented in the literature before. 
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1.6 Outline of the thesis 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature relating 
to the privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation of utility sectors in Europe. This 
review discusses why utility sectors were transformed from state owned enterprises to 
privately owned companies and the role of regulation. Moreover this review also 
documents the performance of utility sectors in Europe in the post privatisation and 
deregulation setting. This is followed by a review of evidence on M&A in European 
utility sectors. This review discusses some of the motives of the electricity sectors to 
engage in M&A. 
Subsequently this Chapter presents the different M&A literature in finance in non- 
regulated industries. This review captures the empirical evidences on shareholder 
wealth creation both in the short run following the announcement of M&A and in the 
long run following the completion of M&A. Moreover I have also reviewed the 
evidence on the motives behind the M&A in non-regulated industries based on the 
studies conducted in the US, the UK and continental Europe. Finally this Chapter 
reviews the US studies on M&A in utility sectors. This review documents the change 
in shareholder wealth both in the short run announcement period and in the long run 
post merger period following M&A in the US utility sectors. 
Chapter 3 identifies the literature gap based on the review conducted in Chapter 2. 
Specifically this Chapter has identified that there is a lack of evidence on the 
performance and motives behind M&A of European utility sectors from finance a 
theory perspective. Following this gap in the literature this Chapter presents three 
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research questions and develops a number of hypotheses based on these research 
questions. 
Chapter 4 presents the methodology and data adopted in this thesis. This Chapter 
starts by justifying the selection of the methodology. This is followed by a detailed 
discussion of the methods that I have used in addressing the three research questions. 
The sample selection criterion to obtain the sample of European utility firms engaged 
in the M&A is also discussed. I present in this Chapter the summary statistics on the 
distribution of the target and acquirer firms engaged in M&A across the different 
utility sectors in Europe. 
Chapter 5 provides an answer to the first two research questions. Firstly this Chapter 
discusses the result obtained on the short run announcement period change in 
shareholder returns of the target and acquirer utility firms using three benchmark 
models. Secondly this Chapter presents the evidence obtained on the long run post 
merger change in returns of the shareholders of the merged utility firms. Thirdly this 
Chapter discusses the evidence on the determinants of the shareholder returns in the 
short run and in the long run. 
Chapter 6 provides an answer to the third research question. In this Chapter I report 
the evidence obtained on the motives behind M&A of European utility sectors. Two 
different methods have been used to evaluate the motives behind M&A. This Chapter 
also provides the interpretation and implications of the results obtained regarding the 
motives behind M&A. 
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Chapter 7 is a summary of the thesis. It also narrates the key findings of this research. 
Finally this Chapter discusses the limitations of this study and makes some 





The role of this literature review Chapter is to situate the research in the extant 
literature and thereby highlight the gaps in knowledge. This Chapter will help justify 
my interest in the area from an academic standpoint. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
there are other reasons for interest, not least the potential policy implications of this 
research. This Chapter therefore presents the main literature relevant to my thesis. 
Critical observations regarding these studies, identification of gaps in literature, and 
the evolution of my research questions that I intend to examine in this thesis are 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 11 have outlined that the aim of this thesis is to examine the causes and 
consequences of M&A of European utility sectors from finance theory perspective. 
Given this aim the purpose of this Chapter is to review two strands of literatures (1) 
pertaining to privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation and subsequently M&A of 
utility sectors in Europe and (2) related to the theory and empirical evidences of M&A 
from finance theory perspective. This is further illustrated in Figure 2.1 below. 
Particularly Venn diagram A in Figure 2.1 illustrates the order of events that has 
shaped the present utility markets in Europe. Venn diagram B depicts the key areas of 
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investigation of M&A from finance theory perspective. This thesis is situated in the 
area of overlap between A and B. 
Figure 2.1 Illustration of the review of literatures 
M&A literature 
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A Gap in research I B 
The purpose of reviewing these two different strands of literatures is given as follows. 
First Section 2.1 provides a brief13 review of the existing literature on the 
privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation in different utility sectors across Europe. 
The reason behind reviewing these studies is to provide a background of how utility 
sectors evolved from state owned enterprises (SOEs) to privatised entities in the late 
eighties and how they performed following privatisation. The goal of this Section is to 
shed light on the importance attached to utility sectors as providers of essential 
services, and in doing so I aim to establish the rationale for conducting research on 
utility sectors. 
13 Since the objective of this study is to examine the M&A of utilities therefore only a brief review has 
been conducted on the privatisation and liberalisation of utilities, in order to provide context. 
27 
Second in Section 2.2 1 review the existing studies that examined the motives of 
European utility companies to engage in M&A. On the basis of this review I establish 
the need for conducting further research in this area. 
Third in Section 2.3 1 introduce the existing theory and empirical evidence in the 
finance literature on shareholder wealth creation following M&A in non-regulated 
industries. The objective of reviewing these studies is to introduce the key debates and 
methodologies surrounding shareholder wealth creation following M&A from finance 
theory perspective. As indicated in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1 in this thesis I aim to 
examine shareholder wealth creation following M&A of European utilities. So this 
review will enable the comparison of the empirical evidences obtained in this thesis 
on M&A in regulated European utility sectors with the existing M&A literature in 
non-regulated industries. In this Section I also discuss some empirical evidences on 
M&A in the regulated electricity utility based on the US studies. In addition the 
discussion of the methodologies on shareholder wealth creation in this Section will 
help to determine and explain the choice of methods that I apply in this research. 
Fourth in Section 2.4 1 review the extant studies on the theory and empirical evidences 
underlying the motives behind M&A in non-regulated industries. As I have indicated 
in Section 1.4 of Chapter 1 one of the objectives of this thesis is to examine the 
motives behind M&A by European acquirers of utilities. Hence through the review of 
these studies I present the key evidence on the motives behind M&A as reported by 
existing literature. Moreover in this Section I also discuss the methodologies applied 
within this existing literature to analyse the motives behind M&A. This will help to 
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justify the choice of methods that I apply in this research. Finally in Section 2.5 I 
provide a summary of this chapter. 
2.1 Privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation of utility sectors in Europe 
In this Section I firstly discuss the transformation of utility sectors in Europe from 
being state owned enterprises to privatised entities. Secondly in this Section I review 
the different empirical evidence on the performance of these sectors in the post 
privatisation and deregulation period. 
Several explanations for the choice of privatisation of utility sectors are documented 
in theory and empirical literature. The main reasons were: an overriding political need 
driven by a strong belief in the power of market forces (Jones, 2001); to reduce the 
financial burden of the state (Yarrow, 1986; Nestor and Mahboobi, 2000); to improve 
efficiency by encouraging competition and allowing firms to borrow from the capital 
market (Yarrow, 1986); to encourage a wider share ownership (Gripaios and Munday, 
1998); to introduce market discipline (Yarrow, 1986). Yarrow argued that when the 
performance of a particular utility company is poor its share prices would fall and 
threats of takeover by a more efficient management would increase. Hence the threat 
of takeovers serves as a disciplining factor on incumbent managements. Furthermore 
Gripaios and Munday (1998) suggested that market discipline should ensure a more 
efficient allocation of resources. 
In Chapter 1I identified that privatisation of utilities was also accompanied by the 
introduction of competition and the liberalisation of European utility markets. 
Competition was also introduced to promote internal as well as allocative efficiency 
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(Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Competition was further encouraged in the network 
utilities because it was believed that competition would lead to greater productivity 
thereby widening consumer choice and lowering prices (Heritier, 2001). Moreover 
technological changes also created opportunity for competition in these utility sectors 
which were previously considered natural monopolies (Parker, 1997; Nestor, 2005). 
As outlined in Section 1.1 of Chapter 1 Vickers and Yarrow (1988) argued that the 
theory of strategic entry deterrence and predatory behaviour might thwart competitors 
by their anticompetitive tactics. Armstrong et al (1994) suggested that regulation 
should be introduced to prevent the problem of market failure. The most likely form 
of market failure that may emanate in utility industries is through the abuse of market 
power 14. So it was accepted by policy makers that liberalisation should be 
accompanied by regulation to ensure that potential competition is effective (Vickers 
and Yarrow, 1988). Both in the UK and continental Europe the policy makers ensured 
that the role of regulation was to strike a balance between the interests of both the 
producers and the consumers (Parker, 1997; Dnes et al, 1998; Heritier, 2001; Parker 
2003). Other intended objectives of deregulation are to ensure that there is no 
regulatory capture15 by the regulatee and there is no regulatory risk16. 
14 When there is only a single firm operating in the market it might lead to monopoly abuse. Since the 
demand for utilities is inelastic, consumers will be bound to pay whatever prices are charged by the 
producers. Hence in theory a profit maximising monopolist will set price above marginal cost leading 
to allocative inefficiency. Moreover the monopolist may not have sufficient incentives to cut their costs 
or introduce new products. This might result in productive inefficiency (Armstrong et al, 1994). 
15 Regulatory capture refers to the unwelcome situation where the regulator acts in the interests of the 
incumbents in the industry rather than those of consumers or potential entrants to the industry (Vickers 
and Yarrow, 1988, Ch. 4) 
16 Regulatory risk refers to the risk faced by utility companies of bring prone to regulatory intervention. 
This occurs if utility companies could not predict the actions of the regulators (Vickers and Yarrow, 
1988, Ch. 4). 
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So far in this Section I have discussed the transformation of different European utility 
sectors from SOEs to privatised entities. One key observation that has evolved from 
this discussion is the importance that has been attached to utility sectors for being 
providers of essential services. Given that the demand for utilities is inelastic the 
significance of these sectors to the consumers cannot be overstated. In addition since 
these sectors contribute a major share to a country's GDP so they exert a major 
influence on a country's economy. In fact it is due to these reasons that even after 
passing utilities into private hands some kind of economic regulation were 
implemented on these sectors. Next I review the empirical studies that have examined 
the actual outcomes of privatisation and deregulation of utilities. 
In examining the actual outcomes of privatisation, the general consensus from most 
previous studies was that privatisation indeed led to a reduction in costs and prices 
(Newbery, 1997; Parker, 1997; Parker, 2003; Florio, 2007). UK studies on the role of 
price cap regulation document that the shareholders of utility companies earned higher 
returns after privatisation (Parker, 1997; Dries et al, 1998). Parker (1997) also 
documented that price cap regulation was effective in the UK in equitably distributing 
the efficiency gains between shareholders in terms of higher profits and consumers in 
terms of lower prices. Dnes et al (1998) reported that overall the regulatory impact on 
shareholder returns were positive, and documented that the RPI-X price cap 
regulation was generous to the electricity companies. 
There is also a significant political debate on the efficacy of service delivery of 
different utility sectors under privatisation. For instance, in the UK the Labour Party 
criticised the Conservative Government's decision to privatise utility sectors. This 
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was also triggered by the media who construed that the high returns made by utility 
sectors are a result of deceiving the regulators during price setting (Jones, 2001). Once 
in power in 1997 the Labour government's immediate action was to fulfil its election 
pledge and impose windfall tax on the profits of utility companies. The review of 
studies in the next Section will reveal how this action of the Labour Government was 
responsible for the retreat of the US electricity companies from the UK market. 
2.1.1 Summary 
The review of empirical evidences on the performances of utility sectors following 
privatisation and deregulation has highlighted the plurality of research that has been 
conducted on utilities in the UK and continental Europe. This admittedly brief review 
in turn shows the importance that is attached to these sectors. This is apparent from 
the extent of the interest that privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation of utilities 
have attracted from its various stakeholders like producers, consumers and even from 
political parties. The extent of the interest reflects the political importance of these 
sectors, and helps justify detailed research of the type reported here. One key reason 
that triggered such a vast amount of research on utilities is the change of ownership 
and introduction of deregulation or re-regulation in these sectors. But these are not the 
only changes that have happened in these utility sectors. As mentioned in Chapter 1 
the privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation of utilities introduced the market for 
corporate control in utility sectors. Utility sectors in Europe subsequently witnessed a 
significant number of mergers and acquisitions. This calls for a need of research on 
the performance of different utility sectors in Europe following M&A. In the next 
Section I review the existing studies on M&A of utilities in Europe and in doing so I 
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shall introduce a gap in our understanding of the importance of M&A in these critical 
industries. 
2.2 Mergers and Acquisitions of utilities in Europe 
Nestor (2005) documents that subsequent to privatisation and liberalisation of utilities 
market the governments in most European countries tried to retain limited residual 
control over these companies through the principle of golden shares. The golden 
shares allowed the government to confer a veto right in case of a transfer of control by 
shareholders (Dnes et al, 1998; Loredo and Suarez, 2000; Nestor, 2005). However 
extant literature revealed that the small size of many European home markets 
prevented effective competition in the product market subsequent to privatisation and 
deregulation (Loredo and Suarez, 2000; Nestor 2005). Moreover Loredo and Suarez 
(2000) also argued that cross border mergers in utilities would also bring in potential 
synergies that could benefit both consumers and shareholders (Loredo and Suarez, 
2000). Therefore the need to open the economy to foreign investment was 
acknowledged in order to avoid private monopolies or oligopolies (Loredo and 
Suarez, 2000). Subsequently golden shares were removed in the UK in 1995 (Dnes et 
al 1998) and European Union outlawed golden shares in 2002 (Nestor, 2005). This 
opened the door for mergers and acquisitions within utility sectors in Europe. 
In this Section I review the existing empirical evidence on M&A of utilities, and 
especially European utilities. I thereby highlight the gaps in these extant studies 
leading to the formulation of a research question later in Chapter 3. 
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2.2.1 Review of extant studies on the motives behind mergers and acquisitions of 
utilities 
The consolidation of European utilities subsequent to deregulation and liberalisation 
has the general tendency to transform utilities industries from a monopoly to an 
oligopoly. This theme has been identified within the literature, and here is a small 
illustrative example. In the context of mergers and acquisitions of utilities in the U. S, 
Becker Blease et al (2008, p. 24) state ".... in a deregulated market utilities needed to 
be large to capture efficiencies in procurement, production, marketing, and 
administration and thereby remain competitive". Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) in the 
US context termed the deregulation of utilities as industry shocks. This study argues 
that takeovers or mergers are often the most cost efficient means of restructuring 
following such `industry shocks'. Eckbo (1983) argued that takeovers among electric 
utilities are usually justified by management as a means of effecting increased 
efficiency, through operative synergetic effects resulting from economies of scale and 
scope. These studies reflected some general consensus on the need for M&A in utility 
sectors. Next I review some of the previous studies on M&A in European utilities. I 
have drawn the critical insights and gaps emerging from a review of these studies at 
the end of this Section. 
Ghobadian et al (1999) examined the motivations of the US acquirers of electricity 
companies to enter into the UK electricity market. They documented that the principal 
motivations for the US companies to enter into the UK electricity market were growth 
strategy and revenue generation, market entry, organizational and financial synergy 
and the benefit of diversification (Ghobadian et al, 1999). This study also found a 
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variety of disincentives that deterred some of the US companies to enter into the UK 
electricity market. Ghobadian and Viney (2000) further analysed the reasons for the 
retreat of some of the US companies from the UK electricity market. Drawing data 
from archival sources they concluded that the main reason for the retreat of these US 
companies was the failure of the UK market to live up to the expectations of these 
investing companies. This failure is attributed to external factors, market failures and 
actions of competitors. External factors here refer to the then Labour Government's 
decision to levy a `windfall tax' upon the monopoly profits of the companies of the 
electricity supply industry (ESI) which the US companies' argued prevented a level 
playing field for business in the UK. The authors refer to market failure as the fall in 
consumption of electricity, which in turn prevented the creation of real market 
opportunities to the US companies. The action of the competitors here is the failure of 
these US companies to form synergistic unions with other US companies in the UK 
market. The authors also argued that some of the US companies were unable to 
defend a global presence while some of the UK acquired companies were resistant to 
the precise strategies that the US companies were seeking to develop. 
The subsequent literature on M&A of utilities in continental Europe has shown that a 
considerable number of utility companies are consolidating in Europe's utility market 
in order to strengthen its geographic position, gain a fast entry into a new market, and 
to gain access to end customers (Allas, 2001). This study suggested that most of these 
M&A deals were overpriced. The reasons cited for these arguably excessive 
premiums were mostly associated with strategic considerations, such as strengthening 
of geographic position, fast entry into a new market and access to end customers. 
Freytag et al (2005) found that the primary motive behind M&A of utilities is to 
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increase the market power. This study looked into the M&A of energy utilities by 
observing 70 takeovers of the US and 69 takeovers of German firms between 1990 
and 2002. They reported that the market value of the acquiring firms on the day of the 
merger announcement rose suggesting that markets perceived the mergers as a 
potential to increase market power. This study also reported that the market value on 
the announcement date increased even for the competitors. The authors suggested this 
as an indication that they, i. e. the competitors, themselves are likely to become 
takeover targets. 
2.2.2 Summary of studies on mergers and acquisitions of utilities in Europe 
The studies reviewed in this Section have been summarised in Table 2.1. From the 
review of the studies in this Section on M&A of European utilities I document that 
these studies have examined the motives behind these mergers and acquisitions. But 
all of these studies have examined the M&A only in the electricity sector. Since in 
Europe all utility sectors have been subjected to M&A following deregulation there is 
a need to examine M&A for all the different utility sectors. Moreover most of these 
studies have examined the M&A of European utilities from a strategic perspective 17. 
From this review of studies it is therefore apparent that there is no evidence on the 
performances of these European utility sectors following M&A from the finance 
literature perspective. 
From the above discussion the crucial gap in literature that has evolved is to examine 
the M&A of European utilities from a finance theory perspective. Empirical literature 
17 There are different alternative perspectives on mergers (Sudarsanam, 2003, ch 3). These are 
economic perspective, strategic perspective and finance theory perspective. This thesis will examine 
the M&A of utilities from finance theory perspective. 
36 
in finance evaluates the performance of M&A by examining the change in 
shareholders wealth creation following M&A. A small number of studies in finance 
literature on M&A have also examined the motives behind M&A based on the three 
predominant theories behind M&A. These theories are synergy, agency and hubris. In 
the next two Sections I will review the empirical studies that have examined the M&A 
from a finance theory perspective. 
Table 2.1 Extant studies on the motives behind M&A in utilities 
Research Paper Country Results 
Principal motivations were growth strategy and Ghobadian et al U. K. revenue generation, market entry, organizational (1999) 
and financial ser , risk diversification 
Ghobadian and U K Reasons 
for retreat were external factors, market 
Viney (2000) . . failures and actions of competitors 
Strengthening of geographic position, gain a fast 
Allas (2001) Europe entry in a new market and to gain access to end 
customers 
Freytag et al U. S. and 
German energy market has a higher potential to 
(2005) Germany 
increase market power compare to the US market 
through M&A 
2.3 Stock market performance following mergers and acquisitions: Theory and 
empirical evidence 
In the previous Section I have reviewed the extant studies on the motives behind 
M&A of utilities. From the review of studies in the previous Section it is clear that 
there is a lack of evidence on the performance of the European utility sectors 
following M&A from a finance theory perspective. Finance literature evaluates the 
success of M&A by examining the shareholder wealth creation following M&A 
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(Sudarsanam, 2003; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). For this reason one of the 
most extensively researched areas in finance has been whether M&A create value for 
the shareholders of both the acquirer and the target firms. In finance theory 
shareholder wealth impact is examined by looking at the short run and the long run 
stock price performance of the companies that were engaged in M&A (Andrade, 
2001; Sudarsanam, 2003). There is an extensive volume of academic literature that 
examines the performance of the target and acquirer shareholders returns following 
M&A. In this Section I have reviewed these empirical studies. 
I have divided this Section further into the following Subsections. Specifically in 
Subsection 2.3.1 I discuss the theory underlying the short run event study 
methodology which evaluates the change in shareholder returns following the 
announcement of M&A. In subsection 2.3.2 I discuss the empirical evidence on the 
short run abnormal returns18 accrued to the shareholders of the target and acquirer 
firms following announcement of M&A in non-regulated industries. In Subsection 
2.3.3 I review the theory and empirical literature surrounding shareholders wealth 
creation in the long run post merger period. In Subsection 2.3.4 I discuss the 
determinants or drivers of shareholders' returns as reported by empirical studies that I 
have reviewed in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3. Finally in Subsection 2.3.5 I review the 
empirical literature on shareholder wealth creation following M&A in utilities. 
'$ The abnormal returns are the returns accrued to the shareholders above the normal returns. The 
normal returns are the returns that the shareholders are expected earn in the absence of any corporate 
event (Sudarsanam, 2003, p. 90). 
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2.3.1 The efficient market hypothesis 
The effect of mergers and acquisitions in the short run on shareholders' wealth has 
been analysed using short run event study methodology'9 (Datta et al, 1992; Schwert, 
1996; Andrade et al, 2001). Event study methodology is based on the efficient market 
hypothesis. Theoretically efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that the market 
price of common stock reflect all publicly available information (Fama 1970). EMH 
posits that if securities markets are efficient then security prices should fully 
incorporate the expectations and information of all market participants and would also 
respond quickly and without bias to new information (Cornell and Morgan, 1990). 
Thus the proponents of EMH posit that in an efficient market the stock price of any 
company at any time reflects the market's best estimate, based on publicly available 
information, of the present discounted value of cash flows from the company. If new 
information becomes available to the market, the stock price of that company will 
adjust to reflect the market's new estimate of that discounted present value. 
The seminal work of Fama (1970) subdivided the empirical work on efficient market 
into three parts: weak form, semi strong form and strong form. The weak form 
efficient market implies that current security prices reflect all information of past 
price histories. The semi strong form efficient market postulates that current security 
prices reflect, all publicly available information. Lastly the strong form efficient 
market test implies that security prices reflect all available information both public 
and private. This study reviewed the empirical work of earlier studies and concluded 
that there is hardly any evidence which contradicts the EMH. 
19 Details of event study methodology will be discussed in Chapter 4 
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Fama (1991) further reviewed the literature on market efficiency and in this study he 
updated the three forms of market efficiency that he documented in his earlier work 
(1970). In this paper he divided the existing empirical works on market efficiency into 
the following categories: (a) tests for return predictability2° (b) event studies21 and (c) 
tests for private information22. Fama (1991) concluded that event study methodology 
provided the most conclusive evidence on market efficiency since security prices 
respond quickly to the announcement of corporate events, usually just within a few 
days. This study of Fama (1991) has drawn support for this theory on the basis of 
existing empirical work on event studies. Drawing references from earlier empirical 
works this study has showed how using event study stock price response following 
different corporate announcements could be captured. Under event study if daily data 
is used than it will eliminate the joint-hypothesis problem which states that market 
efficiency must be tested jointly with an asset pricing model. This is because with 
daily data average stock prices adjust within a few days to the event announcements. 
Rubinstein (2001) further states that EMH works under the assumption that investors 
are rational. 
2.3.1.1 Summary 
Given the theoretical arguments based on the EMH, the event study methodology has 
achieved immense popularity in the field of M&A research in corporate finance 
(Andrade, 2001; Sudarsanam, 2003). A large number of empirical studies have 
applied this methodology to determine shareholder wealth creation following the 
20 Tests for return predictability examine how well past returns can predict future returns. 21 Event studies examine how quickly security prices reflect public information announcements. 22 Tests for private information examine whether investors have any private information that is not fully 
reflected in market prices (Fama, 1991, p. 1576). 
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announcement of M&A (Bruner, 2002). Therefore following these empirical studies 
in this thesis I intend to apply this methodology to examine the change in security 
returns of the target and acquirer shareholders following the announcements of M&A 
in utility sectors by European acquirers. Further justification on the choice of event 
study methodology will be discussed in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4. The next subsection 
reviews the empirical evidence on the short run stock market performance following 
M&A announcements based on the efficient market hypothesis. 
2.3.2 Short run empirical evidence on the changes in shareholder wealth 
following M&A 
This Section documents the empirical evidence on the returns to shareholders of target 
and acquiring firms in the short run. Short run returns here refers to the returns earned 
by the shareholders of the target and acquirer firms in the short event window 
(generally a maximum period of one month) surrounding the announcement date of 
the M&A. The reviews of extant studies in the next two sub-sections are broadly 
divided into the US, the UK and continental Europe. Following Bruner (2002), 
Sudarsanam (2003) and Campa and Hernando (2004), in this study I conduct a meta- 
analysis of the empirical evidence on the announcement period returns for the target 
and acquirer firms in Table 2.2. The meta-analytic approach provides an integration of 
several studies that addresses a set of related research hypothesis. In this meta- 
analysis the research hypothesis relates to whether the target and acquirer 
shareholders earn positive abnormal returns following the M&A announcements. 
Panel A of Table 2.2 provides the summary of evidence obtained from studies based 
on the UK and continental Europe; Panel B provides evidence based on the US 
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studies. Further discussion on the empirical evidences obtained from this table is 
given in Section 2.3.5. 
2.3.2.1 Discussion on the benchmark models used by the short run studies 
The extant studies that I have reviewed in Table 2.2 have used short run event study 
methodology to examine stock price performances. The abnormal returns (see 
Footnote 12 of Chapter 1, p. 17) are examined in the event study methodology using 
different benchmark23 models. From the review of empirical studies in Table 2.2 it is 
seen that most of the studies have used OLS market model as a benchmark to analyse 
the target and acquirer abnormal returns in the short run following the announcement 
of M&A. The reason for the popularity of the OLS market model is that it is well 
specified under a variety of conditions24 (Brown and Warner, 1985). Some studies 
have used a capital asset pricing model (CAPM), a mean adjusted model and a market 
adjusted model as benchmarks. In Chapter 4I describe the benchmark models that I 
have used in this thesis to determine the short run target and acquirer abnormal 
returns. I have also provided the justification for the choice of these benchmarks in 
Chapter 4. 
23 Benchmark models: The actual returns of the target and acquirer firms surrounding the merger 
announcements are analysed with respect to some expected returns. These expected (normal) returns 
are calculated using different return generating models. These models are known as benchmark models. 
The abnormal returns are the difference between these actual and expected returns (Brown and Warner, 
1980). 
24 Brown and Warner (1985) used a simulation approach to examine the impact of events on security 
returns. Using randomly selected securities and assigning a random event date to each security they 
analysed how the returns reacted around the event period. Their study showed that OLS market model 
are well specified under a variety of conditions. 
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2.3.2.2 Short run empirical evidence of target firms 
From the review of the studies in Table 2.2 it is evident that based upon the UK and 
continental European studies and also in the US studies target shareholders invariably 
gained from the announcement of M&A. The average cumulative abnormal returns25 
(CARs) of the targets are in the 20-30% range in most of the extant studies that are 
reviewed. This result is consistent with previous reviews of extant studies reported by 
Jensen and Ruback (1983), Datta et al (1992) and Bruner (2002). Antoniou et al 
(2007) document that these gains to the target shareholders are not surprising given 
the large premiums they receive in M&A. Such studies also reveal that the target 
returns are higher in multiple bids (Franks and Harris, 1989; Bradley et al, 1988) and 
when cash is used as the method of payment (Andrade et al, 2001; Danbolt, 2004; 
Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). They have attributed this to the bargaining power of 
the target firms under multiple bids. 
Overall the empirical studies of the UK, continental Europe and the US are 
unanimous in their conclusion that target shareholders gained in the short run 
following the announcement of M&A. Hence as Bruner (2002) concludes it is 
appropriate to say that an M&A transaction delivers a premium return to target firm 
shareholders. 
Despite the weight of evidence on target shareholders' returns following M&A there 
is a need to extend these findings to M&A in utility sectors. I shall discuss this in 
further detail in 2.3.2.4. 
25CARs are obtained by cumulating the abnormal returns over different event windows (Sudarsanam, 
2003, p. 90). 
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2.3.2.3 Short run empirical evidence of acquirer firms 
The evidence on the returns to acquirer shareholders is not very conclusive. The 
results from the extant studies reveal that the acquirer shareholders either earn 
negative returns or small positive returns around the announcement of the M&A. As 
Table 2.2 shows many of the studies have reported negative returns for the acquirer 
shareholders. 
Evidence presented in Table 2.2 also shows that acquirer shareholders earn more 
when there is a single bid for the targets compared to multiple bids (Franks and 
Harris, 1989; Bradley et al, 1988, Cakici et al, 1996). Antoniou et al (2007) also found 
that acquirer CARs are higher when they buy private and subsidiary targets compared 
to public targets. From the review of empirical studies on acquirer returns it is evident 
that the acquirer returns are much lower than the targets. However there is a lack of 
evidence on acquirer shareholders' returns following M&A of utilities. I have 
discussed this point further in 2.3.2.4 below. 
2.3.2.4 Implications from the short run empirical evidence 
This Section has reviewed the literature on shareholder wealth changes following the 
announcement of M&A. The studies on the short run stock price performance are 
based on the market efficiency paradigm. The general consensus from the review of 
literature on the short run announcement period change in shareholder returns 
suggests that target shareholders have earned significant positive returns following the 
announcement of M&A. The acquirer shareholders on the other hand earned negative 
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or very small positive returns. None of these studies however have examined the 
target and acquirer returns following M&A in the regulated sectors like European 
utilities. 
Historically for many years utility sectors in Europe were under state ownership. As 
discussed in Chapter 1 one of the consequences of privatisation, liberalisation and 
deregulation of European utilities in the 1990s was that it created the market for 
corporate control. Thus from the mid 1990 onwards (particularly after the removal of 
the principle of golden shares) utility sectors in Europe has witnessed a growing trend 
in M&A. This is the first time when utility sectors in Europe witnessed such a 
significant rise in M&A like their counterparts in non-regulated industries. Hence one 
possible reason for this lack of studies is due to lack of availability of data on M&A in 
utility sectors prior to the early 1990s. 
Moreover since utility sectors are regulated and they bear important influence on a 
country's economy so whether announcement of M&A in these sectors generates 
positive returns for the shareholders deserves important consideration. Thus one of the 
objectives of this thesis is to examine the change in stock price performance of the 
target and acquirer shareholders following the announcement of M&A in the context 
of M&A of European utility sectors. 
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2.3.3 Long run studies on shareholder wealth changes following M&A 
Subsection 2.3.2 above has reviewed the studies on M&A that examined the short run 
returns of the shareholders following the announcement of M&A. There are also a 
group of studies that have examined the long run post merger returns of the 
shareholders of the merged entity. These studies have examined the post-merger 
returns as part of a larger study focusing on announcement period returns. Like 
Section 2.3.2 in this Section I have conducted a meta-analysis to present the long run 
empirical evidence on shareholder wealth changes following M&A. This is shown in 
Table 2.3. In Panel AI have reviewed the studies on the UK M&A and in Panel BI 
have reviewed the empirical evidence on the US M&A. 
2.3.3.1 Discussion on the long run methodologies applied by the extant studies 
Table 2.3 shows that most of the long run studies have used Buy and Hold abnormal 
returns27 (BHAR) methodology to compute the long run returns (Loughran and Vijh, 
1997; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Megginson et al, 2004; Gregory and 
McCorriston, 2005; Conn et al, 2005; Dutta and Jog, 2009). This Table also shows 
that some of the extant studies have used Calendar Time abnormal returns 
methodology (CTAR). 
Finance literature documents some methodological debates surrounding the 
computation of long run abnormal returns. For instance Barber and Lyon (1997) 
advocated buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) methodology to determine the long 
Z7 Computational procedure ofBHAR and CTAR has been discussed in Chapter 4. 
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run abnormal returns while Fama (1998) advocated calendar time abnormal returns 
(CTAR) method. Fama (1998) argued that since the BHAR method do not take into 
account the cross sectional dependence of the individual firms abnormal returns under 
calendar time overlap of event periods; hence it generates mis-specified test statistics. 
Lyon et al (1999) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) attempted to resolve the 
methodological problems raised by Fama (1998) with the BHAR methodology. 
Mitchell and Stafford concluded that by using appropriate long run event study 
methodology the anomalies that were documented in most of the long run extant 
studies have been reduced. This study recommended the use of calendar time portfolio 
regression approach to determine the long run abnormal returns. 
Due to these methodological debates some studies like Conn et al (2005) and Dutta 
and Jog (2009) have used more than one method to determine long run abnormal 
returns. A more detailed discussion on the justification of the choice of long run 
methodology that I have used in this thesis is given in Chapter 4. 
2.3.3.2 Empirical evidences on the post acquisition change in shareholder returns 
Table 2.3 shows that almost all the extant studies (except Higson and Elliott, 1998) in 
both the UK and the US have documented the presence of long run post-acquisition 
abnormal returns to the acquirers. But most of the empirical studies have reported 
negative long run abnormal returns. Most of these studies have attributed the negative 
long run returns to some specific characteristics of M&A. I have discussed this in 
Section 2.3.5 below. Some studies have attributed these negative returns to 
methodological misspecifications (Agrawal, et al, 1992). 
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2.3.3.3 Implications from the long run empirical evidence 
From the review of long run studies on post acquisition change in returns of the 
combined firm shareholders it is apparent that most of the studies have reported 
negative returns. However none of these studies are based on regulated sectors like 
utilities. This thesis aims to address this gap. There are several reasons to examine the 
long run post acquisition performance of the shareholder returns following M&A of 
European utilities. These are as follows. First, as mentioned earlier, the increase in 
M&A of European utilities took place in the later part of 1990s when the governments 
in most European countries outlawed the principle of golden shares. The long run 
M&A study generally requires stock price data three to five years following the 
completion of M&A which meant less scope for earlier studies to conduct long run 
empirical research following M&A of European utilities. Since considerable time has 
passed following the surge in M&A activity in European utility sectors so the data 
over a longer period is available to conduct the long run M&A analysis. 
Second as outlined in Chapter 1 this research intends to examine the motives behind 
M&A of European utilities. I will discuss the theory and empirical evidence on the 
motives behind M&A in non-regulated industries in Section 2.4 below. Specifically 
this study aims to examine whether there is synergy, agency or hubris motives, or a 
combination of these motives, are present behind M&A of European utilities. This 
discussion of motives will remain incomplete until the firms' actual achievements of 
the intended outcomes of M&A are assessed. For instance if this research finds that 
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expected that the change in shareholder value in the long run post acquisition period 
would be positive. The aim of this research is partially to address this question. 
The third reason for examining the long run post acquisition returns of the 
shareholders of the combined utility firms relates to the nature of utility sectors itself. 
Since the regulators of utilities are guided by public interest considerations they might 
perceive any merger as anticompetitive. For this reason even in the post merger period 
the merged utility companies are under constant regulatory scrutiny (Loredo and 
Suarez, 2000). In this context I analyse whether the post merger shareholder returns of 
the combined entity are affected as a consequence of regulatory pressures. 
2.3.4 Empirical evidence on stock market reaction following M&A in utilities 
The review of the empirical studies on the short run and the long run stock price 
performance following M&A shows that none of these studies have examined 
shareholder wealth creation following M&A in utilities. In this Section I review the 
existing empirical studies that examined shareholder wealth following M&A in utility 
sectors. This is shown in Table 2.4 
These empirical studies on M&A in utilities are based on the US data. The studies of 
Leggio and Lien (2000) and Becker-Blease et al (2008) outlined that the primary 
objective of their studies was to examine whether M&A in the electricity sector 
following deregulation leads to value enhancing M&A. Table 2.4 also documents that 
the empirical evidence of M&A in utilities is in line with empirical evidence of M&A 
in non-regulated industries where target shareholders gained from M&A while 
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acquirer shareholders suffered losses (Bertunek et al, 1993; Berry, 2000; Leggio and 
Lien, 2000; Becker-Blease et al, 2008). 
However it is evident from Table 2.4 that although the target gains are positive the 
level of target gains is not as large as those earned in non-regulated industries. Leggio 
and Lien (2000) attributed this lower target return to the regulatory nature of utility 
sectors. The authors suggested that due to the economic regulation of utilities the 
acquirers of these utilities were reluctant to pay a higher target premium. This is 
because the acquirers were sceptical that the regulators might disallow the recovery of 
these target premiums by including them in the rate base31. Furthermore these studies 
revealed that the acquirer shareholders incurred lower returns than their counterparts 
in non-regulated industries. Leggin and Lien (2000) also suggested these lower 
acquirer returns are a result of the regulatory nature of utility sectors where the 
regulators frequently prevent mergers from taking place, and the small savings 
associated with these mergers. Bertunek (1993) and Ray and Thompson (1990) 
pointed out that the lack of prior experience of utilities in acquiring and integrating 
the merged companies is also another reason for the lower returns earned by these 
sectors. For the long run performance Becker-Blease et al (2008) documented that the 
post merger buy and hold returns of the electricity companies are either the same or 
worse than the control sample. However, all the studies that I have reviewed in Table 
2.4 are based on M&A of the US utilities, and especially the US electricity 
companies. Hence these results cannot be generalised for other utility sectors. 
31 This is specific to US utilities where utility sectors are subjected to rate of return regulation. 
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2.3.4.1 Summary and implications 
The results obtained in this Section on shareholder wealth creation following M&A of 
utilities are exclusively based on the US studies. The results show that similar to 
studies in non-regulated industries the empirical evidences on M&A in the regulated 
US electricity sectors also revealed that target shareholders gained while the acquirer 
shareholders suffered losses. However the level of target gains were lower compared 
to non-regulated industries. In general the authors attributed this lower target gains to 
the regulated nature of the electricity sector. However since the regulatory regimes are 
different in the US, the UK and continental Europe so it cannot be assumed that the 
results on shareholder wealth creation following M&A by the US electricity 
companies will also apply in the case of M&A of different utility companies in 
Europe. Moreover all the US studies on M&A in utilities are based only on the 
electricity sectors. In this study I will therefore examine the stock price performance 
following M&A of different European utility sectors like the electricity, gas, water 
and telecommunications. 
2.3.5 Determinants of the short run and long run shareholder returns 
The general review of M&A literature in finance on the short run and long run stock 
price performances in Subsections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 has revealed a variety of 
profitability drivers. Specifically these studies have examined the correlation between 
the shareholder returns with the type of M&A event that is announced. These studies 
have examined the correlation by taking the returns accrued to the shareholders both 
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in the short run following the announcement of M&A as well as in the long run 
following the completion of M&A. 
Firstly some studies have distinguished between domestic and cross-border M&A. 
These studies reported that shareholder returns are higher for domestic M&A 
compared to cross-border M&A (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000; Corhay and Rad, 
2000; Lowinski et al, 2004; Campa and Hernando, 2004; Conn et al, 2005). Empirical 
studies have provided several reasons for this outcome. Campa and Hernando (2004) 
attributed the lower acquirer CARs in cross-border mergers to the existence of 
cultural, legal and transaction barriers that prevails across different countries. Campa 
and Hernando also suggested that the acquirer shareholders are penalised for 
embarking in M&A in a foreign country. This is because the market perceives that the 
acquirer pays too much under cross-border M&A. Corhay and Rad (2000) attributed 
the lower returns in cross-border M&As to the difference in corporate governance 
structure that prevails across different countries. On the other hand Lowinski et al 
(2004) suggested that if European market is well integrated then there would be no 
difference in shareholder returns between domestic and cross-border M&A. However 
if the result shows that shareholders earn higher returns in cross-border M&A then 
that would suggest that there are imperfections in product and capital markets. Some 
studies also suggested that imperfect capital market would allow firms to exploit 
favourable exchange rate movements by moving operations into other countries or by 
acquiring foreign firms (Froot and Stein, 1991 and Kang 1993; cited in Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004). Imperfect product market would allow firms to capture rents that 
are not competitively priced. In both these cases shareholder value increase will be 
higher in cross-border M&A compared to domestic M&A. 
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Secondly, the review of empirical studies in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 also revealed that 
most of the studies have reported lower returns for diversified33 M&A compared to 
related34 M&A (Maquiera et al, 1998; Delong, 2001; Doukas et al, 2002; Megginson 
et al, 2004). Previous studies have attributed this result to agency issues. It is believed 
that under diversification excess cash flows are wasted on value decreasing lines of 
business (Doukas et al, 2002). Another reason for diversification is managerial 
optimism where the latter believe that their skills will be easily transferable to a 
different industry (Doukas et al, 2002). Furthermore creating or exploiting market 
power is also considered another reason for an increase in shareholder value under 
related mergers (Maquiera et al, 1998). 
However extant studies on M&A in utilities showed that the market reacted more 
positively for diversifying M&A compared to non-diversifying M&A (Bertunek et al, 
1993; Bums et al, 1998; Berry, 2000; Leggio and Lien, 2000). A number of 
interpretations of this result have been provided in the empirical literature on M&A in 
utilities. First the empirical evidence attributed this corporate focus anomaly to the 
fact that regulations placed on utilities force value maximising managers to seek out 
acquisitions of other utilities outside their own primary business rather than horizontal 
acquisitions (Bum et al, 1998). Secondly these gains primarily occur because of the 
attractiveness of "one-stop" shopping for energy services, overlap in distribution 
territories, and opportunities for information arbitrage, for example enabling electric 
utilities to learn from deregulation experiences of natural gas utilities (Berry, 2000). 
Leggio and Lien (2000) further found that the nature of a regulated industry and the 
33 Diversified M&A refers to M&A taking between firms operating in different lines of business. 34 Related M&A refers to M&A between firms that produce similar products and services (Hitt et al, 
2003). 
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fact that mergers require approval from regulators as well as shareholders also 
contribute to this result. 
Thirdly the empirical literature reported that target and acquirer shareholder returns 
are positively related to the relative size of the acquirer to target firms (Franks and 
Harris, 1989; Sudarsanam et al, 1996; Cakici et al, 1996; Fuller et al, 2002; Campa 
and Hernando, 2004; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Relative size refers to the ratio 
of the market value (MV) of the acquirer to the market value of the target firm35. 
Sudarasanam (1996) reported that a positive relation between relative size and 
shareholder returns suggest that when the target is smaller than the acquirer the latter 
is more willing to pay a higher premium. Moreover these studies also attributed this 
positive relation to the fact that the smallness of the target enables it to be more easily 
integrated with the acquirer. 
Fourthly the M&A literature has labelled the firms with low book to market ratio36 (a 
high stock price relative to book value) as growth firms or glamour firms (see 
Footnote 30, p. 58) and firms with high book to market ratio (low stock price relative 
to book value) as value firms (Fama and French, 1992; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; 
Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). Fama and French (1992) found that there is a 
significant relationship between book to market ratio and realised returns. Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) in the context of US M&A and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) in 
the context of UK M&A have reported that value acquirers outperformed glamour 
acquirers. They attributed this result to the performance extrapolation hypothesis 
35 Some studies have also taken the ratio of target MV to acquirer MV as relative size, e. g. Sudarsanam 
and Mahate (2003). 
36 Some studies like Fama and French (1992,1993) have used book to market ratio while other studies 
like Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) have used market to book ratio. 
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(Footnote 29, p. 58). This hypothesis relates to the over-optimism or hubris of the 
managers of growth firms. Due to this over-optimism the managers of these growth 
firms overestimate their abilities to manage a firm. On the other hand managers of 
value firms (low MTBV) are more prudent in approving an M&A. So M&A of these 
firms are not motivated by hubris and they create value from M&A instead of 
destroying it. 
2.3.5.1 Summary and implications 
This Section has reviewed the empirical studies of the determinants of shareholder 
returns. However most of these determinants of shareholder returns have been 
examined in the context of M&A in non-regulated industries. The deregulation of 
European utility sectors has removed the barriers to entry in these sectors. Due to this 
reason M&A in utility sectors have taken place beyond national borders. One aim of 
this research is therefore to examine whether the shareholder returns are higher for 
domestic mergers of utilities compared to cross border mergers. Moreover many of 
the utility firms have merged with firms in a different line of business, for instance 
electric companies merging with gas companies. Therefore I aim to examine whether 
related M&A of utilities would generate larger operational synergies compared to 
cross-border M&A. This result is likely to bear important implications from the 
standpoint of the investors of utilities who wish to adopt the strategy of domestic 
and/or cross-border M&A. Moreover the studies of Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) have examined the performance extrapolation 
hypothesis in the context of non-regulated industries. Their results therefore could not 
be generalised for regulated industries like utility sectors. Hence I will examine the 
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performance extrapolation hypothesis in the context of M&A in European utility 
sectors. Further discussion on the choice of explanatory variables to examine the 
determinants of shareholders returns is given in Chapter 4. 
2.4 Motives behind M&A: Theory and implication 
As outlined in Chapter 1 one of the purposes of this thesis is to examine the motives 
behind M&A of European utilities. Finance theory documents that there are three 
predominant motives behind mergers and acquisitions: synergy, agency and hubris 
(Bradley et al, 1988; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al, 2000; Lowinski et 
al, 2004; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). In this thesis I propose to test these theories 
on the motives behind M&A in the context of M&A of European utilities. So in this 
Section I discuss the theory underlying these three motives behind M&A. 
The Synergy hypothesis 
The synergy hypothesis proposes that acquisitions take place when the value of the 
combined firm is expected to be greater than the sum of the value of individual firms 
(Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988; Seth, 1990). So under synergy motive the combined 
gains of the shareholders of target and acquirer firms following the announcement of 
M&A will be positive (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al, 2000; Georgen 
and Renneboog, 2004). Hitt et al (2003) had identified four sources of synergy. 
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Table 2.5 Sources of synergy 





Related constrained Both operational and corporate diversification 
relatedness (rare capability, can create 
o ý) Vertical 




Unrelated diversification Related limited diversification 
r. 0 (financial economies) (economies of scope) 
W .0 
Source: Hitt et al; 2003, p. 188 
The rationale behind synergy generation in each of the quadrant as postulated by Hitt 
et al (2003) is explained as follows. 
High operational relatedness and low corporate relatedness: In these M&A synergy 
is generated through economies of scale and scope by exploiting the operational 
relatedness between organisations. Many extant studies have termed this synergy as 
operational synergy (Sudarsanam et al, 1996; Weston et al, 2001). This kind of 
synergy requires an overlap between products, activities and markets of the merging 
firms. In other words these M&As create the scope for vertical integration. Therefore 
firms that want to increase their market power typically embark upon this type of 
M&A. 
Low operational relatedness and high corporate relatedness: In this quadrant M&A 
take place between unrelated industries; for instance mergers between two 
conglomerates. Therefore in these M&A synergy is created from non-operational 
sources like managerial or financial synergy. Managerial synergy refers to cases 
where a more competent acquirer management takes over a target with less competent 
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managers. Financial synergy on the other hand is generated through M&A by 
matching the availability of investment opportunities and internal cash flows. 
High operational relatedness and high corporate relatedness: This kind of M&A 
creates opportunity for both operational and corporate relatedness as previously 
discussed. Thus it allows greatest potential for value creation. 
Low operational relatedness and low corporate relatedness: Since in this quadrant 
there is no relatedness therefore here synergy is created in the form of financial 
economies alone. This refers to the cost savings realised through allocative efficiency. 
Agency or the managerialism hypothesis 
The agency motive suggests that takeovers are primarily motivated by the self interest 
of the managers of the acquiring firms. Extant studies have advanced several reasons 
behind this motive. These are diversification of the management's personal portfolio 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981), use of free cash flow to increase the size of the firm (Jensen, 
1986), and acquiring assets that increase the firm's dependence on the management 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Amihud and Lev (1981) showed that managers of the 
firms engage in conglomerate mergers to reduce their employment risk. In 
conglomerate mergers a portfolio of businesses are created each of which possesses a 
different profile of risk and reward with the aim of reducing the total business risk. 
Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis suggests that managers prefer to use the free cash 
flows of the firms in M&A rather than paying it out to the shareholders. Marris (1964) 
cited in Seth et al (2000) also postulated that managerial compensation is frequently 
tied to the amount of assets under their control, so managers like to seek higher rates 
of growth in assets rather than profits. Since all of these M&A take place due to the 
71 
managers personal benefit at the cost of the benefit of the firm, therefore most of these 
M&A are argued to destroy value. This is because the managers knowingly overpay 
in takeovers as they embark on acquisitions to maximise their own utility at the 
expense of their firm's shareholders (Seth et al, 2000; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 
1993; Fernandez and Baixauli, 2003). Moreover the target shareholders realising their 
value to the acquirer management try to extract a higher premium by using their 
bargaining power. This leads to even greater losses to the acquirer shareholders. As a 
result under agency motive combined gains of the target and acquirer firms are 
negative (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al, 2000). 
Winner's curse or hubris hypothesis 
The hubris hypothesis first coined by Roll (1986) maintains that acquisitions are 
motivated by managers' mistakes due to overconfidence and that there is no synergy 
gain from takeovers. Managers of the bidding firms engage in takeovers because they 
overestimate the target firm's assets. Roll (1986) attempted to interpret the empirical 
results from various extant studies in terms of the hubris hypothesis. This study took 
previous empirical evidence about target firms, total gains and acquirer firms to draw 
support for the hubris hypothesis. Moreover the author also documents that under 
hubris M&A result in a transfer of wealth from acquirer shareholders to target 
shareholders. So the gains to the target shareholders emanate from the losses of the 
acquirer shareholders resulting in a zero combined gain. 
This Section has presented the theoretical arguments behind synergy, agency and 
hubris motives behind M&A as postulated by different extant studies. From the 
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discussion of the theories behind takeovers it is apparent that value destroying 
takeovers emanate from either agency motive or hubris. But the difference between 
agency and hubris hypotheses lies in the fact that under agency theory value 
destruction from M&A take place intentionally by the managers while in hubris this is 
not intentional. 
In Section 2.2 earlier I reviewed some extant studies that examined the motives 
behind M&A of utilities. However none of these studies have formally attempted to 
ascertain the presence of any or all of these motives in the context of M&A of 
European utilities. Since utility sectors are regulated the profitability of these sectors 
are constrained in several ways by the regulators. Despite this fact there has been a 
surge in M&A in European utility sectors after the mid 1990s. In this context one of 
the objectives of this thesis is to examine the motives behind these M&A. This 
analysis might have important policy implications as in future antitrust/competition 
authorities (see Section 1.3, p. 11 for definition) might be more vigilant before 
approving undesirable mergers (that is merger which are motivated by agency or 
hubris). Extant studies have document several ways to determine the synergy, agency 
and hubris motives behind M&A. In Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 below I review the 
empirical evidence on the motives behind M&A. 
2.4.1 Combined gains of target and acquirer shareholder following the 
announcement of M&A: Theory and Empirical evidence 
In the previous Section I have discussed the theory and implications of the three 
predominant motives behind M&A: synergy, agency and hubris. Empirical studies on 
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the motives behind M&A have applied two different methods to examine the motives. 
The first method is the combined gains approach and second method is based on 
correlation analysis. The purpose of this Section is to review the empirical evidence 
based on the combined gains method to examine the motives. Subsection 2.4.2 next 
will discuss the studies based on the second method. 
The seminal paper of Bradley et al (1988) defined the combined gain from M&A as 
the sum of the change in wealth of the shareholders of the target and acquiring firms. 
So the combined gains figure reveals the sum of shareholder value creation of the 
target and acquirer firms following the announcement of M&A. This is calculated as 
the weighted average of the total gains accrued to the shareholders of the target and 
acquirer firms surrounding the M&A announcement date. The weights are the market 
values of the firms prior to announcement date. As discussed in the previous Section 
the combined gains will be positive, negative or zero when the motive behind M&A is 
synergy, agency and hubris respectively. 
In Section 2.3.2 earlier I have reviewed the empirical evidence on the stock price 
performance of the shareholders of the acquirer and target firms following the 
announcement of M&A. Some of the extant studies in Section 2.3.2 have also 
examined the combined gains of the target and acquirer shareholders. In Table 2.6 1 
have documented the result of these extant studies on the combined gains (or losses) 
to shareholders following M&A. 
The general consensus from these studies is that synergy is the predominant motive 
behind M&A in non-regulated industries both in the context of US M&A as well as 
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European M&A. This is evidenced from the positive combined gains accrued to the 
shareholders. The US studies on M&A have reported the total gains in units of 
currency (million dollars). The synergy motive has also been reported by the literature 
on M&A of the US electricity sector (Bertunek et al, 1993; Berry 2000; Becker- 
Blease et al, 2008). However there is no evidence whether this empirical regularity in 
the market for mergers and acquisitions also holds for different utility sectors in 
Europe. 
It may be argued that due to the social welfare characteristics of utility sectors it is 
important that they merge only to generate synergies. Mergers that do not generate 
synergies are likely to be seen as undesirable from a policy perspective for any sectors 
but this is even more undesirable for utility sectors due to the nature of services that 
they deliver. Hence in this thesis I intend to examine whether M&A of utilities by 
European acquirers are motivated by synergy. This analysis has a vital significance 
from public policy perspective. This is because if the findings of this thesis show that 
M&A of European utilities are motivated by agency or hubris then regulators of 






(° CU U> t 4 ° o- 
- ) c- it 
j- rn 






'O b s" 
G) ý 
, C ¢+ vý ý 3 C) a) :öe Ao ti ce w° 
" 




;2 t J-. N .b '0 ö C sue., v, - 
w' 1-. 9 O ° Q) °- O p l O y ;r : v iO " v 
ýo aýý °ý"o c°ýý ý ä ý3 a. c`ýip U cu 0 "" = u2 - _ Ci, "c 




t u to En e} 3 u > 
o 
, 44 *= 
z xv i ° 'v, w° v, ý --ä a) 
J 
O ý" y 
U /1 ß 
c p 0 E -' E O 








rA "O U M 
:c 
ö 
y p 4) 
O 
"ýý 
' ^"ý 00 i CCS .r 










t- lu M 
C) 









> 00 = 










- 00\ ý 
b0 ä 





pip j "r 
Nie 
cý r- r- 
n 
ý.. ý, . >b 
0 
o 
cd to CQ o 
CA G. -,, 3 U oA 
>öQ, 
to ' w cc o 








Vi yý N 
to 
CIO 1. 
rn O O= 
ý'' 
O 
" w; i -tj U ce bA .ý 
TS 0-4 
W-4 00 



















p 00 O ýN pý 
C-4 a, 
tn 
"-ý cc y l--ý 
O 







CýýQ°` , 'ý0 
N 
2.4.2 Synergy, Agency or Hubris? 
In this Section I discuss the empirical evidence on the motives behind M&A in non- 
regulated industries based on the method proposed by Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993). This method examines the motives behind M&A by analysing the correlation 
between target gain (TG) and total/combined gains (CG) and between TG and 
acquirer gains (AG). Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) documented that in this 
method the simultaneous presence of two or more motives behind M&A for a sample 
of firms can be determined. The combined gains method discussed in the previous 
Section only determined the presence of any one motive behind M&A. Therefore 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) argued that only examining the combined gain 
might not provide a true picture of the motives behind M&A. They had put forward 
that even if total gain is positive for a sample of takeovers the acquirer gains might be 
negative for many of the firms in the sample. As indicated in Section 2.4.1 earlier 
synergy motive implies that there should be positive gains for both acquirer and target 
shareholders therefore negative acquirer gains will suggest presence of either hubris 
or agency motive along with synergy motive for such a sample of takeovers. Table 2.7 
shows the expected sign of correlation in the presence of the three motives behind 
M&A which are synergy, hubris and agency. The rationale and implication of this 
Table as outlined in Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and later by Seth et al (2000) 
has been discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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Table 2.7 Theory of gains behind M&A 
Correlation between 
target gain and total gain 
Correlation between target 
gain and acquirer gain 
Efficiency or synergy + + 
Hubris (winner's curse, 
overpay 
0 - 
Agency or managerialism - - 
Source: Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) 
This classic model of Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) for tests of M&A motives is 
later followed by several studies in the M&A literature both in the US and Europe. I 
have reviewed these studies in Table 2.8 below. Evidence from these studies show 
that synergy is the predominant motive behind M&A. However most of these studies 
have also reported presence of either agency or hubris or both along with synergy for 
their respective samples of M&A. But all of these studies have examined the motives 
behind M&A in the context of non-regulated industries. Therefore this thesis aims to 
extend this analysis in the context of M&A of utilities. The rationale for this analysis 
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2.5 Summary and discussion 
In this chapter I have reviewed two strands of literatures firstly on utility sectors and 
secondly on M&A. 
The review of literature on the deregulation of utilities provided a background to the 
nature of utility sectors and how utility sectors in Europe transformed from state 
owned enterprises to privatised entities. I have also reviewed the empirical studies that 
have examined the performance of utility sectors following privatisation and 
deregulation. This review highlighted the importance attached to utility sectors, and 
helps explain why research on these sectors requires serious consideration. 
The discussion of empirical studies of M&A in utility sectors across Europe revealed 
that all of these studies are based only on the electricity sectors. Moreover this review 
also brought to light the lack of study on M&A of European utilities from a finance 
theory perspective. Hence the gap in literature that has evolved from this review is to 
examine the change in shareholder wealth following M&A in European utility sectors. 
Moreover this review also showed that there is no evidence on the motives behind 
M&A of utilities from a finance theory perspective. I have presented the research 
questions on the basis of these gaps in the next Chapter. 
In Section 2.3 I have presented the existing studies on the stock market performance 
following M&A. The key issue that emerge is that there is no evidence on the stock 
market performance following M&A in utility sectors by European acquirers. From 
this review I have documented that there is some evidence on M&A in the electricity 
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sectors based on the US studies. These studies revealed that the returns earned by both 
the target and acquirer shareholders following the announcement of M&A were lower 
compared to those reported by the extant studies in the non-regulated industries. 
These studies have attributed these lower shareholder returns to the regulated nature 
of the electricity sectors. However since the nature of regulation in Europe differs 
from that in the UK so this result cannot be generalised in the context of M&A of 
European utilities. So study of M&A of European utilities requires separate 
examination. 
Finally in Section 2.4 1 have presented the theory and empirical evidence on the 
motives behind M&A from a finance theory perspective. This review revealed the 
methodologies applied by the empirical studies to examine the motives behind M&A. 
The general consensus from these studies showed that synergy is the predominant 
motive behind M&A in non-regulated industries. There is however no evidence on the 
motives behind M&A of European utility sectors. It is vital to examine the motives 
behind M&A of European utilities given the regulated nature of utility sectors along 
with their social and economic significance. Hence in this thesis I aim to examine the 
motives behind M&A of European utility sectors. 
In the next chapter I will discuss the key issues and observations of the literature that I 
have presented in this chapter. I will also present the formal research questions that 
this thesis will address. 
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Chapter 3 
Gap in literature and research questions 
3.0 Introduction 
As outlined in the previous Chapters the aim of this research is to examine the 
performances of European utility sectors following M&A from a finance theory 
perspective. Hence this research is situated between literature surrounding utility 
sectors on the one hand and finance literature on mergers and acquisitions on the 
other. For this reason in Chapter 2I have reviewed two strands of literatures first on 
utility sectors and second on M&A literature in finance. From this review some key 
issues and observations have emerged. In Section 3.1 below I discuss these critical 
issues and observations and thereby I discuss the gaps in these studies. 
In Section 3.2 1 present the research questions and discuss their respective hypotheses. 
Three research questions will be raised in this section. All of these research questions 
relates to an examination of M&A from a finance theory perspective but in the 
context of M&A of European utilities. Finally Section 3.3 concludes. 
3.1 Critique of extant studies and gap in literature 
In this section I discuss the critical observations and issues that have emerged from 
the review of literature in Chapter 2 and thereby I highlight the gaps in this literature. 
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1) The review of literature on privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation of utility 
sectors across Europe provided a background on how and why these utility sectors 
were transformed from state owned enterprises to privatised utilities. Some of 
these studies have examined the outcomes of privatisation and they reported that 
privatisation led to a reduction in costs and prices (Newbery, 1997; Parker, 1997; 
Parker, 2003; Florio, 2007) and higher returns to the shareholders (Parker, 1997; 
Dries et al, 1998). Jones (2001) captured to some extent the public policy debate in 
the UK surrounding the privatisation of utility sectors. This review demonstrated 
the plurality of studies that exist on the privatisation and deregulation of utilities. 
From this review of studies it is apparent that utility sectors are of great 
significance for various stakeholders like the consumers, the investors and the 
politicians and so study of utilities deserves important consideration. 
2) In Section 2.2 of Chapter 2I have reviewed the studies that have examined the 
mergers and acquisitions of utilities across Europe following privatisation and 
deregulation. A number of key issues emerged in this Section from the review of 
empirical evidences on the motives behind M&A of utilities. Firstly most of these 
studies have examined M&A only in the electricity sector. Since the rise in M&A 
in Europe has taken place across all the four utility sectors (i. e. electricity, gas, 
water and telecom) so this requires examination of the performances of all the 
utilities following their M&A. Secondly the study of Ghobadian et al (1999) and 
Ghobadian and Viney (2000) examined the motives behind M&A in utility sectors 
from strategic perspective. Therefore there is a lack of a similar study on the 
motives behind M&A of utilities from a finance theory perspective. Finance 
theory postulated three predominant motives behind M&A, which are synergy, 
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agency and hubris motives, and the empirical studies in finance have examined a 
sample of M&A in terms of these three motives. However there is no evidence on 
the motives behind M&A of European utilities on the basis of these three motives. 
Thirdly from the review of these studies I deduce that there is also a lack of 
empirical evidence on shareholder value creation following M&A of these utilities 
in Europe. Examination of shareholder wealth creation is central to the study of 
M&A in finance. Although the study of Freytag et al (2005) has examined change 
in shareholder wealth creation following M&A, this study has only examined the 
German energy utility targets. Fourthly none of these studies has examined the 
M&A of European utilities taking a very recent sample. Freytag et al's sample of 
German-US energy companies' M&A ends in 2002. Therefore as discussed in 
Section 1.0 of Chapter 1 the growing trend of M&A in different utilities by 
European acquirers also makes it timely to examine the performance of these 
sectors following M&A. 
3) The survey of evidence in the finance literature on shareholder wealth creation 
both in the short run and long run revealed that these studies are largely based on 
non-regulated industries. This is given in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2. For instance 
Campa and Hernando (2004) examined the short run announcement period change 
in shareholder wealth of the target and acquiring firms. In this study they 
partitioned their sample into regulated and non-regulated industries and found that 
returns to target and acquirer shareholders were lower in regulated industries 
compared to non-regulated industries. However this study did not include utilities 
separately within their analysis of regulated industries. Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004) looked into regulated industries separately but these consisted of only nine 
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firms which is hardly a representative sample. They found that acquirers in energy 
and financial sectors earned even more negative cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR)37 than other industries included in their analysis. However since the 
number of regulated firms examined in this study is small therefore this result 
should be considered with care. Moreover none of these studies have examined 
the long run post acquisition returns of the shareholders following the completion 
of M&A. Thus there is no empirical evidence on shareholder wealth creation 
following M&A in all the different utility sectors. Hence in this thesis I shall 
extend this analysis of shareholder wealth creation in the context of M&A of 
European utility sectors. 
4) From the review of long run studies on post acquisition performance in Section 
2.3.3 it is clear that most of these studies have reported negative returns for the 
combined firm shareholders. There are some issues that emerge from the review 
of these long run studies. As discussed in Chapter 4 there are some 
methodological debates associated with the buy and hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR). Fama (1998, p. 283) also reviewed a set of past studies that examined the 
long-term abnormal performance following corporate events (such as IPO, 
mergers, stock-split) and concluded that "consistent with the market efficiency 
hypothesis the anomalies are chance results, apparent overreaction of stock prices 
to information is about as common as under-reaction". Despite these arguments 
some studies on long run performance (like Rau and Vermaelen, 1998) have 
reported long run negative returns. However none of these studies have examined 
the long run returns in the context of M&A of European utilities. Hence in this 
37 Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are abnormal returns that are cumulated over some specified 
event days (MacKinlay, 1997). Detail discussion is given in Chapter 4. 
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study I will extend this empirical evidence on long run post acquisition 
performance in the context of M&A of European utilities. 
5) From the review of literature in Section 2.3 it is also apparent that there a small 
number of studies that have examined shareholder wealth creation following 
M&A in utility sectors. These studies are based on M&A in the US electricity 
sector. As I have mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, since the nature of regulation in 
utility sectors is different in the US and Europe so it cannot be conjectured that the 
US evidence on M&A will also hold in the context of M&A of European utilities. 
Moreover the US evidence is only based on electricity sector. Therefore there is 
clearly no evidence on shareholder wealth creation following M&A by examining 
all utility sectors. Since deregulation of utilities in Europe has encompassed all the 
different utility sectors so this calls for a need to examine M&A of all these utility 
sectors. So in this thesis I intend to study M&A of all the different utility sectors. 
From the discussion so far it is apparent that there is a lack of evidence on shareholder 
wealth creation following the M&A of different European utility sectors. Hence the 
first objective of this research is to examine the shareholder wealth creation following 
M&A of European utility sectors both in the short run following the announcement of 
M&A as well as in the long run following the completion of M&A. 
6) Furthermore the empirical studies on M&A have shown a number of drivers of 
shareholder returns. From the evidences on determinants of shareholder returns in 
Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 it is apparent that all of these explanatory variables have 
been examined in the context of M&A in non-regulated industries (except for 
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related versus diversified M&A which has been examined in the context of M&A 
of US utilities). Thus there is a lack of evidence on these determinants or drivers 
of shareholder returns in the context of M&A by European acquirers of utilities. 
The short run announcement period returns and the long run post merger returns 
that I intend to examine in this thesis will show the extent of gain or loss accrued 
to the shareholders. However in order to analyse the sources of these wealth 
creations it is essential to examine the determinants or drivers of these shareholder 
returns. This is the second objective of this thesis. 
7) In Section 2.4 of Chapter 2I have described that theory and empirical literature in 
finance have put forward three theories behind M&A which are synergy, agency 
and hubris. A small number of empirical studies in finance have examined the 
motives behind M&A on the basis of these three theories. The review of studies 
on the motives behind M&A demonstrates that the finance literature has used two 
different methods to examine the motives behind M&A. In the first method the 
motives have been examined by evaluating the combined gains accrued to the 
shareholders of the target and acquirer firms following the announcement of 
M&A. In the second method the motives have been examined by looking at the 
correlation between target gain and total gain and the correlation between target 
gain and acquirer gain. Most of the empirical evidence based on these two 
methods showed that synergy is the predominant motive behind M&A. However 
from the review of studies on the motives behind M&A it is apparent that none of 
these studies have examined the motives behind M&A of utility sectors from the 
perspective of the finance literature. Since utility sectors are guided by public 
interest consideration so it is important for a variety of reasons that mergers in 
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these sectors take place in order to generate synergies. Thus the third objective of 
this thesis is to examine the motives behind M&A of different European utility 
sectors by applying these two methods. 
3.2 Research Questions 
On the basis of the gaps in the existing studies that I have discussed in the previous 
section I shall now present the research questions that this thesis will examine. The 
three research questions are given as follows. 
Q1: What are the (a) short run and (b) long run wealth effects on the European 
utility companies that were engaged in M&A? Wealth effect of the utility 
companies will be examined (a) in the short run following the announcement 
of M&A and (b) in the long run following the completion of M&A? 
Q2: What are the determinants of shareholder returns? 
Q3: What are the motives of the utility companies to engage in M&A? 
Figure 3.1 below depicts these three research questions. The rest of this Section which 
provides a detailed discussion of these research questions are structured as follows. 
Subsection 3.2.1 presents research question Q1 and the testable hypothesis pertaining 
to this research question. In similar lines Subsection 3.2.2 discusses research question 
Q2. Finally Subsection 3.2.3 confers research question Q3 and the various hypotheses 
related to it. 
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Figure 3.1 Illustration of the research questions 
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The three research questions are illustrated above. As the figure shows, the first 
research question aims to examine the shareholder wealth creation following M&A. 
The boxes in the figure under shareholder wealth creation represent the two measures 
(short run announcement period change in shareholder returns as well as the long run 
post acquisition period change in shareholder returns following the completion of 
M&A) needed to answer this question. The purpose of the second research question is 
to address the determinants of shareholders' value creation following M&A, and here 
90 
the boxes represent the different deal characteristics upon which I have analysed the 
determinants of shareholder returns. In addition as the boxes depict two new 
explanatory variables privatisation and deregulation specific to utility sectors have 
been included in this study to examine the determinants of shareholders returns. The 
rationale behind inclusion of these deal characteristics are given in Subsection 3.2.2 
below. Finally the aim of research question Q3 is to determine the motives behind 
M&A of European utility sectors. Existing theory and empirical literature in finance 
has postulated three predominant hypotheses behind M&A, and these are shown in the 
boxes under the research question Q3. Hence in this study I intend to examine the 
motives behind M&A of European utilities from the standpoint of these three distinct 
theories on merger motives. 
3.2.1 Q1 (a): What are the short run wealth effects of the European utility 
companies that were engaged in M&A? 
This question will be answered on the basis of the theory of efficient market that I 
discussed in Chapter 2. The theoretical argument surrounding market efficiency 
suggests that if the capital market is efficient then the stock prices will incorporate 
any new information very quickly and effectively such that the stock price of a 
company at any time will reflect the market's best estimate (Fama, 1970). The short 
run event study methodology is based on this theory of efficient market. This is 
considered as the most reliable evidence statistically to gauge whether M&A create or 
destroy value for shareholders. Due to this reason as I have outlined in Section 2.3.1 
of Chapter 2 the short run event study methodology has been widely accepted by 
researchers in corporate finance to determine change in shareholder wealth following 
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merger announcement. The extant studies that I have reviewed in Section 2.3.2 have 
all applied this short run event study methodology38 to examine the short run wealth 
creation following announcement of M&A. 
Therefore following this general consensus in this study I will apply this event study 
methodology to evaluate the abnormal returns (if any) that are accrued to the target 
and acquiring firms' shareholders following the announcement of a merger or 
acquisition. As discussed in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 the theory of market efficiency 
suggests that these abnormal returns will reflect the market's best estimate, of the 
present discounted value of cash flows that would actually be generated from the 
M&A (Cornell and Morgan, 1990). 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) will be calculated over different event 
windows extending several days surrounding the merger announcement day. To 
ensure the robustness of the results I will use three benchmark models to calculate the 
short run cumulative abnormal returns. These are the market model, the mean 
adjusted model and the world market model. The rationales behind inclusion of these 
three benchmark models are given in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4. 
Hypothesis on the short run shareholder wealth creation 
As outlined in Chapter 1 in this research I hypothesize that in the short run following 
the announcement of M&A the abnormal returns accrued to the target and acquirer 
shareholders will be lower compared to that reported by empirical studies in non- 
38 The detail explanation on the working of the short run event study methodology has been discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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regulated industries. These lower abnormal returns would be due to the regulated 
nature of utility sectors (Leggio and Lien, 2000). Due to the social 'welfare 
characteristics of utility sectors the regulators of these sectors need to ensure that 
these sectors do not earn supernormal profits (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Due to this 
reason the acquirer shareholders will be sceptical when asked to pay a higher 
premium for the targets as they might not be able realise these higher premiums after 
the mergers due to regulation. 
In fact as discussed in the previous Chapters in the context of M&A in the US 
electricity sector Leggio and Lien (2000) and Becker-Blease et al (2008) also reported 
that the short run target and acquirers returns were lower than in non-regulated 
industries. These studies attributed this to the regulated nature of the electricity sector. 
In the context of US regulatory regime these studies argued that the regulators would 
disallow the acquirers to recover the premiums paid to the targets by passing it to the 
rate base. Even though the nature of utility regulation is different in the US and 
Europe nevertheless due to the very nature of utility sectors examined in this study I 
expect that the announcement period returns of target and acquirer shareholders will 
be lower than their counterparts in non-regulated sectors. 
3.2.2 Q1 (b): What are the long run wealth effects of the European utility 
companies that were engaged in M&A? 
While the short run announcement period stock price performance would help to 
determine the expected returns from M&A, the realised returns could only be 
determined by examining the long run post merger stock price performance of the 
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combined entity. As discussed in Chapter 2 the proponents of long run post merger 
studies have justified the need of examining long run returns by arguing that short run 
announcement period returns might not fully capture the wealth effect from M&A. In 
addition most of the long run studies showed that the short run positive returns in the 
announcement period do not persist in the long run (e. g. Agrawal et al, 1992; 
Antoniou et al, 2007). In fact most of the long run studies have reported that in the 
post merger period the shareholders of the merged entities have earned negative 
returns. Extant studies have termed this difference in short run and long run result as 
post merger `anomaly' (Agrawal, 1992; Fama 1998). This difference in returns 
between short run announcement period and long run post merger period might also 
hold true in the context of M&A of European utilities. 
Moreover the long run post merger performance will also have important policy 
implications for future investors of European utilities who might consider embarking 
in M&A. Therefore one of the objectives of this thesis is to examine the long run post 
merger stock price performance of European utility companies that engaged in M&A. 
The review of extant studies in Table 2.3 of Chapter 2 showed that long run post 
acquisition performances are typically examined for a period of three to five year after 
the completion of M&A. In this research I will analyse the long run returns three 
years from the M&A completion date. As many of European utility firms have 
completed their M&A very recently, five years post acquisition performance could 
not be analysed for all the firms in the sample. 
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This study will use two long run event study methods to ensure robustness of the 
results. These methods are Buy and Hold Abnormal returns (BHAR) and Calendar 
Time Abnormal Returns (CTAR). Detail description of CTAR and BHAR 
methodologies are given in Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4. 
Hypothesis on the long run shareholder wealth creation 
In this study I hypothesize that the long run post merger change in shareholder returns 
of the combined European utility firms will be negative. This hypothesis emanates 
from the review of empirical studies on post acquisition performance where the 
majority of the studies have reported negative returns for the combined firms' 
shareholders. Moreover in the context of M&A of the US electricity sector Becker- 
Blease et al (2008) found that in the long run post merger period the shareholders of 
the merged entities have suffered significant wealth losses. Following these empirical 
evidences in both regulated and non-regulated industries in this study I hypothesize 
that the shareholders of merged entities will earn negative returns in the long run post 
merger period. 
3.2.3 Q2: What are the determinants of shareholder returns? 
The first research question will answer the extent of gain or loss accrued to the 
shareholders in the short run and in the long run. However in order to examine the 
sources of these shareholder returns it is imperative to examine the determinants or 
the drivers of these shareholder returns. The objective of this research question is to 
examine the sources of these shareholder returns. 
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In order to determine the sources of shareholder wealth creation in this study I 
examine two regression models. In the first model I examine the sources of short run 
abnormal returns accrued to the shareholders of the target and acquirer utility 
companies. In the second regression model I examine the sources of long run 
abnormal returns earned by the shareholders of the merged entity in the post merger 
period following the completion of M&A. The purpose of these regression models is 
to investigate the short run and the long run abnormal returns with respect to six 
different characteristics of M&A. These six variables include privatisation, 
deregulation, degree of relatedness of utility mergers (for instance gas-electric merger 
or electric-electric merger), domestic versus cross-border M&A, the glamour status of 
the acquirers and relative size of acquirer to target firms. 
Regression hypothesis: The expected outcomes of the regression tests have been 
discussed as follows. 
" First one of the objectives of this thesis is to analyse the change in shareholder 
wealth following M&A of European utilities from the time period starting 
from 1990 to 2006. This period also has witnessed the privatisation of utility 
sectors in most of the European countries. But all the European utility 
companies that engaged in M&A were not subjected to privatisation. Some of 
these companies were under private ownership since their inception. Hence in 
this thesis I aim to examine whether the shareholder returns are higher for 
those utility companies that were subject to privatization. This result might 
have important implications from the standpoint of the investors and 
regulators of M&A. This is because this result will reveal whether utility firms 
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that are subject to privatization are more adept to the strategy of M&A in 
terms of generating shareholders' wealth. 
" Second this study examines whether the shareholders returns are explained by 
the level of deregulation of different utility sectors in different European 
countries. The extant studies in Chapter 2 showed that deregulation of utilities 
acted favourably for the shareholders as they earned higher returns (Parker, 
1997; Dnes et al, 1998; Boardman and Laurin, 1998; Robinson and Taylor, 
1998; Parker 2003, Florio, 2007). Hence in this research I posit that the market 
will respond positively towards M&A of those utilities which are fully 
deregulated in their respective home country. Another reason for this 
hypothesis is that M&A of utilities that operate in a partially regulated setting 
might not bring the investors their desired returns. This is because the 
investors might be under the pressure from the regulatory agencies. The 
regulators might cause a lengthy wait of regulatory review for the merger to be 
completed. Moreover the regulators might impose conditions on mergers 
which may further reduce potential increases in shareholder value. 
Furthermore the shareholders of the acquiring firms may have little incentive 
to take on the added risk associated with a merger (Leggio and Lien, 2000). 
This is because the regulator may disallow the recovery of premiums paid to 
targets. For this reason the acquirers will have no incentive to pay a premium 
over market value for a target. Due to these several factors the acquirer returns 
might be affected under partial or full regulation. So this study posits that the 
short run CARs and the long run combined BHARs will be positively related to 
deregulation. 
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" Third in this thesis I aim to examine whether shareholder wealth creation is 
higher for domestic or cross-border M&A. As discussed in Chapter 2 there are 
several extant studies that have examined these deal characteristics in the 
context of M&A in non-regulated industries. These studies have provided 
mixed arguments on the impact of this deal characteristic on shareholder 
returns. This study aims to examine this deal characteristic in the context of 
M&A of European utility sectors. Empirical studies on M&A of European 
utilities suggest that the small size of many European countries will prevent 
the generation of potential synergies from M&A under domestic mergers 
(Loredo and Suarez, 2000). Since utility sectors are large capital intensive 
industries so it is likely that the potential for synergy in terms of economies of 
scale and scope are higher for cross-border M&A in comparison to domestic 
M&A. Hence the testable hypothesize concerning this explanatory variable is 
that the market will react more favourably for M&A of European utilities 
under cross-border M&A compared to domestic M&A. 
" Fourth I attempt to examine whether the shareholders' wealth creation are 
explained by the degree of relatedness of M&A in European utility sectors. 
Degree of relatedness here refers to whether the M&A has taken place within 
same sector (for instance electric-electric mergers) or different utility sectors 
(for instance gas-electric mergers). As discussed in Section 2.3.5 of Chapter 2 
extant literature has reported two varying evidence of shareholder returns with 
respect to the degree of relatedness of M&A for regulated and non-regulated 
industries. In this thesis I intend to extend this case in the context of M&A of 
European utility sectors. 
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" Fifth from the survey of literature in Chapter 2 it has been identified that some 
extant studies have reported that shareholder returns are explained by the value 
or glamour status of the acquirers. Particularly these studies have showed that 
shareholders returns are higher for value acquirers compared to glamour 
acquirers in the long run post merger period (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; 
Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). These extant studies attributed this 
phenomenon to performance extrapolation hypothesis. (Please refer to 
Footnote 29, p. 58 of Chapter 2 for its definition). From the definition of 
performance extrapolation hypothesis it is apparent that if this hypothesis 
holds then it will imply that glamour acquirers have engaged in M&A due to 
managerial hubris. Therefore this is one way of determining hubris behind 
M&A. The extant studies also contend that the performance extrapolation 
hypothesis will hold in the long run post merger period because markets will 
take some time to reassess the quality of the acquirers. Therefore empirical 
studies suggest that the correlation between shareholder returns with respect to 
value versus glamour M&A will be positive in the short run and negative in 
the long run. In the thesis therefore I intend to examine whether this 
performance extrapolation hypothesis will hold in the context of M&A of 
European utilities. 
" Sixth empirical studies have shown that relative size of acquirer to target firms 
acts as a proxy for acquisition risk (e. g. Sudarsanam et al, 1996; Campa and 
Hernando, 2004; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). These studies hypothesized 
that when the target firms are smaller than the acquirers it assists in the post 
acquisition integration and thereby helps to realise the potential synergies from 
the mergers. Moreover the larger the target size the greater will be the 
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financial distress in case of failed acquisition. This thesis aims to examine this 
hypothesis in the context of M&A of European utilities. 
This is first study that has attempted to examine whether shareholder wealth creation 
following M&A of European utility sectors are explained by the different 
characteristics of M&A. If the findings suggest any significant association of these 
different M&A characteristics with shareholder returns then it will have important 
policy implications for the investors of utilities. Specifically these findings might 
influence the investors in undertaking important strategic decisions pertaining to 
M&A of European utility sectors. 
3.2.4 Q3: What are the motives of the utility companies to engage in M&A? 
This question will be answered in the light of the three theories of motives behind 
M&A that has been postulated by the finance literature. These theories are synergy, 
agency and hubris. Following the empirical literature in finance discussed in this 
thesis I will use two different methods to examine the motives behind M&A. First the 
motives will be analysed by looking at the weighted average of the combined gains of 
the target and acquirer firms in the twenty one days event window surrounding the 
announcement date. The weights are the market values of the firms taken two months 
prior to the event announcement date. Following the definition of the three motives 
discussed in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 this study would identify the presence of 
synergy, agency or hubris motives behind M&A of European utilities if the combined 
gain is positive, negative or zero respectively. 
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The second method that has been used to examine the motives follows from the model 
of Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) presented in Table 2.7 of Chapter 2. Berkovitch 
and Narayanan posited that there might be a simultaneous existence of more than one 
motives behind M&A. The combined gain figure would not be able to reveal this. 
Hence this research will look into the correlation between target gain and total gain 
and the correlation between target gain and acquirer gain to determine the presence of 
two or more motives behind M&A of European utilities. Detailed discussion of the 
two methodologies pertaining to the examination of motives behind M&A will be 
undertaken in Section 4.2.4 of Chapter 4. 
Next I will discuss the different testable hypotheses of synergy, agency or hubris or a 
combination of them which are postulated by different empirical studies. 
Presence of synergy motive 
The synergy hypothesis proposes that M&A take place when the value of the 
combined firm is greater than the sum of the values of the individual firms. Thus 
under synergy motive the average total gain of a sample of European utility firms that 
are engaged in M&A will be positive. Moreover under synergy motive there would be 
a positive correlation between target gain and total gain. Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993) argued that the positive correlation would generate from the bargaining power 
of the target firms. This bargaining power could either stem from resistance of the 
target or from competition among potential acquirers for the target. Berkovitch and 
Narayanan argued that under the presence of such bargaining power the target gain 
will increase with total gain leading to a positive correlation. Therefore in this thesis if 
101 
the results indicate that either the total gain is positive or there is also a positive 
correlation between target gain and total gain then presence of synergy motive behind 
M&A of European utility sectors can be concluded. 
Presence of agency motive 
The definition of agency motive suggests that managers of the acquiring firms engage 
in M&A in order to maximise their own self interest at the expense of the 
shareholders. Thus if there is the presence of agency motive then mean total gain of 
the sample of European utilities that embarked in M&A will be negative. Moreover 
the target shareholders realising their value to the acquirer management will tend to 
extract a higher premium from the acquirer managers. Thus the target gain might be 
positive even when the total gain is negative. Here the losses to the acquirers are more 
than offset by the gains to the target firms leading to negative total gains. The more 
severe the agency problem the higher will be the target gain. Since the total gain is 
negative therefore under agency motive there will be a negative correlation between 
target gain and total gain. From this discussion it is evident that in the context of 
M&A of European utility sectors if the findings of this thesis suggest that either the 
combined gain is negative or there is a negative correlation between target gain and 
total gain then presence of agency motive can be deduced. 
Presence of hubris 
Hubris theory contend that there are no gains from M&A and takeovers take place due 
to acquirer managers' overconfidence/mistakes in estimating the potential gains from 
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M&A. Hence if there is hubris behind M&A of European utilities then mean total gain 
will be zero. But even under the presence of hubris the target shareholders would 
extract some premium from the acquirer shareholders. Due to this reason under hubris 
motive there is a transfer of wealth from acquirer to target shareholders. Since the 
total gain is zero hence under hubris there would be no correlation between target 
gain and total gain. Hence presence of hubris can be identified if the findings either 
indicate that there is zero total gain from M&A or there is zero correlation between 
target gain and total gain. 
So far the discussion on the motives behind M&A have been designed to examine the 
presence of synergy, agency or hubris motives by testing the correlation between 
target gain and total gain. In order to determine the simultaneous presence of two 
motives behind M&A it is imperative to examine the subsample of positive and 
negative total gains. For this the sample of European utilities that engaged in M&A 
would have to be partitioned into a subsample of positive total gain and a subsample 
of negative total gain. 
Presence of synergy and agency motive 
As discussed above takeovers with positive mean total gain imply synergy and 
takeovers with negative mean total gain imply agency. Therefore under synergy 
motive there will be positive correlation between target gain and total gain in both the 
sub-samples of positive total gain and negative total gain. Similarly under agency 
motive there would be negative correlation between target gain and total gain in both 
the sub-sample of positive total gain and subsample of negative total gain. Hence if 
there is a positive correlation between target gain and total gain in the positive total 
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gains subsample and negative correlation between target gain and total gain in the 
negative total gains subsample then it would imply simultaneous presence of both 
synergy and agency motives behind M&A. In this thesis I intend to examine whether 
there is simultaneous presence of synergy and agency motives in the context of M&A 
of European utility sectors. To further this objective the sample of total gains will be 
partitioned into subsamples of positive and negative total gains. Further discussion of 
this methodology is given in Section 4.2.4 of Chapter 4. 
Presence of agency and hubris motive 
By definition, if we observe agency motive the mean total gain of a sample of M&A 
will be negative. To determine the presence of agency and hubris motive behind 
M&A in the sample of European utilities it is necessary to analyse the correlation 
between target gain and total gain in the subsample of negative total gain. This is 
because since agency motive implies negative total gain so it is evident that there will 
be no presence of agency motive in the sub-sample of positive total gain. In this study 
if the result indicates that in the subsample of negative total gain the correlation 
between target gain and total gain is zero then simultaneous presence of both agency 
and hubris motives behind M&A can be concluded. 
Presence of both synergy and hubris motive 
To determine the presence of synergy and hubris motive behind M&A in the sample 
of European utilities it is necessary to analyse the correlation between target gain and 
acquirer gain in the Subsample of positive total gain. This is because since synergy 
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implies positive total gain so it is evident that there will be no presence of synergy 
motive in the sub-sample of negative total gain. 
In the positive total gain subsample it is possible that there is a subgroup of acquirers 
whose gains are negative39. In the positive total gain subsample if there 
is positive 
correlation between target gain and acquirer gain for the subgroup of acquirers with 
positive gains (evidence of synergy) and negative correlation between target gain and 
acquirer gain for the sub-group of acquirers with negative gains (evidence of 
hubris) 
then this would imply the coexistence of synergy and hubris motive. Since hubris 
motive imply that there is zero total gain therefore under hubris motive there is a 
transfer of wealth from acquirer to target shareholders. Thus under hubris motive the 
amount of positive gain accrued to the target shareholders is exactly the amount of 
negative gain or loss that is borne by the acquirer shareholders. So in the presence of 
hubris motive there will be negative correlation between target and acquirer gain for 
the subgroup of acquirers with negative gain. Therefore given this argument in this 
study I set to examine the correlation between target gain and acquirer gain in the 
positive total gain Subsample to determine the simultaneous presence of synergy 
motive and hubris behind M&A of European utility sectors. 
The findings on the motives behind M&A of European utility sectors will have 
important policy implications from regulatory perspective. Specifically if the results 
of this thesis suggest that M&A of European utility sectors are caused by agency 
motive or managerial hubris then it would signal the regulatory bodies to be more 
vigilant in future and prevent such undesirable M&A from taking place. 
39 Since total gain is a sum of target gain and acquirer gain therefore in the subgroup of acquirer whose 
gains are negative, positive total gain emanates from positive target gain. In this case the negative gains 
of the acquirers are outweighed by the positive gains of the target resulting in a positive total gain. 
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3.3 Summary 
In this Chapter I have firstly presented a critique of the extant literature that were 
reviewed in Chapter 2 and have highlighted the key issues and gaps in these studies. 
Firstly from the review of literature it is evident that there is a lack of evidence on 
how the M&A of European utilities had an impact on the shareholders' wealth both in 
the short run and in the long run. Secondly none of these studies have examined the 
motives behind M&A of European utilities from finance theory perspective. 
Specifically finance literature has documented three predominant theories behind 
M&A which are synergy, agency and hubris. But there is no empirical literature that 
has examined the M&A of the European utilities on the basis of these three motives. 
Overall the review of studies document that there is a good number of empirical 
studies that have examined the market for corporate control in finance literature. 
However none of these studies have examined this in the context of M&A of 
European utility sectors. Since the utility sectors are regulated and they have 
important social welfare characteristics hence impact of M&A in these sectors 
requires serious consideration. In this context the objectives of this thesis is to 
examine (a) how the M&A of European utility sectors had an impact on the 
shareholders wealth (b) the source of shareholders' gains or losses from these M&A 
and (c) the motives behind these M&A. 
Based on these objectives Section 3.2 presented the three research questions that this 
thesis will address. In this Section I have also outlined the proposed methodology and 
their respective hypotheses. 
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The methodology that will be used to address the three research questions has been 
discussed in Chapter 4 and the results have been discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology and Data collection 
4.0 Introduction 
In Chapter 3I have presented the three research questions that this thesis aims to 
address. Broadly the purpose of this thesis is to examine the M&A of European utility 
sectors from the perspective of finance theory. Specifically this research proposes to 
examine three different areas pertaining to M&A of European utility sectors. Firstly I 
examine how the M&A of European utility sectors have affected the shareholders' 
wealth. Secondly I intend to study the determinants or the sources of changes to 
shareholders' wealth. Thirdly I look into the motives behind M&A in utility sectors. 
Given these research objectives the purpose of this Chapter is to discuss the different 
methodologies that have been implemented to answer these questions. However 
before moving into the detailed discussion of the methodologies this Chapter first 
presents the philosophical perspective of this research and provides a broad 
justification behind the chosen research design. This is presented in Section 4.1. 
Section 4.2 presents the various methodologies to address the three research question 
and also discusses the underlying principles behind these chosen methodologies. 
Specifically Subsection 4.2.1 discusses the measurement of short run stock price 
performance using different benchmark models. Subsection 4.2.2 examines the 
methodologies for the measurement of long run stock price performance. Subsection 
4.2.3 presents the discussion of methodology to address the second research question 
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on the determinants of shareholder returns. Subsection 4.2.4 exhibits the two 
approaches to determine the motives behind M&A of European utilities. Section 4.3 
discusses the source of data collection and sample selection process. Section 4.4 
concludes. 
4.1 The philosophical perspective: justification behind the chosen methodology 
The purpose of this Section is firstly to discuss the different philosophical traditions of 
research design. Secondly I establish where my research is positioned within these 
different philosophical traditions. In doing so I shall present the justification for my 
chosen research design. 
Broadly there are two philosophical traditions in social science research (a) positivism 
and (b) social constructionism (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). Positivism by definition 
suggests that social world exists externally and its properties should be measured 
externally through objective methods rather than subjectively through sensation, 
intuition or reflection (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). Social constructionism on the 
other hand suggests that reality is determined by people rather than by objective or 
external factors. 
Given these two philosophical traditions Crotty (1998) outlined that a research 
process involves four elements. This is shown in Table 4.1 below. 
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Table 4.1 Philosophy of research process 
Epistemology: Theoretical 
Methodology: 
plan of strategy 
Methods: 
technique or 
way of perspective: , action that lies procedure used 
to 
understanding philosophical behind the choice 
gather or analyse 
and explaining stance that lies use of and 
data related to 
'how we know behind the chosen particular 
some research 
what we know' methodology methods 
question or 
hypothesis 
Positivism and social constructionism are the two broad epistemologies under which 
different social science researches are situated (Crotty, 1998). Crotty (op. cit. ) also 
showed that there are several theoretical perspectives that can be categorised under 
the broad philosophy of positivism and social constructionism. Similarly there are 
several methodologies and methods that fall under the different theoretical 
perspectives. 
As discussed in the previous Chapters the objective of this thesis is to examine the 
M&A of European utility sectors from finance theory perspective. In the words of 
Franfurter and McGoun (2000), "The methodology of financial economics in general 
and research in market efficiency in particular, is unmistakably the methodology of 
positive economics as invented by Friedman (1953)... ". The theory of positive 
economics in its turn as postulated in the book "The Methodology of Positive 
Economics" by Friedman (1953, p. 5 cited in www. wikipedia. org, May 2010) states 
that "... economics as science should be free of normative judgments for it to be 
respected as objective and to inform normative economics. Normative judgments 
frequently involve implicit predictions about the consequences of different policies. " 
From this discussion it is apparent that research in finance entails a positivist 
epistemology. Given this argument of positivist epistemology underlying the research 
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in financial economics tradition, the dominant trend in financial economics research 
has been to adopt this positivist research paradigm. In fact the existing finance 
literature on M&A that I have reviewed in Chapter 2 has examined the value changes 
realised through M&A by adopting a positivist/objectivist approach entailing 
numerical data analysis. 
As outlined in the previous Chapters in this study the first research question I aim to 
examine is the change in shareholder wealth in the context of M&A of European 
utility sectors. Both the short run announcement period as well as long run post 
acquisition period changes in shareholder wealth following M&A will be examined. 
The short run announcement period change in shareholder wealth creation in based on 
the theory of efficient markets which I have discussed in Chapter 2. In order to 
examine the realised returns following M&A I intend to examine the long run post 
acquisition performance. So the first research question will be addressed following a 
quantitative approach which falls under the spectrum of positivist research. 
The second research question that I have presented in Chapter 3 is to examine the 
determinants of the shareholder wealth creation with the types of M&A. To address 
this question I have used two multiple regression analyses. The aim of this multiple 
regression is to establish causality. Specifically I shall examine whether the change in 
shareholder wealth creation following M&A can be explained by different 
characteristics of M&A. 
The third research question is to analyse the motives behind M&A of European utility 
sectors. Three distinct theories have been postulated in finance literature on the 
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motives behind M&A which are synergy, agency and hubris. To examine these 
motives existing finance literature has employed two different methods. These 
methods are the combined gains methods and the regression approach. Hence 
following this existing finance literature in this thesis I have applied these methods to 
examine the motives behind M&A in the context of European utility sectors. In 
Section 4.2.4 1 have discussed these methods in detail. 
Therefore taken together the research questions I intend to address in this thesis are 
positioned under the positivist research tradition. Specifically I adopt a quantitative 
approach following existing finance literature on M&A to examine the three research 
questions on M&A of European utility sectors. The philosophical perspective behind 
the chosen methodologies is presented in Table 4.2 below. 





Positivism: social world 
exists externally and so 
its properties should be 
measured through 
Finance Event study Numerical data 
objective methods rather 
theory methodology and 
analysis 
than subjectively perspective regression analysis 
through sensation, 
reflection or intuition 
4.2 Methodology 
The event study methodology has been used to address the change in shareholder 
wealth both in the short run after the announcement of the event and in the long run 
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post merger period. Event study methodology was first introduced by Fama et al 
(1969). This method examines changes in security prices in response to an event or 
announcement. Event studies help to examine how the flow of information to the 
market about an event affects stock prices (Sudarsanam, 2003). It is therefore a 
powerful tool for assessing the impact of corporate changes on the value of a firm. 
Event studies are used for two purposes (Sudarsanam, 2003). First it is used to test 
market efficiency and second it is used to examine the wealth impact of an event. 
In Section 2.3.1 1 have discussed that short run event studies are based on the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH). The semi strong version of EMH posits that in an efficient 
market security prices reflect all publicly available information (Fama, 1970). Thus 
following the EMH this study posits that the impact of announcements of M&A on 
shareholders' wealth will be captured by security returns following these M&A 
announcements. In this study the short run security price performance of the European 
utilities following M&A has been analysed using three benchmark models. The 
methodology on the short run event study has been discussed in Section 4.2.1. 
The long run event study (typically 3 to 5 years) test the security returns following the 
merger completion (Agrawal et al, 1992; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Andrade et al, 
2001). As discussed in Section 3.2 two long run abnormal performance estimators 
have been used in this research to ensure the robustness of the results across different 
model specification. The three year post merger performance has been examined by 
analysing the Buy and Hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and the Calendar Time 
abnormal returns (CTAR). This has been shown in Section 4.2.2. 
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For both the short run and long run event study methods I have taken equally 
weighted market index. This is because under value weighted index the null 
hypothesis of zero abnormal returns gets rejected very often (Brown and Warner, 
1980, p. 148). Brown and Warner (1980) also reported in their simulation study that 
there is no evidence that value weighted index will improve the power of the tests. 
Moreover Higson and Elliott (1998) reported that value weighted index might be 
driven by few large takeovers. 
To address the second research question on the determinants of short run and long run 
shareholders' returns I have conducted multiple regression analyses. I have discussed 
this in Section 4.2.3. To address the third research question on the motives underlying 
the M&A of European utilities first the combined gains of the target and acquirer 
shareholders have been analysed around the M&A announcement date. The second 
method that has been used to analyse the motives is by examining the correlation 
between target gains and acquirer gains and between the target gains and total gains. 
This has been discussed in details in Section 4.2.4. 
4.2.1 Measurement of short run stock price performance 
The short run stock price performance following the announcement of the event has 
been examined using daily stock price data. Under the short run event study 
methodology the wealth effect of a security following the announcement of M&A is 
obtained by calculating the abnormal returns of the securities surrounding the 
announcement date. As discussed in Section 2.4.1 of Chapter 2 the short run event 
study is based on the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). The efficient market 
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hypothesis posits that in the absence of any event announcement the securities are 
expected to earn normal returns. So presence of abnormal movements in share prices 
following the announcement of an event reflects the impact of the announcement of 
the event on the security returns. This is the reason why event study measure 
abnormal returns following the announcement of an event. This is in fact the essence 
of event study methodology. Brown and Warner (1980) posit that a security price 
performance can be shown as `abnormal' when it is compared to a benchmark 
(normal returns). The abnormal return is the difference between actual ex-post return 
of the security which is obtained over the event window and the normal or expected 
return of the firm that is obtained from the estimation window. The event window is 
the number of days where the abnormal return is calculated surrounding the event 
date. The event window in earlier empirical studies reviewed in Table 2.2 of Chapter 
2 normally extends from 11 days to 21 days surrounding the event date. This thesis 
has examined the abnormal returns on an 11 days (-5 to +5) event window 
surrounding the event date. Following Brown and Warner (1985) in this study the 
estimation window extends from -6 days to -244 days prior to the event date. The 
event window and the estimation window should not coincide in order to prevent the 
event announcement from influencing the normal performance model parameter 
estimates. This is shown in Figure 4.1 below. 
Figure 4.1 Illustration of event period and estimation period 
4 Estimation period r-Event period-4, 
Event date 
The normal or expected returns are determined ex-ante over the estimation window on 
the basis of different return generating models or benchmark models. Different 
benchmarks models make different assumptions about the expected (normal) returns 
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of the securities (Brown and Warner, 1980,1985). This study 
has used three 
benchmark models to determine the expected (normal) returns of the securities using 
daily share price data. These models are ordinary least squares (OLS) market model, 
the world market model and the mean adjusted returns model. The different 
assumptions of expected return under each of these three benchmark models will 
be 
discussed in the following Subsections. 
The reason for using OLS market mode140 is that it is `relatively powerful' and `well 
specified' under a variety of conditions (Brown and Warner, 1985). In addition in this 
study I have applied the world market model benchmark due to the following reason. 
Park (2004) argued that event study in a multi country setting should incorporate 
world market model as benchmark in order to capture the movements in global market 
index and changes in exchange rate. Since in this study the utility companies that were 
subject to M&A are from different European countries therefore following Park 
(2004) in this thesis I have applied the world market model. Finally in order to 
determine the robustness of the results obtained from these two benchmark models, I 
have used the mean adjusted model to determine the abnormal returns. 
4.2.1.1 OLS market model 
The OLS market model benchmark assumes that return of security i at time t is a 
function of market return at time t. This is expressed as follows: 
ao Brown and Warner (1985) used a simulation approach to examine the impact of events on security 
returns. Using randomly selected securities and assigning random event date to each security they 
analysed how the returns reacted around the event period. Their study showed that OLS market model 
are well specified under a variety of conditions. 
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Ri,, = ar +AR,,,,, + Ei, t (4.1) 
Where R,, t is the rate of return for security i on 
day t; Rm i 
is the rate of return on the 
equally weighted market portfolio on day t. In this study the sample of firms comes 
from different European countries and each country has different market indices. 
Therefore for each firm their respective countries' market index has been used to 
calculate the market returnRm, t . a; and 
ß; are the intercept and slope parameter for 
security i respectively; and c1, t is the error term for security i on day t. The parameters 
a; and ß; are estimated by regressing security returns R, t on the market return Rmj 
for 
the estimation period. The estimates of a; and ß; are denoted by 6 and ft 
respectively. ä and / are thereby used to obtain the expected return. Thus the 
expected return E(R,,, ) of security i at time t under the market model is given by 
E(R, ý)=ä+ftRmj (4.2) 
Hence as shown in Equation 4.2 under the OLS market model the expected return of a 
security is obtained by estimating the securities sensitivity to the general market 
movements prior to the event date. Denoting the event date as day 0, the estimation 
period has been taken from day -244 to day -6. The event period in this study has 
been taken from -5 days to +5 days surrounding the event announcement date. As 
discussed above the event period and the estimation period should not coincide so that 
the effect of event announcement is not reflected in the share price returns on the 
estimation period. So the estimation period is cut off at 6 days before the 
announcement to search for possible leakages of information prior to the 
announcement (Bertunek et al, 1993). 
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4.2.1.2 World market model 
The utility companies that have been analysed in this study are from different 
European countries. Thus for each security in the sample their respective local market 
index was used to estimate the abnormal returns in the OLS market model (given by 
Equation 4.1). In addition in the world market model Park (2004) incorporated the 
impacts of local market index, world market index and foreign exchange rate. Park 
reviewed several studies which reported that returns of a security are not only affected 
by movements in local market index but also by change in global market index. The 
reason for the influence of global market index on a security price return of a 
particular country is the integration of global capital market (Conn and Connell, 1990; 
Becker et al, 1996 and Chaumenton et al, 1998 as cited in Park, 2004). So in the world 
market model Park (2004) has incorporated the global market index to estimate the 
returns of an individual security. This is shown in Equation 4.3 below. Park (2004) 
also documents another factor that explains the stock price return. This is the foreign 
currency exchange rate. There are several empirical studies cited by Park (2004) 
which reported that stock returns of individual firms are significantly affected by 
movements in exchange rate. The economic logic behind this argument is that equity 
markets in most countries continuously readjust stock prices in response to 
simultaneous or lagged movements of foreign exchange. Hence to incorporate the 
impact of change in foreign exchange rate on the returns of security prices Park 
(2004) proposed to use the third independent variable to estimate the security price's 
return. This variable is the change in foreign currency exchange rate in the domestic 
country. Park showed that this world market model has more power in explaining 
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short run abnormal returns to events across different countries. The world market 
model is expressed as follows: 
Ri, r = ar + 
QliRLmr + ßz, iRw,,, r + 
ß3, iERj r+ Er,, 
(4.3) 
Here the parameters a, , 
ß1, r, /32,1 and 
ß3, i are estimated over the estimation period 
(-6 to 
-244 days prior to the event date) 
by regressing security return R,,, on the return of 
local market index RLmt, return on world market index Rwmg and ER, is the change in 
foreign currency exchange rate in country j at time t. This study has used FTSE-A11 
world index returns as the return on world market index Rwmt and the relative change 
of local currency in terms of US dollars as ERS,,. Under the world market model the 
expected return E(Ri, 1) 
is given by: 
E(Rr r) =ä+ 
ßi, rRLmf + Q2, iRw, nr + 
Q3, IERý, r 
(4.4) 
4.2.1.3 Mean adjusted model 
The mean adjusted benchmark model assumes that the ex ante expected return for a 
security is constant across time but can differ among securities. In this model the 
expected return E(R,, 1) 
for security i at time t is the average return of the security 
over the estimation period which ranged from -244 days to -6 days of the event date. 
This is shown as follows 
1 -6 
Rý, r E(R,,, ) = 239t--244 
(4.5) 
This model is consistent with capital asset pricing model (CAPM) under the 
assumption of constant systematic risk (0=1) for all securities and stationery optimal 
investment opportunity for investors (Sudarsanam 2003, p. 91). Both the OLS market 
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model and the mean adjusted model determine the expected return over the estimation 
period which ranges from -244 days to -6 days prior to the event date. However in the 
OLS market model the expected return is obtained by regressing the actual return of 
security i on market return over the estimation period while under the mean adjusted 
model the expected return of a security is the average return of that security over the 
estimation period. 
4.2.1.4 Abnormal Returns 
As defined in Section 4.2.1 above the abnormal return for each event AR,,, is the 
difference between the actual return Rt, t and expected return E(R,, t) 
AR,,, = Ri,, - E(R,, r 
) (4.6) 
The M&A of European utilities' data that has been gathered from SDC showed that 
some of the securities in the sample of both the acquirer and the target have identical 
event dates. Moreover in 50 percent cases in my sample of European utilities even if 
the event dates did not match the event window coincided for some securities in the 
sample. This phenomenon is termed as clustering in event study literature (Brown and 
Warner, 1980; Campbell et al, 1997; Collins and Dent, 1984). Under clustering when 
event windows overlap between two or more securities the co-variances between the 
abnormal returns may differ from zero and the distributed results presented for the 
aggregated abnormal returns are not applicable (Campbell et al, 1997). As a result of 
clustering of event windows the abnormal returns of individual securities may suffer 
from contemporaneous correlation problem (Collins and Dent, 1984; Brown and 
Warner, 1985; Mackinlay 1997). Contemporaneous correlation problem refers to the 
cross sectional dependence of the security specific abnormal returns. Collins and Dent 
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(1984) reported the degree to which the standard deviation of cross sectional sample 
mean is underestimated when correlation between return data is ignored. 
One approach that is applied under clustering of event date is the portfolio approach 
of Jaffe (1974). The portfolio approach is designed to take into account the correlation 
between abnormal returns of different securities. Under this approach portfolios were 
formed taking those securities whose event periods coincided. Therefore following 
Collins and Dent (1984) the portfolio abnormal returns are calculated as follows 
1" 
ARP, AR,,, 
n ; z, 
(4.7) 
where n is the number of securities whose event period coincided on day t. Only AR,,, 
of the securities were included for those securities whose event period did not 
coincide. 
The average abnormal returns (AAR) have been calculated across the N portfolios for 
the 11 days surrounding the event. The AAR are calculated as follows 
AR 
p, t + 
AR,,, 
AAR, = p=1 . =1 N 
(4.8) 
, N= N1+N2; t=T(-5), T(-4),..., T(0).., T(4), T(5) 
where T(-5) is 5 days prior to the event date and T(5) is 5 days after the event date. 
Here N is the sum of number of portfolios (for those securities whose event date 
coincided) and individual securities (for those securities whose event date did not 
coincide) that has been formed across various event dates. 
The short run wealth effects for the bidding and the target firms are measured by 
calculating the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) surrounding the 
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announcement date. The CAAR help to determine the overall inference of the event 
(Mackinlay, 1997). Moreover CAAR also helps to show the impact of the event over 
a multiple event window (Brown and Warner, 1980; Mackinlay, 1997). 
The CAARs are aggregated using different event windows. 
12 
Therefore CAARI1,2 = AAR1 , 
(4.9) 
CAAR,,, 12 
is the cumulative average abnormal returns from event window tl to t2 
where T(-5): 5 tl<t2 <-T(5) . 
The null hypothesis HO posits that there are no significant CAARs around the event 
announcement date for both the target and acquirer shareholders of the European 
utilities engaged in M&A. So CAAR(t,, t2) follows a normal distribution with mean 0 
and constant variance denoted by .2 (t1, t2). This is shown as follows 
CAAR(t,, t2) - N(0, cr2(t1, t2)) (4.10) 
4.2.1.5 Test Statistic 
Following Collins and Dent (1984) and Brown and Warner (1985) this study has used 
the time series standard deviation test as the test statistic to examine the statistical 
significance of AAR, and CAAR11, t2. This test uses a single variance estimate for the 
entire portfolio. The estimated variance of AAR, is calculated over the estimation 
period of 239 days starting from -6day to -244 day. This is given by 
E2 






AAR = 239 
Z AAR, 
t=-6 
The portfolio test statistic for the event date t is given by 
AAR` (4.12) 
aAAR 
The test statistic for CAAR,,,, 2 is given by 
CAARlt. 




Equations 4.12 and 4.13 test the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal performance 
is zero in the short run following the announcement of M&A. After running the 
regression of OLS market model and world market model for the sample of both the 
targets and acquirers it was found that Durbin Watson test statistic showed either 
presence of positive or negative autocorrelation in a small percentage of target and 
acquirer securities. Brown and Warner (1985) document that failure to take into 
account this autocorrelation could lead to misspecification of the test statistic. Thus to 
correct the autocorrelation generalised least square has been applied to the OLS 
market model and the world market model (Gujarati, 2003). This is given in Appendix 
A4.1 and A4.2. 
4.2.2 Measurement of long run stock price performance 
M&A literature in finance generally use two approaches to study the post acquisition 
performance. These are a stock-based approach and an accounting based approach. 
The accounting based approach is not commonly used since accounting data contains 
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much noise and is subject to earnings announcement (Healy et al, 1997). Hence this 
thesis has employed the stock based approach to measure the post acquisition 
performance. The three main ways of calculating the long term stock returns are the 
buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR), cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and 
Calendar time abnormal returns (CTAR). 
The BHAR approach is favoured by some researchers because BHARs are more 
consistent with the true investor experience than the CARs to determine the long run 
post merger monthly abnormal returns of the securities that engaged in M&A (Barber 
and Lyon, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999). As Barber and Lyon (1997) had put forward the 
differences between CARs and BHARs emanate from the result of monthly 
compounding. While CARs ignore compounding the BHARs include the effect of 
compounding. So an annual BHAR determines the yearly abnormal return a 12 month 
CAR does not readily translate into a measure of annual performance. This is because 
dividing the 12 month CAR by 12 yields the mean monthly abnormal returns (Barber 
and Lyon, 1997). In fact Barber and Lyon (1997) showed that CARs are biased 
predictors of BHARs. They showed that a sample of firm that have zero annual BHAR 
had a mean annual CAR of 5%. Therefore if researchers use annual CARs instead of 
BHARs they would wrongly conclude presence of abnormal returns when there is 
none. They refer this problem as measurement bias. Due to these problems with long 
run CAR this research has used the BHAR approach to determine the long run 
abnormal returns in the sample of European utilities engaged in M&A. 
However the BHAR approach does not take into account the cross-sectional 
dependence among sample firms. This problem has been taken into account in the 
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CTAR approach. Hence in this thesis I have also incorporated the CTAR in order to 
test the robustness of the result obtained under the BHAR approach. 
In the CTAR approach the average abnormal return is obtained for each calendar 
month for all event firms within the prior pre-specified investment periods (such as 1 
year, 2 years and 3 years). Since the event portfolios are formed each month so the 
cross-sectional correlations of the individual event firm returns are automatically 
accounted for in the portfolio variance at each point in calendar time. Thus the cross 
sectional dependence which might prevail under BHAR approach is taken into account 
in this method. 
Since the CTAR method takes into account the cross-sectional dependence of 
securities therefore this approach is an improvement over the BHAR approach. 
However Lyon et al (1999) document that BHAR captures the true investor experience 
but the CTAR does not precisely measure the investor experience. This is because 
CTAR takes into account the average abnormal returns of each calendar month for all 
event firms within the prior pre-specified investment periods (such as one year, two 
years and three years). Since both the approaches have certain pros and cons, the long 
run post merger abnormal returns have been analysed in this thesis using both BHAR 
and CTAR method in order to ensure robustness of the long run result across different 
model specifications. Lyon et al (1999) also recommended that in a particular study of 
long run abnormal returns both the BHAR and CTAR method should be used in order 
to ensure robustness of the results. 
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The long run post merger event window in both the BHAR and the CTAR approach is 
taken as three years after the acquisition completion month which is referred as month 
0. Majority of long run event studies such as Barber and Lyon (1997), Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) and Conn et al (2005) have 
adopted a 3-year event window. The rationale behind using a three year window is 
that acquisitions have a strong and extended impact on firm profile and this can be 
reflected in multi-year firm performance. 
Under both these approaches the three year post merger abnormal returns have been 
analysed by examining the monthly stock returns. Monthly return data is argued to be 
more appropriate than daily return data in long term event studies. This is because 
monthly data reduces many of the problems encountered using daily return data such 
as overstatement of the magnitude of abnormal returns because returns are 
compounded daily (Roll, 1983; Kennedy and Limmack, 1996). Similar to the 
measurement of short run abnormal returns, the long run BHARs and CTARs are 
analysed using some benchmark (normal) returns. The benchmark or normal returns 
are the returns which the firms are expected to earn in the absence of any event. 
4.2.2.1 Buy and Hold abnormal return 
The buy-and-hold abnormal return, or BHAR, approach measures the average multi- 
year return from a strategy of buying all firms involved with an event and selling at 
the end of a pre-specified holding period versus a comparable strategy investing 
otherwise similar non-event firms (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). The BHAR of 
security i for the holding period T is calculated as follow. 
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TT 
BHAR f, T = 




In Equation 4.14 R,,, is the return of security i at month t and E(R,, r) is the expected or 
normal monthly return based on a benchmark model. T is the number of months in the 
holding period that has been analysed following the event completion month. In this 
study 1 year, 2 years and 3 years holding period BHARs are analysed following the 
event completion month. 
The average BHAR (ABHAR) for the sample of N firms for a particular holding period 
T (1,2, or 3 years post merger) is calculated as follows 
ABHART =1 BHARI, T N , _, 
4.2.2.2 Benchmark model used to calculate BHAR 
Fama and Freanch (1992) showed that common stock returns are related to firm size 
and book value to market value ratio. So they suggested that any test for detecting 
long run abnormal returns should control for firm size and book to market ratio. In the 
BHAR approach I have taken a reference portfolio (also referred as control portfolio) 
based on size (market capitalisation) and market value to book value41 (MV/BV) ratio 
as benchmarks. The expected return E(R,,, ) for each security in the sample is the 
average return of the securities in the control portfolio that has been sorted from the 
list of firms in each sample security's respective market index. In this study the 
41 As outlined in Footnote 36 of Chapter 2 (p. 67) some studies have used book to market value as 
benchmarks (Fama and French, 1992,1993) while some studies have used market to book value as 
benchmarks (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998 and Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). 
(4.15) 
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control portfolios are determined from the list of the firms in the market 
index that 
matches closely to the sample firms in terms of size (market capitalisation) and 
MV/BV. To determine the size and MV/BV matching control portfolios first all the 
stocks listed in each sample country's market index have been collected. For each 
firm in the sample their respective country's stocks in the market index are ranked on 
the basis of their market capitalisation at the end of June for each sample year. Fama 
and French (1993) have selected June of each year so as to ensure that the book value 
of each stock becomes available. Following Fama and French (1993) this study has 
used June42 of year t to rank the stocks in the market index in terms of size and book 
to market ratio. These portfolios are again rebalanced in June of year t+1 to drop those 
stocks which have delisted and include those that have been newly listed. These 
stocks are then grouped into 5 portfolios. Stocks with the smallest market values are 
placed in portfolio 1 and stocks with largest market values are placed in portfolio 5. 
Each size (market values) quintiles is further divided into five subgroups based on 
their MV/BV ratio. Stocks with the smallest MV/BV ratios are placed into sub-group 
1, and those with the largest MV/BV ratios are placed into sub-group 5. This led to 
the construction of 25 size and MV/BV control portfolios. The control portfolios are 
constructed at June of each year and the returns are calculated from July of each year. 
Out of these 25 size and MV/BV control portfolios, the portfolio whose size and 
MV/BV matches closely to a sample firm's size and MV/BV on the M&A completion 
month is selected. The equally weighted average return of the control portfolio is the 
expected return for the respective sample firma3. 
42 Most of the extant studies that have used the reference portfolio approach have used June to construct 
the portfolio. 
43If the event completion month for a sample firm falls between January and June of year t then the 
control portfolio for each year has been determined by rebalancing the portfolios at June of year t-1, t 
and t+l (since 3 year BHARs has been analysed). If the event month falls between July to December of 
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4.2.2.3 Test Statistic for BHAR 
To test the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal performance is equal to zero for 
the sample of N European utilities the following test statistic has been employed 
ABHART 
tBHAR - a(BHAR,, r )/, N 
(4.16) 
In Equation 4.16,6(BHARi, T) is the cross sectional sample standard deviation of the 
individual BHAR for the sample of N firms. 
4.2.2.4 Calendar time abnormal returns 
The second approach that has been applied in this study to determine long run 
abnormal returns is the calendar time abnormal returns approach. This approach is 
strongly advocated by Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). This approach 
is specified as follows 
CTAR1,, =R1, t -E(R, t) (4.17) 
R,, is the return of security i at month t and E(R,,, ) is the expected or normal monthly 
return based on a benchmark model. 
year t then the control portfolio for each year has been determined by rebalancing the portfolios at June 
of year t and t+1, and t+2. 
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In each calendar month t, a portfolio from the sample firms is formed by including all 
stocks from the sample firms which have completed M&A in the past 12,24 or 36 
months. The average CTAR for the portfolio of firms in a calendar month t is denoted 
by CTAR t. This is shown in Equation 4.18. 
In the next calendar month t+l the portfolio is rebalanced to include new event firms 
that executed an M&A in the previous month and disregard those that have completed 
one-to-three years of their M&A. For each security in the sample their market 
capitalisation data and MV/BV ratio is collected on their respective event completion 
month. 




t i=1 N, 
(4.18) 
N, is the number of sample firms in the calendar month t. The monthly CTAR1 are 
standardized by estimates of portfolio standard deviation following Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000). The standardized CTAR, helps to control for heteroskedasticity. 
CTARI 
SCTAR, = aCTAR, (4.19) 
a- for a calendar month t is the standard deviation of the CTARs for the portfolio CTAR 
of firms in a particular calendar month t. The total number of calendar months is 
denoted by T. Therefore there are T numbers of o each for a particular calendar 




MSCTAR =-I: SCTAR1 T, 
=1 
(4.20) 
4.2.2.5 Benchmark model that is used to calculate CTAR 
The benchmark models that are normally used in the CTAR method are the reference 
portfolio approach, Fama French three-factor model or Carhart four-factor model. 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) identified that the Fama French three-factor model and 
Carhart four-factor model wrongly assumes that factor loadings are constant over a 
relatively long period. This is unlikely since the composition of event portfolio 
changes overtime. Fama and French (1997) have showed that different industries have 
different factor loading and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) document that corporate 
events tend to cluster through time by industry. Due to this reason the portfolio 
composition of event firms is likely to be heavily concentrated in a few industries at 
each point in time but in different industries over a long period. Hence assumption of 
constant factor loading can lead to biased estimation results under the Fama French 
three-factor and Carhart-four factor asset pricing models. Lyon et al (1999) further 
document that the Fama French three factor model wrongly assumes that there is no 
interaction between the three factors. They argued that this assumption is likely to be 
violated because they suggested that for small firms there is a significant relation 
between MV/BV ratio and small firms. Due to these problems associated with these 
asset-pricing models this study has used reference portfolio approach based on size 
and MV/BV as the benchmark expected return to determine the CTAR. Thus similar 
to the BHAR approach in this study I have used the reference portfolio approach to 
determine the CTAR. The construction of this reference portfolio is given in Section 
4.2.2.2 above. 
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4.2.2.6 Test Statistic for CTAR 





The denominator of Equation 4.21 is the standard error of the monthly standardised 
CTAR denoted by SCTAR in Equation 4.19. 
4.2.3 Determinants of the short run announcement period CARs and the long run 
post merger BHARs -multiple regression analyses 
The short run and the long run event study methodology discussed in Section 4.2.1 
and 4.2.2 would help to determine the gains or losses accrued to the shareholders in 
the short run following the M&A announcement and in the long run following the 
completion of M&A. The methodology discussed in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 could 
not explain the determinants or the sources of the short run and the long run wealth 
creation following M&A. This Section therefore presents two multiple regression 
models that would help to determine the sources of shareholder returns in the short 
run announcement period and in the long run post merger period. In the short run the 
CARs under the OLS market model has been used to examine the determinants of 
shareholder returns. Since the CAR results are consistent across all the three 
benchmark models so I have selected the CARs under the OLS market model to 
determine the shareholder returns. For the long run I have used the shareholder returns 
obtained under the BHAR method. 
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Multiple regression analysis allows the assessment of the relationship between one 
dependent variable and several independent variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996, 
Chapter 5). It gives the impact of each independent variable on the dependent variable 
while isolating the influences of other independent variables. 
The regression model that estimates short run cumulative abnormal returns of the 
acquirer and target firms as a function of several explanatory variables is presented in 
Equation 4.22. The regression model that estimates the long run three year post 
merger BHAR as a function of several explanatory variable is presented in Equation 
4.23. Equations 4.22 and 4.23 will specifically examine to what extend the different 
deal characteristics explains the shareholder returns. 
The regression model for the short run CARs is given as follows: 
CAR( 5, +5) =a + ß, PRIV + ßZ DEREG+ ß3 DOM + ß4 SSECT + ßs BIDMTB+ ß6 Log(RELSIZ) +e 
(4.22) 
CAR (-5, +5) is the cumulative abnormal returns accrued to the acquirer and target 
shareholders in the 11 days event window under the OLS market model surrounding 
the event date. 
Similarly the regression model for the long run three year post merger BHARs is given 
as 
BHAR =a+ß, PRIV +, 8, DEREG + ß3DOM + ß4 SSECT + ß5 BIDMTB + 96Log(RELSIZ) +c 
(4.23) 
The different explanatory variable taken in Equations 4.22 and 4.23 are defined as 
follows. The first explanatory variable is privatisation (PRIV) which is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has been privatised prior to M&A. The 
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second explanatory variable is deregulation (DEREG) which is also a dummy variable 
and takes the value 1 if that firm's respective utility sector is fully deregulated in its 
home country and 0 otherwise. Domestic (DOM) is the third dummy variable which 
takes the value 1 if the M&A takes place with a firm in its home country and 0 if the 
M&A is cross border. Same sector (SSECT) is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1 if the M&A take place between same sector (e. g. electric-electric or 
telecom-telecom mergers) and 0 if it is within cross sectors (e. g. gas-electric mergers). 
BIDMTB is the explanatory variable that examines whether shareholder returns are 
explained by the market to book value of the acquirer firms. Relative size (RELSIZ) is 
the ratio of market capitalisation of the acquirer to the market capitalisation of the 
target taken two months" prior to the event date. 
The following Subsections explain the implications of each of these explanatory 
variables that have been used in the above two regression Equations. 
4.2.3.1 Privatisation 
As discussed in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 this study hypothesize that returns accrued to 
the target and acquirer shareholders in the short run and the combined firm 
shareholders in the long run will be explained by the explanatory variable 
privatisation. This will be examined by the coefficient ßl of the explanatory variable 
PRIV. If ßl is positive and significant it would imply that shareholders of the utility 
companies that were previously under state ownership and were subject to 
44 The market capitalisation data is taken two months prior to the event date so that the stock price is 
least affected by the influence of acquisition rumours (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). 
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privatisation earned higher returns compared to those firms that were under private 
ownership since their inception. 
4.2.3.2 Deregulation 
Table 4.3 presented in Section 4.3 below reveals that not all the utility sectors in all 
the European countries are fully deregulated. There are still some countries in Europe 
where some utility sectors are still partly under government control. The coefficient ß2 
will determine whether the level of deregulation had any impact on shareholder 
wealth creation following M&A. 
4.2.3.3 Domestic versus cross-border M&A 
In Chapter 3I have hypothesized that for European utility sectors cross-border M&A 
would generate higher returns compared to domestic M&A. I have also provided the 
rationale for this hypothesis in Chapter 3. Thus in the context of M&A of European 
utilities this thesis aims to examine whether domestic or cross-border M&A has a 
significant impact on the short run acquirer CARs and the long run combined firm 
BHARs. In Equations 4.23 and 4.24 dummy variable domestic (DOM) would examine 
whether the short run and the long run shareholder returns are explained by domestic 
or cross-border M&A. The coefficient 1.3 is associated with the explanatory variable 
DOM. If ß3 is not statistically significant then it would imply that there is no 
difference in shareholder returns between domestic and cross-border M&A. 
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4.2.3.4 Related versus diversified M&A 
Dummy variable (SSECT) has been used to distinguish between related and 
diversifying acquisitions. The dummy variable has been set to 1 when the M&A takes 
place within the same utility sector and 0 under different utility sectors. The 
coefficient ß4 is associated with the explanatory variable SSECT. 
4.2.3.5 Acquirer market value to book value ratio of equity (MTBV) 
In Equations 4.22 and 4.23 the independent variable BIDMTB will determine the 
systematic difference in shareholder returns based on acquirer market to book ratio. 
The market to book value ratio has been taken two months prior to the M&A 
announcement date in order to prevent these ratios from getting influenced by the 
announcement rumours. As mentioned in Chapter 3 if performance extrapolation 
hypothesis holds then in the short run there will be a positive relation between 
shareholder returns and acquirer MTBV while in the long run post merger period this 
relation will be negative. The coefficient of the explanatory variable BIDMTB, (35 is 
thereby expected to be positive in the short run and negative in the long run. 
4.2.3.6 Relative Size 
In the context of M&A of European utilities the relative size of acquirer to target may 
be one of the factors that influence the acquirer returns. This thesis therefore attempts 
to examine the relation between relative size of acquirer to target firm and the 
shareholder returns. So the relative size (RELSIZ) is taken as an explanatory variable. 
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Relative size is taken as the MV of the acquirer at the end of two months prior to the 
announcement month 0, over the MV of the target firm at the same time. Logarithmic 
transformation of the relative size is taken to minimise the impact of outliers. Taking 
the logarithm will normalise the distribution of this independent variable. 
4.2.4 Determination of motives behind the M&A of European utilities 
The motives behind M&A of European utilities have been examined using two 
different approaches. As discussed in Chapter 3 first the motives behind M&A have 
been analysed by looking at the weighted average of the combined gains of the target 
and acquirer firms in the twenty one days event window surrounding the 
announcement date. From the definition of synergy, agency and hubris discussed in 
Chapter 2a positive combined gain would imply synergy, a negative combined gain 
would imply agency and zero combined gain would imply hubris motive behind 
M&A. The weights are the market values of the firms taken two months prior to the 
event announcement date. The market values are taken two months before the 
announcement date so that these values are not influenced by any leakage of news 
regarding the announcement of the event. This has been examined by the following 
Equation 
iT arg etGain' + AcquirerGain' CAR Torar =tý (4.24) MV T erg ei + MV Acquirer 
CAR'Toiaº is the average synergistic gain of firm i, T arg etGain' is the gain (or loss) 
accrued to the it' target firm shareholders and AcquirerGain' is the gain (or loss) 
accrued to the shareholders of the it' acquirer firm. CAR, ',,,,,, is expressed in 
percentage. This is shown in Chapter 6. 
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In Equation 4.24 
T argetGain' = MVTarset * CARzeTget (-10, +10) (4.25a) 
AcquirerGain' = MVACq,,; rer 
* CARÄcqui er 





the market capitalisation of the ih target firm and ith 
acquirer firm respectively. Since the sample of European utility companies that are 
analysed in this thesis come from different European countries so their market 
capitalisations are expressed in different currencies. Hence the market capitalisation 
of different European utilities are converted into the British pound sterling by 
multiplying with the exchange rate (pound equivalent of the European currencies) on 
that respective date. The total gains are therefore reported in pound millions45. The 
mean and median combined gains both in absolute and in percentage forms are 
reported in Chapter 6. The absolute combined gains are obtained by evaluating only 
the numerator of Equation 4.25. Wilcoxon46 ranked test is conducted to determine 
whether the median total gain is statistically greater than zero. 
As discussed in Chapter 3a second approach has been used to determine the motives 
behind M&A of European utilities. This approach examines the correlation between 
target gain and total gain and the correlation between target gain and acquirer gain. 
This allows determination of the simultaneous existence of more than one motive 
behind M&A of European utility sectors. Table 2.7 in Chapter 2 has shown how the 
signs of correlation coefficient will help to determine the presence of different motive 
behind M&A. 
as Bradley et al (1988) and Seth et al (2000) have termed this as dollar gains since in these studies the 
total gains were reported in US dollars. 
46 Wilcoxon signed rank test is a non parametric equivalent oft-test. It is used when the distributional 
assumptions that underlie t-test is not satisfied. This test is used in several extant studies to determine 
the statistical significance of the median (Bradley, 1988). 
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The relation between target gain and total gain has been examined by the following 
Equation 
Target gain =a+ ß*Total gain (4.26) 
Synergy Theory 
From the hypothesis discussed in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 if the sign of ß is positive 
then it would imply synergy motive. This is because by definition of synergy total 
gain is positive. Moreover under synergy target gain is also positive as the targets 
manage to extract a higher premium from the acquirer through their bargaining power. 
Due to this reason extant studies have put forward that under synergy motive there 
would be a positive correlation between the target gain and total gain. 
Agency Theory 
From the definition of agency motive (presented in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, p. 69) 
M&A take place due to acquirer managers self interest. So under the presence of 
agency motive M&A are value destroying in nature. Thus the total gain is negative in 
this M&A. However as discussed in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 the target shareholders 
will tend to extract a higher premium from the acquirer managers. Due to this reason 
the target gain would be positive even when the total gain is negative. Here the losses 
to the acquirers are more than offset by the gains to the target firms leading to 
negative total gains. Hence if there is a negative correlation between target gain and 
total gain (ß is negative) then that would imply agency motive. 
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Hubris Theory 
The hubris theory contends that M&A take place due to acquirer managers' 
overconfidence or hubris. So total gain is zero under the hubris motive. From the 
discussion in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 even under the presence of hubris the target 
shareholders would extract some premium from the acquirer shareholders. Due to this 
reason under hubris the gain to target shareholders is exactly offset by losses to 
acquirer shareholders resulting in zero total gain. Thus if there is no correlation 
between target gain and total gain (ß is zero) then that would imply agency motive. 
Synergy and Agency 
In order to determine simultaneous presence of both synergy and agency motive, 
Equation 4.26 has been analysed separately for positive total gain subsample and 
negative total gain subsample. In Chapter 3I have shown that if the correlation 
between target gain and total gain is positive (ß>O) in the positive total gain 
subsample and the correlation between target gain and total gain is negative in the 
negative total gain Subsample (ß<O) then this would imply simultaneous presence of 
both synergy and agency motives behind M&A. 
Agency and Hubris 
To determine the presence of both agency and hubris motive Equation 4.26 has been 
analysed only on the negative total gain subsample. By definition of agency motive 
the total gain is negative. However if the correlation between target gain and total gain 
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is zero (0=0) in the subsample of negative total gain then it would imply simultaneous 
presence of both agency and hubris motive. 
Synergy and Hubris 
As shown in Table 2.7 (p. 79) of Chapter 2 the presence of motives are also analysed 
by examining the relation between target gain and acquirer gain. This is represented 
by the following Equation 
Target gain =a+ ßl*Acquirer gain (4.27) 
By the definition of synergy discussed in Chapter 2 M&A would lead to increase in 
wealth of the shareholders of both the target and acquirer firms. So if ßl is positive it 
will imply synergy motive behind M&A. However if ßl is negative (both in the full 
sample as well as in the subsample of negative total gains) it would imply presence of 
either hubris or agency or both. 
To determine if synergy and hubris hypothesis co-exist in the positive total gain47 
subsample the following Equation has been analysed following Seth et al (2000). 
Target gain =a+ ß1Acquirer gain + ß2 (Acquirer gain*Dummy) (4.28) 
Dummy =0 if acquirer gain is positive and 1 if acquirer gain is negative. This dummy 
is used since the acquirer gain can be negative even though the total gain is positive. 
47 As discussed in Chapter 2 by definition synergy motive will be present only in the positive total gain 
subsample. Therefore to determine presence of synergy only the total gains full sample and positive 
total gains Subsample has been examined. 
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In Equation 4.28 if ß1 is positive but ß2 is negative it would imply coexistence of both 
synergy and hubris motives behind M&A. This is because positive ßl implies that 
there is a positive correlation between target gain and acquirer gain for the subgroup 
of acquirers with positive gains (evidence of synergy). A negative sign of ß2 implies 
that there is a negative correlation between target gain and acquirer gain for the sub- 
group of acquirers with negative gains. As mentioned above Equation 4.28 has been 
analysed on the positive total gain Subsample. Hence a negative 132 implies a transfer 
of wealth from acquirer to target shareholders (evidence of hubris). This is because 
under the hubris motive the amount of positive gain accrued to the target shareholders 
is exactly the amount of negative gain or loss that is borne by the acquirer 
shareholders. 
4.3 Source of Data Collection and Sample selection 
Given the three research questions that I have presented in Chapter 3 in the previous 
Section I have provided a detailed presentation of the various methodologies that have 
been applied to address these research objectives. The purpose of this Section is to 
discuss the sample selection and the source of data collection. 
Data on M&A of European utilities has been collected from Securities Data 
Corporation Mergers and Acquisition database48 (SDC). However SDC does not 
provide information about firm name changes following acquisitions. To obtain this 
Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) and AMADEUS databases have been used to 
48 SDC provides detailed quantitative information about M&A worldwide. It is the most comprehensive 
source of M&A worldwide and a major source of data for acquisition related empirical studies (Rau 
and Vermaelan, 1998; Sudarsanam, 2003; and Conn et at, 2005; Antoniou et at, 2007). 
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track history of changes to firm name. Data on stock price, market indices, market 
capitalisation and market to book value, exchange rates have been obtained from 
DataStream. 
The following criteria were applied to identify the sample of European utilities 
engaged in M&A. 
1. Only completed deals have been included in the sample. 
2. Both the target and acquirer should be listed companies. 
3. The acquirer nation should be any of the European countries 
4. The target and acquirer should belong to any of the utilities industry like electricity, 
gas, water and telecommunications. 
S. Only those deals were selected where percentage of shares owned after transaction 
by the acquirers is more than 50 percent. 
6. The study covers M&A for 17 years period with merger announcement date 
ranging from lst Jan 1990 to 31st Dec 2006. 
Based on the above criteria 156 mergers and acquisitions deals were identified as 
sample. The share price data were not available for all the 156 target and acquirer 
firms. The share price data were obtained for 126 acquirer firms and 96 target firms. 
Detailed description of the sample companies in terms of year of M&A, utility sector 
and country of acquisition is given in Tables 4.4,4.5 and 4.6 below. 
Table 4.3 shows the level of privatisation and deregulation of public utilities namely 
electricity, gas, water and telecommunication in some of the major EU countries. This 
data has been obtained from ABS energy research 2006. Subsequent to the 
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deregulation of European utilities, they were subjected to substantial M&A. The 
deregulation of the European utilities took place in the early 1990s in most of the 
European countries49 as discussed in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2. Hence the sample of 
European utilities that has been examined in this study ranges from January 1990 to 
December 2006. 
Table 4.3 Level of privatisation and deregulation 
This Table shows the level of privatisation and deregulation activity that took place 
across different utility sectors in different European countries 
Electricity Gas Water Telecommunication 
UK Full Full Full Full 
Germany Partial Full Partial Full 
Italy Partial Full Partial Partial 
France Partial Closed Closed Partial 
Greece Partial Closed Partial Partial 
Austria Partial Full Closed Closed 
Belgium Partial Full Closed Partial 
Netherlands Partial Full Closed Partial 
Spain Full Partial Partial Full 
Portugal Partial Partial Closed 
Source: A 13S energy research 2000 
Full Less than 25% government ownership 
Partial = Between 25% and 75% government ownership 
Closed = More than 75% government ownership 
Table 4.4 below shows the distribution of the sample of European utility companies in 
terms of the form of the deal. Form of the deal here refers to whether the particular 
deal was a merger or an acquisition. In a merger two companies come together and 
share their resources to achieve certain objectives. In an acquisition the acquirer firm 
49 The British experiment started earlier in mid 1980s with privatisation of British Telecom in 1984. 
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purchases the assets or shares of the target firms such that the shareholders of the 
target firm ceases to be the owners of that firm (Sudarsanam, 2003). So in a merger a 
new entity is formed whereas in an acquisition the target firms become a subsidiary of 
the acquirer firm. A takeover is a specific form of acquisition where the acquirer is 
much larger than the target. 
Specifically Table 4.4 shows the distribution of the utility deals across different forms 
of M&A that has been defined by SDC database. According to SDC database 
acquisition of majority interests implies that the acquirer firm has purchased a major 
stake of the target firm. Acquisition of partial interest implies that acquirer firm has 
purchased a smaller stake of the target firms. As mentioned above in this study only 
those M&A deals were taken where more than 50 percent of the target shares were 
acquired. So even after acquisition of partial interest the target shares held by the 
acquirer is above 50 percent. Acquisition of remaining interest as its name suggests 
implies that the acquirer firm has purchased the rest of the stakes of the target firms. 
From Table 4.4 it is seen that mergers comprises about 34 percent of the total M&A in 
utility sectors, acquisition of majority interest is about 27 percent of the total sample, 
acquisition of partial interest and acquisition of remaining interest are 18 and 21 
percent respectively. 
Table 4.5 below shows the distribution of M&A that have taken place across different 
utility sectors and the country of the acquirer companies. From this Table it is clear 
that the bulk of M&A activity has taken place in the electricity sector which accounts 
for 49 percent of the total M&A that has taken place in the European utility sectors 
145 
from 1990 to 2006. This is followed by the telecom sector which accounts for 35 
percent. 
Table 4.4 Different forms of M&A deals in European utilities 1990-2006 













1990 1 1 1 3 
1991 2 2 
1992 1 3 1 5 
1993 1 1 2 
1994 1 1 1 3 
1995 4 1 2 1 8 
1996 3 2 5 
1997 3 5 1 9 
1998 4 3 10 17 
1999 7 3 4 3 17 
2000 9 5 6 1 21 
2001 3 2 2 1 8 
2002 3 4 4 1 12 
2003 1 2 4 4 11 
2004 2 1 2 5 
2005 5 5 1 5 16 
2006 6 2 3 1 12 
53 42 28 33 156 
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Table 4.5 Distribution of M&A of European utility companies across different 
utility sectors and country of the acquirer firms 
Country\Sector Electricit Gas Water Telecom Total 
Belgium 3 3 
Denmark 3 3 
France 2 12 4 18 
Finland 7 3 10 
Germany 21 2 2 25 
Greece 1 1 
Italy 2 6 8 
Netherlands 1 1 
Norway 1 1 
Portugal 2 2 
Russian Fed 2 2 4 
Spain 21 1 1 8 31 
Sweden 2 7 9 
Switzerland 1 4 5 
UK 13 3 6 13 35 
Total 76 6 19 55 156 
Table 4.6 below shows the spread of the acquirer firms across their country and the 
year of acquisition. This Table reveals that the UK, Spain and Germany are the three 
leading countries that had the maximum number of acquirer utility companies that 
embarked in M&A. 
Table 4.7 shows the spread of the target firms across the country of the acquirer firm 
and the year of acquisition. From the Table it is seen that similar to acquirer sample in 
the target sample also the UK, Spain and Germany are the top three countries that had 
the most number of target utility companies that were subject to M&A. 
From Tables 4.6 and 4.7 it is seen that the level of M&A activity in the utility sectors 
started taking pace after 1995. The reason for this phenomenon can be attributed to 
the fact that most of the European countries started removing the principle of golden 
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shares5° during this period. This has removed the restriction on M&A in utility sectors 
across Europe leading to a surge in M&A. This is further evident from Figure 4.2. 
This Figure shows that from 1990 to 2006 the maximum number of M&A has taken 
place after 1995 with the highest being in the year 2000. 
Figure 4.3 shows the value of M&A deals in the sample of European utility sectors 
and the total value of M&A in all the European sectors. This Figure shows that the 
highest value of M&A in terms of deal size occurred in 1999 both for the European 
utility sectors and for all European sectors. In fact as indicated in Section 1.3 of 
Chapter 1, the largest M&A in terms of deal size was recorded in this year between 
the UK's Vodafone and Germany's Mannesmann. 
so The definition of the principle of golden shares has been described in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2. This 
Section documented that the principle of golden shares were withdrawn from the UK in 1995 and the 
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4.4 Summary 
This Chapter has discussed the methodologies that are required to answer the three 
research question and the source of data and sample selection process that have been 
used in this research. Firstly Section 4.1 has presented a justification behind the 
chosen methodologies and the philosophical underpinnings that lies behind these 
chosen methods. Since this research entails examination of short and long run wealth 
creation following M&A of utilities and motives behind these M&A so this study has 
adopted a positivist theoretical perspective. Positivist research paradigm addresses the 
research questions objectively. Specifically this study carries out short and long run 
analyses of stock market performance of the utility companies to address the first 
research question and regression analysis to address the second and third research 
question. The different methodologies have been presented in Section 4.2. 
Specifically in Section 4.2.1 has presented the short run event study methodology. 
Three different benchmark models have been used in the short in order to examine the 
robustness of the short run results across different model specifications. 
Section 4.2.2 has discussed the long run event study methodology that has been 
applied to analyze the long run post merger abnormal returns accrued to the combined 
firm shareholders following M&A. Two long run event study methods have been used 
to analyse the abnormal returns. These are the BHAR approach and the CTAR 
approach. 
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Section 4.2.3 has presented the methodology to analyse the second research question 
which intends to examine the determinants or sources of the shareholder returns. The 
method adopted to determine the motives behind M&A of the European utilities has 
been presented in Subsection 4.2.4. Finally Section 4.3 has presented the source of 
data collection and sample selection criteria. 




The Durbin Watson test statistic is a very popular test to detect serial correlations and 
it is reported in SPSS while conducting regression (Gujarati, 2003). To correct the 
autocorrelation problem detected for some securities under the OLS market model the 
generalised least squares has been applied to the OLS market model given by 
Equation (4.1). It is assumed that the error term follow first order autocorrelation 
fir = PPI-t + Er -1<p<1 (A4.1) 





The Durbin Watson d statistic is given by 
d=2(1- pipt-I (A4.3) Ale 
From the A4.2 Equations above it follows that 
d= 2(1- p) (A4.4) 
Thus in this study when an individual security exhibited either positive or negative 
autocorrelation it has been corrected as follows. 
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Following Gujarati (2003) it is assumed that if Equation 4.1 holds at time t it will also 
hold true at time t-1. Hence 
R1,, 
-, = ai 
+QiRm, r-t + Pr-t 
(A4.5) 
Multiplying by p on both sides of Equation A4.5 we obtain 
pR,, 1-, = par + PßiRm, j-I + Pµ1-I 
(A4.6) 
Subtracting A4.6 from A4.5 gives 
(R,., -p R1,, ,)=a, (1- p) + ßr (R,,, - PR,.,, -, 
) + s, (A4.7) 
Where st = (pt - PPI-1) 
Equation A4.7 is also expressed as 
R, =+ ARm. t + Ci 
(A4.8) 
Since the error term of Equation A4.7 satisfies the usual OLS assumptions so it is free 
from autocorrelation (Gujarati, 2003). In this study the Durbin Watson statistic of all 
the securities which were affected by autocorrelation showed no autocorrelation when 
GLS was applied to the revised OLS market model given by Equation M. S. 
156 
Appendix A4.2 
Similar to the OLS market model, the generalised least squares has been applied to the 
securities that showed the problem of autocorrelation under the world market model. 
Equation A4.1 to A4.4 of Appendix A4.1 is also repeated under the world market 
model. 
Similar to Appendix A4.1 the world market model at time t-1 is expressed as follows. 
Rr, r = a, + 
Q2, iRwmr-l + Q3,1ERj, r-l + £r, r-ý (A4.9) 
Multiplying by p on both sides of Equation A4.9 we obtain 
PRt, r-I =Pat + PßrrRLm, t-r + Pß2tRwm, r-t + Pß31ERj, j-j + PEt. t-r 
(A4.10) 
Subtracting A4.10 from A4.9 we get 
a, -, D) + ßlr (RLm, t - PRLm, r-1) + 
ß2, 
r (Rwm, ý - PRwm,, -i 
) 
+ /33,1 DER jr- PER j, r-i) + (Et - Pct-i ) 
(A4.11) 
Equation A4.11 is also expressed as 




m, r + 
/j3, iERJ* ,r+ 
cr (A4.12) 
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As described in Appendix A4.1 Equation A4.12 is free from autocorrelation (Gujarati, 
2003). Similar to OLS market model the Durbin Watson statistic of all the securities 
which were affected by autocorrelation showed no autocorrelation when GLS was 
applied to the revised world market model given by Equation A4.12. 
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Chapter 5 
Wealth effects from M&A of European utilities and determinants of 
shareholders' returns 
5.0 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis as outlined in Chapter 1 is to examine the causes and 
consequences of M&A of European utilities from finance theory perspective. To 
further this aim I have proposed three research questions in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. 
The objective of this Chapter is to report the results based on the research questions 
Q1 and Q2. In order to address these research questions a sample of 156 cases of 
M&A in utilities has been identified from SDC database from 1990-2006.1 have 
presented the summary statistics of this data in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4. 
The first research question as presented in Chapter 3 is given as follows. 
Q1: What are the (a) short run and (b) long run wealth effects on the European utility 
companies that were engaged in M&A? Wealth effect of utility companies will be 
examined (a) in the short run following the announcement of M&A and (b) in the long 
run following the completion of M&A? 
The goal of this research question is to determine whether M&A of European utility 
sectors has led to increase in shareholders' value. Detailed discussion of 
methodologies pertaining to examination of shareholder wealth creation is given in 
Section 4.2 of Chapter 4. 
159 
The testable hypotheses pertaining to the short run and long run shareholders' wealth 
creation following M&A of European utility sectors have been described in Section 
3.2 of Chapter 3. Specifically in the context of short run M&A I have hypothesized 
that due to economic regulation of utility sectors the target and acquirer shareholders 
will obtain lower returns compared to that reported by empirical evidences in non- 
regulated industries. The results on the short run shareholder returns based on all the 
three benchmark models support this hypothesis. In fact the results show that 
consistent with empirical evidences the target shareholders gained but the acquirer 
shareholder have earned losses. But the level of gains accrued to the target 
shareholders is lower compared to non-regulated industries. I will discuss the 
implications of these short run results further in Section 5.1 below. 
In the context of long run post merger change in shareholder wealth creation the 
proposed hypothesis is that in the post merger period the combined firm shareholders 
will earn negative returns. As discussed in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 this hypothesis is 
based on existing long run evidence in non-regulated industries. But only the 1 year 
post merger BHAR supports this hypothesis. I have discussed this further in Section 
5.2 below. 
The second research question that this Chapter will address is given by 
Q2: What are the determinants of the shareholder returns? 
The purpose of this research question is to determine the sources or drivers of the 
short run and long run shareholder returns. The testable hypotheses related to the 
different characteristics of M&A is given is Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. 
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The regression results however suggest that most of the coefficients corresponding to 
different M&A deal characteristics are not statistically significant. In the context of 
regression on long run post merger returns only the coefficients of the dummy 
variables privatisation (PRIV) and domestic (DOM) are statistically significant. This 
suggests that in the context of M&A of European utilities cross-border M&A generate 
higher returns compared to domestic M&A. The implications of these results have 
been detailed in Section 5.3 below. 
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 reports the results 
based on the short run wealth effects of the target and acquirer shareholders following 
the announcement of M&A of European utilities. Section 5.2 discusses the result 
based on the long run post merger abnormal returns accrued to the combined firm 
shareholders. Section 5.3 discusses the overall implication of the results on 
shareholder wealth creation. In Section 5.4 1 report the results obtained on the 
determinants of the short run and the long run shareholder returns. Finally Section 5.6 
provides a summary of the Chapter. 
5.1 Results on short run stock price performance 
The short run wealth effect following M&A of utilities has been examined by 
calculating the abnormal returns of the securities surrounding the announcement date. 
In this Section I report the short run abnormal returns accrued to the target and 
acquirer shareholders under the three benchmark models. At the end of this Section I 
have provided the detailed implication of these short run results. 
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5.1.1 Announcement period returns based on the OLS market model benchmark 
In Table 5.1,1 report the AAR in the 11 days event window under the OLS market 
model. Panel A shows the AAR for the portfolio of acquirer firms and panel B shows 
the AAR for the portfolio of target firms. From Table 5.1 it is evident that the AARS 
are mostly negative and not statistically significant for the sample of acquirers except 
for day 0. On the other hand the AARS for the target sample are mostly positive and 
statistically significant. This result is consistent with the general M&A studies as 
reviewed in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 which showed that target firms gained while the 
acquirer firms either earned zero or negative returns. I will discuss this further in 
Section 5.1.4 below. 
While the AAR reports the average abnormal returns of the target and acquirer 
shareholders on particular dates within the event window the overall inference of the 
event is determined by the cumulative average abnormal returns CAAR. Equation 4.9 
in Chapter 4 shows the evaluation of CAAR for a particular event window. The 
announcement period CAAR for different event windows under the OLS market model 
benchmark has been reported in Table 5.2. Panel A shows the CAARs for the portfolio 
of acquirer firms while panel B shows the CAARs for the portfolio of target firms. It is 
evident from panel A of the Table that the acquirer CAARs are negative in all the 
event windows. However not all of them are statistically significant. 
The target CAARs on the other hand are positive in all the event windows. Moreover 
target CAARs are statistically significant at 1 percent level. This result is consistent 
with the empirical evidence on short run stock price performance of the shareholders 
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Table 5.1 Average abnormal return (AAR) of the acquirer and target firms based on the OLS 
market model benchmark 
This Table reports the average abnormal returns (AAR) for the entire sample of completed mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) of the European utilities from 1990 to 2006. Panel A reports the eleven days 
acquirer AARs surrounding the event date. The eleven days target AARS surrounding the event date are 
shown in panel B. The AARs are calculated for 106 acquirer firms and 94 target firms whose stock 
prices were available. The OLS market model is expressed as follows: Rt,, = at + ßiR, n t+ sj t 
R, 
n, g 
is the return on the equally weighted market portfolio on day t; R, is the return for security i on 
day t; In the OLS market model the expected return for each security for both the target and acquirer 
portfolios are obtained by estimating a, and Pi. This is done by regressing security returns R,, on the 
market return Rm,, for the estimation period. The estimation period is 239 days from day -6 to day -244 
relative to the M&A announcement date. The expected return E(R, ) under the OLS market model is 
given by E(R, 1) =d+ 






t) . The abnormal returns for n securities whose event period coincided on day t 




the event date is calculated as follows: AAR, = p=' N. 
The significance of the AAR is tested by t- 
statistic. ** indicates significance at 1% level. The fifth column shows the percentage of abnormal 
returns that were positive on each day in the 11 days event window. 
Panel A: Acquirer AAR based on OLS market model 
Day N AAR t- statistic %(+) 
-5 106 -0.0015 -0.75 48 
-4 106 0.0002 0.09 54 
-3 106 0.0003 0.15 63 
-2 106 -0.0006 -0.30 53 
-1 106 0.0009 0.46 59 
0 106 -0.0039 -1.92 53 
1 106 0.0016 0.76 60 
2 106 -0.0005 -0.26 55 
3 106 -0.0007 -0.35 57 
4 106 -0.0008 -0.40 55 
5 106 -0.0016 -0.77 52 
Panel B: Target AAR based on OLS market model 
Day N AAR t- statistic %(+) 
-5 94 -0.0010 -0.38 37 4 94 0.0009 0.34 60 
-3 94 0.0071** 2.65 56 
-2 94 0.0086** 3.22 55 
-1 94 0.0112** 4.19 59 
0 94 0.0539** 20.17 66 
1 94 0.0120** 4.67 37 
2 94 0.0019 0.70 40 
3 94 0.0029 1.07 48 
4 94 0.0016 0.61 45 
5 94 -0.0040 -1.51 38 
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Table 5.2 Cumulative average abnormal returns (CHAR) of the acquirer and target firms based 
on the OLS market model benchmark 
This Table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of the portfolio of acquirer (Panel 
A) and target firms (Panel B) for different event windows. The CAAR represents the entire sample of 
completed M&A of the European utility companies from 1990 to 2006. The M&A announcements are 
identified from SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. The CAAR for an event window (tl, t2) is 
r2 
given as follows: CAARtl. t2 =Z 
AAR1 
. The significance of CHAR is tested by t-test. *and ** 
ti 
indicates the significance at 5% and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Acquirer CAAR based on OLS market model 
Interval CHAR t-statistic 
(-5, +5) -0.007005** -11.35 (-2, +2) -0.00270** -2.95 (-1, +1) -0.00173 -1.46 (0, +1) -0.00249 -1.72 (-1,0) -0.00360** -2.49 
0 -0.00436* -2.13 
Panel B: Target CHAR based on OLS market model 
Interval CAAR t-statistic 
(-5, +5) 0.0954** 118.51 
(-2, +2) 0.0880** 73.68 
(-1, +1) 0.0775** 50.28 
(0, +1) 0.0663** 35.14 
(-1,0) 0.0651** 34.45 
0 0.0539** 20.17 
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following the announcement of M&A that has been reviewed in Section 2.3.2 of 
Chapter 2. Particularly the review of empirical literature in Section 2.3.2 revealed that 
the short run target CAARs lay in the range of 20% to 30%. However in the context of 
M&A of European utility sectors I find that the target CAARs under the OLS market 
model benchmark is less than 5% across all the different event windows. So it is 
apparent that although the target shareholders of utilities have earned positive returns 
but these returns are far lower than their counterparts in other non-regulated 
industries. The implication of this result is given in Section 5.1.4 below. 
This research has also used two other benchmark models in order to ensure that the 
short run stock price performance obtained under the OLS market model is robust 
across different model specifications. These alternate benchmark models are the world 
market model and the mean adjusted model. The results of stock price performance 
obtained under these two models have been discussed in Subsections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3. 
5.1.2 Announcement period results based on the world market model 
The expected return or the normal return under the world market model benchmark is 
represented by Equation 4.4 of Chapter 4. As discussed in Chapter 4 the world market 
model developed by Park (2004) incorporates not only the local market index in 
explaining the return of a security but also it has incorporated the movements in the 
global market index. Park (2004) argued that due to the integration of the global 
capital markets the returns of a security are also influenced by movements in the 
global market index. Hence it is necessary to incorporate a global market index along 
with a country's local index to determine the normal expected return of a security. 
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Park (op. cit. ) also argued that in most countries security prices readjust in response to 
simultaneous or lagged movement of foreign exchange. Hence he postulated that 
foreign currency exchange rate could influence the return of a security. Therefore in 
the world market model Park (2004) used the foreign currency exchange rate as 
another explanatory variable. 
The rationale provided by Park to use these two additional explanatory variables: the 
global market index and foreign currency exchange rate is to remove the country 
specific differences. In the context of M&A of European utility sectors the sample of 
target and acquiring companies' belonged to different countries. Therefore the sample 
of target and acquirer firms has different market indices and also different exchange 
rates. Hence in this study following Park (2004) I have incorporated the world market 
model to examine the short run shareholders' returns following M&A of European 
utilities. 
However the short run target and acquirer abnormal returns obtained under the world 
market model is no different from the OLS market model. The announcement period 
AAR based on the world market model is given in Table 5.3. From panel A of Table 
5.3 it is evident that similar to the OLS market model the acquirer AAR for the 11 days 
surrounding the event date are mostly negative. The AAR figures are also quite close 
to that obtained in the OLS market model in absolute terms. However all the target 
AARS are not statistically significant. The targets AAR as shown in panel B of Table 
5.3 are all positive. But only the 3 day AAR surrounding the event dates is statistically 
significant. 
166 
Table 5.3 Average abnormal return (AAR) of the acquirer and target firms based on the world 
market model benchmark 
This Table reports the AARs of the acquirer and target firms based on the world market model 
benchmark. Panel A reports the eleven days event window AARs for the portfolio of acquirers while 
Panel B reports the AARs for the portfolio of target firms. The world market model is expressed as 
follows: 
R,, = a' +, 31"' RL, nr 
+ ß2, i 
Rwmr +J6 3-' 
ERr 
. Here the parameters ajA, 19162', and 
l3,! are 
estimated over the estimation period (-6 to -244days prior to the event date) by regressing security 
return R,,, on the return of local market index RLm, , return on FTSE All World Index as 
Rwmt 
, and 
relative change of the local currency in terms of US dollars as ER,. Under the world market model the 
expected return E(R1, ) is given by: E(R1, r) =ä+ 
ß1, 
IRi,,,, + 
ß2,, Rwmr + ß3,, ER,. The abnormal 
returns for each security are evaluated as follows: AR,,, = R,, - E(R,, ) . The abnormal returns 
for n 
n 
securities whose event period coincided on day t is calculated as follows: ARP ARt 1 . The n ; =t AARS for the N portfolios for ten days surrounding the event date is calculated as follows: 
N 
Z ARa, r 
AARt = p=1 N. 
The significance of the AAR is tested by t-statistic. ** and * indicates 
significance at 1% and 5% level respectively. The fifth column shows the percentage of abnormal 
returns that were positive on each day in the 11 days event window. 
Panel A: Acq uirer AAR based on world market model 
Day N AAR t- statistic %(+) 
-5 105 -0.0015** -0.71 42 
-4 105 -0.012** 0.11 50 
-3 105 0.001 0.56 53 
-2 105 -0.001 -0.59 48 
-1 105 0.005 0.28 47 
0 105 -0.0056** -2.65 45 
1 105 0.0024 1.13 51 
2 105 -0.0008 -0.38 47 
3 105 -0.0013 -0.63 52 
4 105 -0.0014 -0.65 45 
5 105 -0.0035 -1.65 37 
Panel B: Target AAR based on world market model 
Day N AAR t- statistic 
-5 83 -0.00042 -0.15 39 
-4 83 0.00085 0.31 55 
-3 83 0.0054* 1.96 55 
-2 83 0.0067* 2.43 53 
-1 83 0.012** 4.30 64 
0 83 0.048** 17.40 68 
1 83 0.013** 4.56 42 
2 83 0.003 1.17 47 
3 83 0.003 1.07 41 
4 83 0.0014 0.51 50 
5 83 -0.0046 -1.67 39 
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Table 5.4 Cumulative average abnormal returns (CHAR) of the acquirer and target firms based 
on the world market model benchmark 
This Table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of the portfolio of acquirer and 
target firms engaged in M&A. Panel A reports the CAARs for the acquirer firm across different event 
windows while panel B reports the CAARs of the target firms across different event windows. The 
CAAR represents the entire sample of completed M&A of the European utility companies from 1990 to 
2006. The M&A announcements are identified from SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. The 
r2 
CAAR for an event window (tl, t2) is given as follows: CAAR1I t2 = 
AAR, 
. The significance of 
rl 
CAAR is tested by t-test. *and ** indicates the significance at 5% and 1% respectively 
Panel A: Acquirer CHAR based on world market model 
Interval CAAR t-statistic 
(-5, +5) -0.0109** -17.17 
(-2, +2) -0.0046** 4.94 
(-1, +1) -0.0025* -2.14 
(0, +1) -0.0032* -2.15 
(-1,0) -0.005** -3.35 
0 -0.006** -2.65 
Panel B: Target CAAR based on world market model 
Interval CAAR t-statistic 
(-5, +5) 0.048** 105.71 
(-2, +2) 0.059** 66.75 
(-1, +1) 0.061** 45.47 
(0, +1) 0.073** 31.04 
(-1,0) 0.082** 30.69 
0 0.088** 17.40 
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Table 5.4 reports the CAAR for the portfolio of target and acquirer firms based on the 
world market model51. The results are again consistent with those obtained in the OLS 
market model. The target CAARs are positive in all the event windows and the 
acquirer CAARs are negative in most of the event windows. Moreover all the CAARs 
for both the target and acquirer firms are significant either at one percent or at five 
percent level. The CAAR figures are also quite close to that obtained in the OLS 
market model. From a methodological standpoint it can be concluded that although 
Park (2004) postulated the need of world market model for examining event study in a 
multi country settings however the results of the world market model are very close to 
the OLS market model. This again shows the robustness of the OLS market model 
across various sample situations as concluded by Brown and Warner (1985). 
5.1.3 Robustness check: Announcement period results based on the mean 
adjusted model 
From Subsections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 it is seen that the AAR and CAAR for the portfolio of 
acquirer and target firms generated consistent result under the OLS market model and 
the world market model. This Section checks the robustness of the AAR and CAAR 
reported under the OLS market and world market model benchmarks. To do this a 
third benchmark model has been used which is the mean adjusted model. The 
expected return under the mean adjusted model benchmark is represented in Equation 
4.5 of Chapter 4. The reason behind using the mean adjusted model is to ensure that 
the short run stock price performance of the target and acquirer shareholders 
51 The discrepancy in the number of target and acquirer firms between OLS market model and world 
market models is due to lack of availability of data on some of the explanatory variables for some 
acquirer and target firms under the world market model. 
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Table 5.5 Average abnormal return (AAR) of the acquirer and target firms based on the mean 
adjusted model benchmark 
This Table reports the AARs for the portfolio of acquirer and target firms based on the mean adjusted 
model benchmark. Panel A reports the eleven days event window AARS for the portfolio of acquirers 
while Panel B reports the AARs for the portfolio of target firms. In the mean adjusted model the 
expected return E(R, 1) is the average return of the security over the estimation period which ranged 
from -244 days to -6 days of the event date. This is shown as follows E(R,, ) =1 R« . The 2391--244 
abnormal returns for each security are evaluated as follows: AR, 1 = 
R1,1 - E(R, t) . 
The abnormal 
returns for n securities whose event period coincided on day t is calculated as follows: 
in 
AR 
p, 1 _- 
ARi 
1. The AARs for the N portfolios for ten days surrounding the event date is n ; _, 
N 
E ARp, t 
calculated as follows: AAR, ="N. The significance of the AAR is tested by t-statistic. ** and 
* indicates significance at 1% and 5% level respectively. The fifth column shows the percentage of 
abnormal returns that were positive on each day of the eleven days event window. 
Panel A: Acquirer AAR based on mean adjusted model 
Day N AAR t- statistic %(+) 
-5 106 0.0020 0.85 50 
-4 106 -0.0003 -0.13 49 
-3 106 0.0006 0.24 51 
-2 106 -0.0017 -0.73 41 
-1 106 -0.0016 -0.69 42 
0 106 -0.0061** -2.62 42 
1 106 0.0023 0.97 51 
2 106 0.0008 0.35 50 
3 106 -0.0007 -0.29 47 
4 106 -0.0006 -0.26 47 
5 106 -0.0008 -0.32 45 Panel B: Target AAR based on mean adjusted model 
Day N AAR t- statistic %(+) 
-5 94 0 0.01 42 
-4 94 -0.005 -0.15 55 
-3 94 0.0076** 2.57 50 
-2 94 0.0083** 2.80 63 
-1 94 0.0128** 4.31 60 
0 94 0.0607** 20.43 67 
1 94 0.0137** 4.62 44 
2 94 0.0025 0.85 36 
3 94 0.0027 0.94 42 
4 94 0.0008 0.28 40 
5 94 -0.0037 -1.26 40 
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Table 5.6 Cumulative average abnormal returns (CHAR) of the acquirer and target firms based 
on the mean adjusted model benchmark 
This Table reports the CAAR for the acquirer and target firms based on the mean adjusted model. Panel 
A reports the acquirer CAARs for different event windows while panel B reports the target CAARs for 
different event window. The CAAR for an event window (tl, t2) is given as follows: 
r2 
CAARrl, 12 =E AAR, . 
The significance of CAAR is tested by t-test. *and ** indicates the 
ti 
significance at 5% and 1% respectively 
Acquirer CAAR based on mean adjusted model 
Interval CAAR t-statistic 
Panel A 
(-5, +5) -0.0062** -2.63 
(-2, +2) -0.0078** 4.74 
(-1, +1) -0.0037* -2.26 
(0, +1) -0.0054** -4.02 
(-1,0) -0.0065** -6.26 
0 -0.0059** -8.43 
Target CAAR based on mean adjusted model 
Interval CAAR t-statistic 
Panel B 
(-5, +5) 0.1052** 117.39 
(-2, +2) 0.0981** 73.81 
(-1, +1) 0.0872** 50.86 
(0, +1) 0.0744** 35.43 
(-1,0) 0.0735** 35.00 
0 0.0607** 20.43 
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following the announcement of M&A of European utilities is robust across different 
model specifications. 
Table 5.5 shows the 11 days AARs around the event date for the portfolio of acquirer 
and target firms under the mean adjusted benchmark model. Consistent with the OLS 
market model and world market model the acquirer AARs are negative in almost all 
the 11 days window surrounding the event date. The target AARs under the mean 
adjusted model as shown in panel B of Table 5.5 are positive in almost all the 11 days. 
Moreover the target AARs from -4 day to +1 day is also significant at one percent 
level. This is consistent with the AARS reported under OLS market model and world 
market model. 
The results for acquirer CAARs as reported in panel A of Table 5.6 are negative across 
all the event windows. These CAARs are also statistically significant at 1 percent level 
for all the different event windows. The CAARs for the target shareholders as shown 
in panel B of Table 5.6 are on the other hand positive across all the event windows 
and these are significant at one percent level. Therefore the CHAR results for both the 
portfolios of target and acquirer firms are consistent with the OLS market model and 
world market model. 
Hence it can be concluded that the analysis of short run target and acquirer returns 
following the announcement of M&A of European utility sectors is robust along 
different model specifications. 
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5.1.4 Implications of the short run stock price performance 
In this study the short run stock price performance following the announcement of 
M&A of European utility sectors suggests that the target shareholders have earned 
significant positive returns while the acquirer shareholders have suffered losses. This 
result is consistent along all the three benchmark models. This result is also consistent 
with the empirical evidence reviewed in Chapter 2. 
The size of target CHAR in the (-1, +1) event window for the OLS market model, 
world market model and mean adjusted model are 7%, 6% and 8% respectively. But 
the review of empirical literature on the short run stock price performance in Chapter 
2 showed that the target gains lay between 20 to 30 percent in most of these extant 
studies. Therefore as discussed in Section 5.1.1 above the size of target gain is quite 
small when compared to the target gains reported in the empirical studies of M&A in 
non-regulated industries. 
The size of acquirer CAAR for the OLS market model, world market model and mean 
adjusted model are -0.1%, -0.2% and -0.3% respectively for the event window (-1, 
+1) and these are also statistically significant. However the empirical evidence on 
short run stock price performance in Table 2.2 of Chapter 2 showed that acquirer 
CAAR lay between the range of -3.47% reported by Houston et al (2001) to 1.77% 
reported by Fuller et al (2002). So from the short run announcement period returns of 
the acquirer shareholders it is apparent that although the acquirers have earned 
negative returns but the extent of these negative return is not very high. 
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These results suggest that M&A of utilities in Europe were not perceived favourably 
by the market. This is evidenced by the negative CAAR accrued to the acquirer 
shareholders and very low positive CAAR accrued to the target shareholders under the 
three benchmark models. The reason for lower CAAR for the shareholders of utility 
sectors can be attributed to the regulated nature of these sectors. 
In Chapter 3 it was hypothesized that in the short run due to the regulated nature of 
utility sectors the acquirers of utilities will not pay a higher premium to the targets. 
This is because the acquirers will be sceptical that the regulators of utilities might not 
allow them to realise these higher premiums after the mergers52. Hence the target 
returns will be lower than that reported in non-regulated industries. Since the results 
show very low target gains as mentioned earlier so clearly this hypothesis holds true. 
This result is also consistent with the returns accrued to the target shareholders in the 
context of M&A of the US electricity sector as reported by Leggio and Lien (2000) 
and Becker-Blease et al (2008). These studies also had attributed these lower target 
gains to the regulated nature of utility sectors. 
In the case of acquirer shareholders the results suggest that although the returns are 
negative but they are not as low as those reported by some extant studies on M&A in 
non-regulated industries. Therefore it is evident that the losses accrued to the acquirer 
shareholders are less severe compared to that earned by acquirers in non-regulated 
industries. This result can again be attributed to the regulatory nature of utility sectors. 
Particularly since utility sectors provide essential service so the role of the regulators 
is to ensure that these sectors do not suffer losses. Hence the market has reacted less 
52 This point has also been raised by Leggio and Lien (2000) in the context of M&A of the US 
electricity sector. 
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adversely for the acquirers of utility sectors compared to empirical evidences on 
acquirer returns in non-regulated industries. 
However in the context of M&A of the US electricity sector Leggio and Lien (2000) 
found that the acquirers of the electricity companies have earned more negative 
returns compared to those in non-regulated industries. This difference in result 
between the European utility sectors and the US electricity sector can be attributed to 
the difference in nature of utilities regulation in these two regions. 
5.2 Long run stock price performance 
In recent years there have been a significant number of extant studies that have 
examined long run post merger performance. These studies have been reviewed in 
Chapter 2. The results from these studies provide mixed evidence on the long term 
post merger stock price performance. 
In this Section I discuss the results on the long run post merger stock price 
performance of the combined entity. In this study the 3 years post completion period 
has been taken to evaluate the long run performance. As discussed in Chapter 4 in this 
research two long run abnormal return estimators have been analysed. These are the 
Buy and Hold abnormal returns (BHAR) approach and the Calendar Time abnormal 
(CTAR) returns approach. The details computational procedures for BHAR and CTAR 
have been discussed in Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4. 
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Section 5.2.1 discusses the long run result based on the BHAR approach while Section 
5.2.2 discusses the result based on the CTAR approach. In Section 5.2.3 1 have 
provided the implication of the long run empirical evidence obtained in this research. 
5.2.1 Long run stock price performance under the BHAR approach 
Table 5.7 shows the long run BHAR over the 1 year, 2 years and 3 years holding 
periods. The results show that the long run BHARs over all the three different intervals 
are negative. The mean long run BHAR is -6.6% (t = -1.88) in the 1 year post merger 
period, -3.9% (t = 0.80) in the 2 years post completion period and -4.8% (t = -1.22) in 
the 3 years post merger period. However only the 1 year mean BHAR is statistically 
significant at 5 percent level. The significance of the mean BHARs are tested by a t- 
statistic. 
The median BHAR figures are similar to the mean BHAR. The significance of the 
median BHARs are tested by Wilcoxon z-statistic. The median BHAR for the 12,24 
and 36 months are -4.6% (z = -1.3), -6.5% (z = -0.78) and -4.5% (z = -1.15) 
respectively. However none of the median BHARs are statistically significant. Table 
5.7 also shows that in the 1 year post merger period 44 percent of the utility firms had 
a positive BHAR, in the 2 years post merger period 43 percent of the firms had 
positive BHAR and in the 3 years post merger period 44 percent of the firms 
experienced positive BHAR. Moreover from Table 5.7 it is also clear that the sample 
size decreases as the analysis moves from 1 year holding period to 3 years holding 
period. This might be due to the fact that some firms might have got delisted in the 2- 
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3 years post merger period or some firms might themselves been taken over by other 
firms. 
The BHAR result shows that in the three year post merger period the utility firms 
earned negative returns. The t-statistic shows that only the 1 year holding period 
BHAR is statistically significant. 
From the statistically significant negative 1 year BHAR result it is apparent that in the 
1 year post acquisition period the shareholders of the combined entity suffered 
significant losses. However since the 2 and 3 years BHARs are not statistically 
significant so no interpretation can be drawn from them. Further discussion on the 
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5.2.2 Long run stock price performance under the CTAR approach 
The long run CTARs over the interval of 1 year, 2 years and 3 years are shown in 
Table 5.8. Table 5.8 shows that similar to the BHARs in the 3 years horizon the long 
run CTARs are also negative in the entire 3 years interval. The mean CTARs for the 1 
year, 2 years and 3 year horizons are -1.9% (t = -0.022), -1.5% (t = -0.197) and -8.3% 
(t = -0.135) respectively. But the t-statistic shows that none of these results are 
statistically significant. Since none of the CTARs are statistically significant so no 
interpretation could be drawn from them on the long run post merger performance. 
5.2.3 Implication of the long run results 
The hypothesis pertaining to long run post merger performance as outlined in Section 
3.2 of Chapter 3 is that in the long run the shareholders of the combined entity will 
earn negative returns. This hypothesis is made on the basis of existing empirical 
evidences on the long run post merger performance both in regulated and non- 
regulated industries. Since the 1 year post merger BHAR is negative and statistically 
significant therefore clearly this hypothesis is accepted. This negative long run BHAR 
is also consistent with the studies of Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), Conn et al 
(2005), Gregory and McCorriston (2005) and Antoniou et al (2007) in the context of 
M&A in non-regulated industries in the UK. Moreover the long run BHAR and CTAR 
results are also consistent with the long run results reported in Becker-Blease et al 
(2008) in the context of M&A of the US electricity companies. The negative and 
statistically significant BHAR in the 1 year post merger period suggests that M&A of 
utilities in Europe is not a good strategy for utility firms to survive and flourish in the 
post deregulation period. Another reason for these negative returns could be attributed 
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Table 5.8 Long run calendar time abnormal returns of the post merger combined firms following 
M&A of European utilities with size and market to book adjusted control portfolios as 
benchmark 
This Table reports the long run calendar time abnormal returns (CTAR) of the post merger combined 
firms. The CTARs are calculated in the intervals of 1 year, 2 years and 3 years post merger period 
following the merger completion date. The CTARs are calculated each month as the difference between 
the event-portfolio return and the expected return on the control portfolio, standardized by the portfolio 
residual standard deviation. To determine the size and market to book (MV/BV) matching control 
portfolios first all the stocks listed in each sample country's market index have been grouped into 5 
portfolios based on their size (market value). Each size (market values) quintiles is further divided into 
five subgroups based on their MV/BV ratio. Out of these 25 size and MV/BV control portfolios the 
control portfolio whose size and MV/BV matches closely to a sample firm's size and MV/BV on the 
M&A completion month is selected. This control portfolio return is the expected return for the 
respective sample firm. For each calendar month ta mean CTAR, is calculated across the firms as 
N, 
follows CTAR, = 
CTAR,, 
t . 
Nt is the number of sample firms in the calendar month t. The Nr 
monthly CTAR1 are standardized by estimates of portfolio standard deviation. The standardized 
CTARI is calculated as follows: SCTAR, = 
CTAR` 
.A grand mean of the monthly standardized 6CTAR, 
CTAR, is thereby calculated as follows: MSCTAR =1 SCTAR1 .T is the total number of T t_, 
calendar months. The significance of the CTARs are tested by means of a t-test. 
Interval CTAR t- statistic 
(0, +1 year) -0.019 -0.022 
(0, +2years) -0.105 -0.197 
(0, +3years) -0.083 -0.135 
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to the lack of prior experience of the European utilities in acquiring and integrating 
the merged companies. Moreover the regulatory and safety requirements that the 
utility acquirers need to maintain also keep them away from more profitable targets. 
These two points have also been raised by Bertunek (1993) and Ray and Thompson 
(1990) in the context of M&A of the US electricity companies. Since the 3 years 
CTAR and the 2 years and 3 years holding period BHARs results are not statistically 
significant so no interpretation could be derived from these figures. 
From the review of studies in Chapter 2 it is apparent that the general consensus from 
the short run studies is that the combined gains of the shareholders of the target and 
acquirer firms are positive53. However the extant literature on long run post merger 
performance reported negative returns being accrued to the combined firm 
shareholders in the post merger period. Some M&A literature have termed this 
phenomenon as post merger anomaly (Agrawal et al, 1992; Fama, 1998). Since in this 
thesis 1 year post merger BHAR is negative and statistically significant so it can be 
concluded that the post merger `anomaly' also holds true in the context of M&A of 
European utility sectors. 
5.3 Shareholder wealth creation from M&A of European utility sectors 
In this Section I will discuss the overall implication of the results on the short run and 
long run stock price performance on shareholders' wealth. 
Bruner (2002) documented that only 20 percent of mergers have succeeded and most 
mergers typically erode shareholders' wealth. The review of extant studies in Section 
53 This is shown in Table 2.6 of Chapter 2. 
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2.3 of Chapter 2 on shareholders' wealth creation following M&A also reinstated this 
fact. The significant positive gains accrued to the target shareholders in the short run 
following the announcement of M&A implied that in most of these M&A there has 
been a transfer of wealth from the acquirer to the target shareholders (Bruner, 2002). 
But as mentioned in the previous Chapters most of these studies are based on non- 
regulated industries. 
In the context of M&A of European utility sectors this thesis documents that similar 
to M&A in non-regulated industries the target shareholders have gained while the 
acquirers have suffered losses. Moreover similar to non-regulated industries the long 
run post merger shareholders' returns are also negative. But the difference in the 
results of this study and the extant studies on M&A in non-regulated industries lies in 
the fact that in this study I document that the target shareholders have earned very low 
positive returns. The level of losses incurred by the acquirer shareholders is also quite 
low. This low target gain and acquirer loss can be attributed to the regulatory nature 
of utility sectors. As indicated in Section 5.1.4 above on one hand economic 
regulation of utility sectors might have prevented the acquirers from paying a higher 
premium to target firms. On the other hand the regulatory bodies would also ensure 
that utility sectors do not suffer losses. Hence the market did not react too adversely 
for the acquirer shareholders. 
The long run post acquisition result suggests that the combined firm shareholders 
have incurred significant losses in the 1 year period following the completion of 
M&A (as evidenced from the statistically significant 1 year BHAR). Thus overall the 
results on shareholder wealth creation following M&A of European utility sectors 
reinforce the existing evidences of wealth losses from M&A. However it is also 
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apparent from the results that the extent of this wealth loss is not very severe in 
comparison to empirical evidences on non-regulated industries. In Chapter 61 shall 
report the losses in absolute terms incurred by the shareholders following M&A of 
European utilities. 
5.4 Determinants of shareholder returns 
First in this Section I discuss the descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the 
M&A deals. Second in this Section I report whether the shareholder returns are 
explained by these different characteristics of M&A. Specifically I examine whether 
the shareholder returns are explained by the following characteristics of M&A which 
are privatisation, deregulation, degree of relatedness of the M&A, domestic versus 
cross-border M&A, value versus glamour M&A and relative size of acquirer to target 
firms. 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the M&A deals 
In this Section I present the descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the M&A 
deals. This is given in Table 5.9. 
From the figures in Table 5.9 it is seen that 67.5 percent of the acquirer utilities were 
subjected to privatisation prior to M&A implying that majority of the European utility 
companies were under state ownership before being subjected to privatisation, 
deregulation and finally to M&A. Moreover 69.3 percent of the acquirer utilities are 
under full deregulation in their home country while the remaining acquirer utilities are 
either fully or partially regulated. 
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The percentage of acquirer utilities that acquired the target in their. home country 
(domestic) is 45 percent. This suggests that majority of M&A deals of the European 
utility sectors are cross-border M&A. The figures also suggest that majority (88.2 
percent) of M&A that took place in the European utility sectors are related M&A. The 
Table also shows that mean acquirer MTBV is 2.68 and the mean of the variable Log 
(RELSIZ) is 1.02. A mean Log (RELSIZ) of 1.02 implies that on average the acquirer 
MV is larger than target MV. This in turn indicates that in majority of the M&A deals 
the size of the acquirers were higher than the targets. 
In the next Section I will discuss whether these characteristics of the M&A deals had 
a significant impact on shareholder wealth creation following M&A. 
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Table 5.9: Characteristics of the explanatory variable 
This Table reports the characteristics of the explanatory variable. For the first four control variables the 
percentage of dummy variable that is equal to 1 has been reported. For the acquirer MTBV (BIDMTB) 
variable and Log of relative size Log (RELSIZ) their mean and standard deviation has been reported. 





Same Sector 88.2 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Acquirer MTBV 2.682545455 0.301352233 
Log (RELSIZ) 1.028038107 0.11120996 
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5.4.2 Determinants of short run stock price performance 
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 report the regression results on the determinants of short run 
announcement period acquirer and target CARs during the sample period 1990-2006. 
In Section 3.2 of Chapter 3I have discussed the testable hypotheses on the expected 
outcomes of the regression tests. 
The result suggests that the coefficients of privatisation dummy variable (PRIV) is 
0.006 (t = . 52) for acquirers and 0.011 
(t=. 317) for targets, which are positive but not 
statistically significant. Clearly this indicates that the market does not differentiate 
between M&A of utility sectors which had undergone the privatisation process 
compared to other utilities which were not subjected to privatisation. 
The coefficients of deregulation variable (DEREG) is 0.004 (t = . 305) 
for acquirers 
and 0.025 (t=. 619) for targets which are again positive but not statistically significant. 
This indicates that in the short run announcement period the market does not 
differentiate between M&A of European utilities based on their level of deregulation. 
In Chapter 3I have hypothesized that under partial deregulation the full benefits of 
M&A may not be realised. So under partial deregulation the acquirer shareholders 
will have less incentive to pay a premium for obtaining the target firms. Hence it was 
hypothesized that gains to target and acquirer shareholders will be higher under full 
deregulation than under partial deregulation. However the results do not support this 
hypothesis. This suggests that shareholder returns following M&A are not dependent 
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The coefficients of the dummy variable domestic (DOM) is given by -0.003 (t = -. 22) 
for acquirers and -0.0216 (-0.567) for targets, which are not statistically significant. 
This suggests that the short run announcement period acquirer and target CARS are not 
affected by whether the M&A is domestic or cross-border. In Chapter 3 it was 
hypothesized that since utility sectors are large and capital intensive so cross-border 
M&A of European utilities will lead to greater returns compared to domestic M&A. 
This is because the scope of economies of scale and scope are higher for cross-border 
M&A compared to domestic M&A. The result however does not support this 
hypothesis. This result is also inconsistent with the study of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia 
(2000), Corhay and Rad (2000) and Campa and Hernando (2004) in the context of 
European M&A in non-regulated industries. All of these studies reported that 
domestic M&A generate higher shareholder returns compared to cross-border M&A. 
This result is however consistent with study of Lowinski et al (2004) in the context of 
M&A of Swiss acquirers acquiring domestic and cross-border targets. They had also 
reported no significant relation between acquirer CARs and domestic or cross-border 
M&A. Lowinski et al (2004) suggested that this is due to the integration of the 
European markets. It is likely that this argument also holds true in the present context 
of M&A of European utility sectors. 
The coefficients of the dummy variable same sector (SSECT) is 0.021 (t = 1.11) for 
acquirers and -0.0198 (t= -. 405) for targets are again not statistically significant. This 
suggests that the market does not distinguish between M&A of related and diversified 
utilities. This result is not consistent with those of Bertunek et al (1993); Bums et al 
(1998) and Berry (2000). These studies reported that there is a positive correlation 
between shareholder returns and diversification in the context of M&A of the US 
utilities. In the context of European M&A in non-regulated industries Doukas et al 
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(2001) and Gregory and McCorriston (2005) showed that the acquirer returns are 
positively correlated with related acquisition compared to diversified acquisition. The 
authors attributed this result to agency theory where the managers engage in 
diversifying acquisitions to minimise the business risk. However in the context of 
M&A of European utility sectors this result does not hold true. 
The coefficient of acquirer MTBV (BIDMTB) is 0.001 (t = 0.582) for the acquirers 
which is positive but not statistically significant. Empirical studies have associated 
firms with higher MTBV as glamour firms and lower MTBV as value firms. Glamour 
firms are high growth firms with good past performance while value firms are low 
growth firms with poor past performance. This has been discussed in Chapter 2. Rau 
and Vermaelen (1998) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) have found that glamour 
firms have high acquirer returns in the short run announcement period but negative 
returns in the long run post merger period. The value firms earn the opposite. These 
studies have termed this phenomenon as performance extrapolation hypothesis. This 
has been described in Footnote 29 of Chapter 2 (p. 58). According to this hypothesis 
the market extrapolates the past performance of the acquirers when it assesses the 
value of an acquisition (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). It implies that glamour managers 
are more likely to overestimate their own abilities to manage an acquisition (driven by 
hubris) while value managers are more prudent in approving a major transaction. In 
the context of M&A of European utilities I find that there is no significant relation 
between announcement period acquirer returns and its MTBV. Thus in the short run 
performance extrapolation hypothesis cannot be concluded for the sample of 
European utilities. 
190 
The coefficient of relative size (RELSIZ) again does not show any relation with the 
short run acquirer and target returns and it is also not statistically significant. As 
discussed in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 empirical studies have associated more risk for 
those M&A where the size of target is larger than the acquirer (Sudarsanam et al, 
1996). However in this research I find that the announcement period acquirer returns 
cannot be explained by the relative size of acquirer to target firms. So this result is 
inconsistent with the studies of Sudarsanam et al (1996) and Campa and Hernando 
(2004) which reported a significant relation between relative size and acquirer returns. 
Both of these studies have examined M&A of European firms in non-regulated 
industries. 
Overall the regression results on the short run announcement period suggest that none 
of the explanatory variables have any statistically significant impact on the short run 
announcement period acquirer and target returns. The short run results on the 
determinants of shareholder returns clearly do not support the hypotheses that were 
put forward in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. Moreover as shown above the results on the 
deregulation dummy (DEREG), domestic dummy (DOM) and relative size (RELSIZ) 
variable are not consistent with extant studies. The coefficients of the dummy variable 
same sector (SSECT) and the explanatory variable acquirer MTBV (BIDMTB) are 
consistent with some studies like Maquiera et al (1998), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), 
Delong (2001), Doukas et al (2002), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) and Megginson 
et al (2004). But since these coefficients are not statistically significant so no 
conclusive interpretation can be derived. 
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5.4.3 Determinants of long run stock price performance 
Table 5.12 reports the regression results on the determinants of the 1 year, 2 year and 
3 years post merger combined firm BHARs during the sample period 1990-200654 
The long run result shows that the coefficient of privatisation (PRIV) dummy is 
positive and significant in the 1 year post merger period. The coefficient for this 1 
year BHAR is 0.267 (t=2.26) which is positive and statistically significant at 5 percent 
level. This implies that in the post merger period the combined firm shareholders of 
those utility sectors that were previously under state ownership and were subject to 
privatisation prior to M&A have earned higher returns compared to those which were 
in private sector since their inception. This suggests that the potential for synergy is 
higher for the newly privatised utility sectors. The review of studies in Section 2.1 
document that privatisation led to increase in efficiency. The higher shareholder 
returns may thus be attributed to the higher level of efficiency of the newly privatised 
utility sectors. This is a significant finding of this research and has important policy 
implications for the investors of utility sectors in Europe. 
The coefficients of the dummy variable deregulation (DEREG) are not statistically 
significant for any of the BHARs in the 1,2 and 3 years period. This result therefore 
does not support the hypothesis that shareholder returns will be higher for M&A of 
European utilities which are fully deregulated. 
54 Note that the difference in the number of observations in the regression of 1,2 and 3 year 13HARs is 
firstly due to the fact that some firms might have got delisted in the 2-3 years post merger period or 
some firms might themselves been taken over by other firms as discussed earlier in Section 5.2.1 
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The coefficient of domestic (DOM) dummy is positive and statistically significant at 
10 percent level for the 1 year post merger BHAR. But the coefficient is not 
statistically significant for the 2 years post merger BHAR. For the 3 years post merger 
BHAR the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent level. The 
positive coefficient for the 1 year post merger period implies that the combined firm 
shareholders have earned higher returns for domestic M&A compared to cross-border 
M&A. On the other hand the negative coefficient for the 3 year post merger BHAR 
implies that the shareholder returns are lower for domestic M&A compared to cross- 
border M&A. One possible interpretation for this result is that for the initial 1 year 
after the merger completion the utility companies that engaged in cross-border M&A 
could not earn higher returns because of the existence of legal, cultural and 
transaction barriers that might prevail across different countries (Campa and 
Hernando, 2004). There might also be difference in corporate governance structures 
across different countries as indicated by Corhay and Rad (2000). But as the length of 
the post merger period increased the utility companies that were involved in cross- 
border M&A may have overcome these barriers. This is reflected in the negative 
coefficient of DOM in the 3 years post merger period which indicates the shareholders 
in cross-border M&A have earned higher returns compared to shareholders in 
domestic M&A. 
Table 5.12 also shows that the coefficients of the dummy variable same sector 
(SSECT) are not statistically significant in any of the 1,2 and 3 years post merger 
period. So the result suggests that there is no difference in post merger shareholder 
returns between related and diversified M&A. In the context of M&A in non- 
regulated industries Berger and Ofek (1995), Maquiera et al (1998), Doukas et al 
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(2001) and Gregory and McCorriston (2005) reported that related M&A created more 
value to shareholders compared to diversified M&A. On the other hand in the context 
of M&A of the UK utilities, Loredo and Suarez (2005) argued that diversified M&A 
has more potential for synergy that could benefit both consumers and producers. 
However the regression result of the combined firm BHARs does not support this 
diversification argument. 
The long run regression result further revealed that none of the coefficients of the 
independent variable acquirer market to book value (BIDMTB) are statistically 
significant. This result is inconsistent with the performance extrapolation hypothesis 
suggested by Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003). The 
performance extrapolation hypothesis states that M&A of growth firms (higher 
acquirer MTBV) are motivated by hubris or overconfidence of the managers while 
managers of value firms (low MTBV) are more prudent in approving an M&A. Hence 
under performance extrapolation hypothesis the long run shareholders' returns of the 
combined firms are negatively related with the acquirer MTBV. However in the 
present context the regression result does not support this hypothesis. This in turn 
suggests that M&A of growth utility firms (higher MTBV) are not motivated by 
hubris. Absence of hubris motive behind M&A of European utility sectors will be 
further reinforced by the evidences on the motives behind M&A in Chapter 6. 
The coefficients of the explanatory variable relative size (RELSIZ) are not statistically 
significant in any of the 1,2 or 3 years post merger BHARs. Thus it is seen that 
similar to short run regression results the long run post merger returns of the 
shareholders cannot be explained by relative size of acquirer to target firms. 
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Overall the multiple regressions of the 1,2 and 3 years post merger BHARs on the 
explanatory variables suggest that most of independent variables could not explain the 
returns accrued to the combined firm shareholders in the long run post merger period. 
Only the coefficients of dummy variables privatisation (PRIV) and domestic (DOM) 
are statistically significant. The statistically significant positive coefficient of the 
dummy variable privatisation (PRIV) clearly implies that potential for synergy is 
higher for the newly privatised utility sectors. The coefficient of the dummy variable 
domestic (DOM) is significantly positive in the 1 year post merger period but 
significantly negative in the 3 years post merger period. This result can be attributed 
to the fact that the legal, cultural and transaction barriers which might have prevented 
the generation of synergy for the utility companies under cross-border M&A in the 
initial year following merger completion were overcome in the 3 years post merger 
period. This is evidenced in the negative coefficient of the dummy variable domestic 
(DOM) for the regression of the 3 years BHAR. 
5.5 Summary 
This Chapter attempted to answer the first two research questions that I have 
presented in Chapter 3. The results of the announcement period acquirer and target 
CAARs are consistent across all the three different models. The short run result 
suggests that the target shareholders earned very low positive returns while the 
acquirer shareholder suffered losses. This result is therefore consistent with M&A in 
non-regulated industries which report positive target returns and negative acquirer 
returns following the announcement of M&A. 
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The positive target returns are however very low compared to that earned in non- 
regulated industries as reviewed in Chapter 2. This low return is attributed primarily 
to the perceived risks associated with investing in utility sectors. These perceived 
risks refer to the fact that due to regulatory intervention the acquirer shareholders 
might not be able to realise higher target premiums. Hence the acquirers are reluctant 
to pay a higher target premium. This is reflected in the low positive returns earned by 
the target shareholders. 
The short run announcement period result also revealed that although the acquirer 
shareholders have suffered losses the level of these losses are lower compared to that 
reported by empirical literature in non-regulated industries. I have reviewed these 
studies in Table 2.2 of Chapter 2. This result can be attributed to the regulatory nature 
of utility sectors. The role of the regulators is to ensure that utilities earn a stable rate 
of return. Due to this reason the market might have reacted less unfavourably towards 
acquirers of European utilities compared to acquirers in other non-regulated 
industries. 
The results on the long run returns suggest that in the post merger period the 
shareholders have suffered losses. But only the 1 year post merger BHAR result is 
statistically significant at 5 percent level. From the long run post merger result it is 
apparent that M&A of utilities in Europe is not a good strategy for the utility firms to 
survive and flourish in the post deregulation period. One possible reason for these 
negative returns is the lack of prior experience of the European utilities to embark in 
M&A. 
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Overall the short run and long run results from this study support the existing 
evidence on wealth losses from M&A. However as the results suggest the extent of 
these losses are lower than observed in non-regulated industries. This is attributed to 
the regulatory nature of utility sectors. 
The results based on the determinants of shareholder returns suggest that most of the 
independent variables could not explain the sources of shareholder wealth changes 
following M&A of European utility sectors. This is evident from the fact that most of 
the coefficients of the explanatory variables are not statistically significant. Only the 
coefficients of the dummy variables privatisation (PRIV) and deregulation (DEREG) 
are statistically significant in the regression of the long run post merger BHARs. 
In Chapter 6 next I will discuss the empirical evidence obtained on the motives behind 
M&A of European utility sectors. 
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Chapter 6 
Motives behind M&A of utilities 
6.0 Introduction 
The result in Chapter 5 reinforces the existing evidences on shareholder wealth losses 
from M&A. However despite these wealth losses there is still a continuing trend of 
M&A. The question that arises from such evidence is: what are the reasons behind 
these M&A. This is the third question I have put forward in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 
in the context of M&A of European utilities. The purpose of this Chapter is to present 
the empirical evidence obtained in this study on the motives behind M&A. 
As outlined in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 the M&A literature in finance have advanced 
three predominant motives behind M&A which are synergy, agency and hubris. 
Synergy hypothesis implies that M&A are motivated by the economic gains that 
would emanate from merging the resources of two firms. The hubris hypothesis 
suggests that M&A occur due to managerial hubris or overconfidence in evaluating 
the potential gains that would accrue from an M&A. The agency hypothesis entails 
that M&A are motivated by acquirer managers' self interest at the expense of the 
acquirer shareholders. 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) documented that in most merger announcements 
acquirer firms make statements about the potential synergies from M&A. However 
quite often these projected gains are not realized. This might be either due to 
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overconfidence or over-optimism of the managers implying managerial hubris or due 
to agency problems. 
In this study I attempt to examine whether the sample of M&A of European utility 
sectors are motivated by synergy, agency or hubris. To analyse this first I have 
examined the combined gains of the acquirer and target shareholders following the 
M&A announcement. In the second method I attempt to distinguish between the 
different motives behind M&A by performing a correlation analysis of the target, 
acquirer and total gains accrued to the shareholders following the announcement of 
M&A. This second method would also help to determine whether there is presence of 
more than one motive behind M&A in the sample of European utility sectors. 
The three motives behind M&A are tied to the shareholders' wealth creation that I 
have discussed in Chapter S. For instance under synergy motive it is assumed that 
managers of the acquirer and target firms intend to maximise shareholders' wealth. So 
under synergy motive the combined wealth accrued to the shareholders is expected to 
be positive. Moreover under synergy motive target gains will be positively correlated 
to both acquirer gains and total gains55. 
M&A of European utility sectors can also be motivated by agency where the self 
interest of the acquirer managers is the key reason behind M&A. Under agency 
motives the combined wealth gain from announcement of M&A will be negative. 
Moreover as detailed in Section 3.2 under agency motive the target gains will be 
negatively correlated to both acquirer gains and total gains. 
55 1 have discussed the rationale behind this in Section 3.2. 
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When M&A take place due to hubris the total gain is zero. This is due to the fact that 
under hubris the higher the target gain the lower is the acquirer gain such that there is 
a transfer of wealth from target to acquirer shareholders. Hence sum of gains accrued 
to the target and acquirer shareholders is zero. Moreover as discussed in Section 3.2 
of Chapter 3 under hubris hypothesis the correlation between target and acquirer gain 
is negative and the correlation between target and total gain is zero. 
The evidences obtained on the motives behind M&A of European utility sectors 
suggest that there is a strong presence of synergy motive behind M&A. This is 
evidenced from the statistically significant median total gains and positive correlation 
between target gain and total gain. Moreover presence of agency motive cannot be 
ruled out since the mean total gain is negative and half of the acquirer gains are 
negative. However these are not statistically significant. The implications of these 
results are discussed in Section 6.3. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.1 below I have 
reported the results based on the combined gains method. In Section 6.2 1 have 
presented the results of the correlation analyses. Finally in Section 6.3 1 have 
discussed the implication of the results that are derived in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. 
6.1 Combined gains, target gains and acquirer gains 
In this Section I report the result obtained on the motives behind M&A based on the 
combined gains accrued to the shareholders of the target and acquiring firm. The 
combined gains are taken as the sum total of target and acquirer gains in the twenty 
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one days event window surrounding the announcement date. As described in Section 
4.2 of Chapter 4 the combined gains are reported in pound sterling (L) millions 56. 'Me 
combined gains are also expressed as the weighted average of target and acquirer 
gains. The weights are the market values of the firms taken two months prior to the 
event announcement date. The market values are taken two months before the 
announcement date so that these values are not influenced by any leakage of news 
regarding the announcement of the event. This has been presented in equation 4.25 of 
Chapter 4. The combined 21 days cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the target 
and acquirer firms surrounding the event date is denoted by CARro,., 
From the definition and rationale behind the three motives presented in Section 3.2 of 
Chapter 3a positive combined gain would imply synergy motive, a negative 
combined gain would imply agency motive and zero combined gain would imply 
hubris behind M&A. 
The result on the motives behind M&A of European utility sectors based on the 
combined gains method is presented in Table 6.1. The Table 6.1 shows that in 67 
percent of the cases the targets obtained positive gains while in 51 percent cases the 
acquirers earned positive gains. The total gain is positive in 61 percent cases. This 
56 As discussed in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4 the combined gains accrued by different utility companies 
in Europe are converted in British Pound at their historical exchange rates. 
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Table 6.1 Combined gains accrued to the target and acquirer shareholders following the 
announcement of M&A 
This Table reports the combined gains, target gains and acquirer gains over the event window (-10, 
+10) surrounding the event date. The combined gains have been reported in pound sterling millions. 
The target gain for a single firm i has been calculated as follow: (Target gain); = CAR, (-10, +10)*MVL. 
Similarly acquirer gain for firm j has been calculated: (Acquirer gain) = CARS(-10, +10)*MVj. The 
combined gain is the sum of target and acquirer gains. In this Table the mean and median of the target 
gains, acquirer gains and total gains have been reported. The statistical significance of the mean total 
gain, target gain and acquirer gain is determined by t test. The statistical significance of the median 
total gain is determined by the Wilcoxon signed rank test. * denote statistical significance at 10 percent 
level. 
The percentage combined gain for each pair of target and acquirer firms has been calculated as follows. 
CýTat., -TargetGain+AcquirerGain As reported in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4 all the three MVrazget +MVdcquirer 
benchmark models have given similar CAR figures. Therefore only one of the benchmark model CARs 
have been taken to calculate the total gain, target gain and acquirer gain. In this Table the OLS market 
model CARs are taken. Since the market value of the sample of European utilities were initially 
reported in their respective countries' currency so in order to report the results in a single currency 
(pound sterling) all the market values were converted into pound at their historical exchange rate. The 
t-statistic for the mean percentage combined gain is given in the parentheses. To evaluate combined 
gains both the target and acquirer returns are required for an individual deal. So only those pair of deals 
were taken where both the target and acquirer share price were available. This has reduced the number 
of deal size to 70. 
Total gain over the event window (-10, +10) in £ million (N=70) 
Gain to Mean Median Min Max %Positive 
Total -108.32 46.03 -28591.51 10493.23 61 
(-0.207) (1.47*) 
Target 313.92 18.95 -1006.20 7444.49 67 
(-2.52) 
Acquirer -422.24 -0.67 -27585.31 9885.73 50 
(-0.87) (-0.102) 
Combined gain as %of pre- 
offer market value of target -0.007% 0.01 -1.06 0.20 61 
and acquirer firms 
(-0.43) 
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suggests that about three fifth of the M&As are motivated by synergy and the rest by 
agency and/or hubris. Furthermore in 76.7 percent of the cases with positive total 
gains the acquirer gains are positive. This further indicates that the majority of the 
acquisitions were motivated by synergy. 
Table 6.1 also shows that the mean target gain is £313.42 million and the mean 
acquirer gain is -£422.24 million. So the mean total gain is -£108.32 million. This 
indicates that although majority of the M&As are motivated by synergy but the 
negative gains in absolute terms outweighed the positive gains resulting in a negative 
mean total gain. However this mean total gain is not statistically significant. From the 
definition of the three motives behind M&A it is evident that the negative mean total 
gain indicates agency motive behind M&A. However since this is not statistically 
significant therefore agency motive cannot be confirmed with certainty. 
The median total gain is £46.03 million which is positive and significant at 10 percent 
level. The significance of the median total gain is examined by Wilcoxon signed rank 
test. Since median by definition is the medium most value in the list of total gains of 
the sample of European utilities therefore positive median value further indicates that 
majority (or at least half) of M&A were motivated by synergy. Since the result 
indicates that the mean total gain is negative but the median total gain is positive so it 
implies that negative mean total gains were caused by some large losses incurred by 
some utility firms from M&A. 
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Table 6.1 further reveals that percentage total gain denoted by CAR,,,., is -0.7%. 
However this negative CART,., is not statistically significant. So again agency motive 
cannot be confirmed with certainty. 
From the result on the combined gain reported in Table 6.1 it is evident that synergy is 
one of the motives behind M&A of European utility sectors as evidenced by 
statistically significant positive median total gains. But since the absolute mean total 
gain and percentage mean total gains are reported to be negative so agency motive 
cannot be ruled out. However since these values are not statistically significant so 
agency problem cannot be confirmed with certainty. In order to test the robustness of 
these results in Section 6.2 next I will present the results on the motives behind M&A 
of European utility sectors by examining the correlation between target gain and total 
gain and between target gain and acquirer gain. 
6.2 Correlation between target gain/ total gain and target gain/acquirer gain 
As discussed in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 the combined gains figure could not 
determine the simultaneous presence of two motives behind M&A. Therefore in order 
to examine two or more motives behind M&A correlation analyses between target, 
acquirer and total gain have been conducted. The rationale and implication behind 
adopting this methodology has been discussed in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. 
The expected correlation between target gain and total gain and target gain and 
acquirer gain under the presence of the three motives was discussed in Section 2.4.2 
of Chapter 2. This structure is represented in Table 6.2 below. 
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Table 6.2 Correlation structure under the presence of synergy, hubris and agency 
Correlation between 
target gain and total gain 
Correlation between target 
gain and acquirer gain 
Efficiency or synergy + + 
Hubris (winner's curse, 
overpay) 
0 - 
Agency or managerialism - - 
6.2.1 Result on the correlation between target gain and total gain 
Panel A of Table 6.3 provides the results of the regression model, Target Gain =a+ 
ß*Total Gain, for the entire sample and for the subsample of positive and negative 
total gain. For the entire sample the correlation between target and total gain is 
positive and significant. The estimate of ß is 0.094 (t = 3.6) which is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level. The correlation between target gain and total gain 
is also positive in the positive total gain subsample. The estimate of ß is 0.37 (t = 5.9) 
which is again positive and statistically significant at 1% level. The positive 
correlation between target gain and total gain in the entire sample as well as in the 
subsample of positive total gain indicates presence of synergy motive behind M&A of 
European utility sectors. 
In order to determine simultaneous presence of synergy and agency motive the 
correlation between target gain and total gain is examined in the negative total gain 
subsample. This is because by definition of agency, total gain should be negative. But 
as I have indicated earlier under synergy motive correlation between target gain and 
total gain is positive. So there will be simultaneous presence of synergy and agency 
motive behind M&A if the correlation between target gain and total gain is positive in 
the negative total gain subsample. The result in Table 6.3 signifies that in the negative 
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total gain subsample ß is 0.024 (t = 1.3) which is positive but not statistically 
significant. Therefore from this result it is apparent that synergy and agency motives 
do not coexist in the negative total gain subsample. 
As Table 6.2 indicates under presence of hubris there will be zero correlation between 
target gain and total gain. But the correlation between target gain and total gain is 
non-zero in the negative total gain subsample as evidenced in Table 6.3. So the 
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6.2.2 Result on the correlation between target gain and acquirer gain 
The correlation result between target gain and acquirer gain is given in Panel B of 
Table 6.3. The result shows that the estimate of ßl is 0.043 (t = 1.4) which is positive 
but not statistically significant. Since ßl is positive but not statistically significant 
therefore presence of synergy motive cannot be concluded. 
In the positive total gain subsample the correlation between target gain and acquirer 
gain is examined with the following equation: Target gain =a+ AiAcquirer gain + ß2 
(Acquirer gain*Dummy). Dummy =0 if acquirer gain is positive and 1 if acquirer 
gain is negative. This dummy is used since the acquirer gain can be negative even 
though the total gain is positive. So the dummy variable is used to examine the 
correlation between target gain and acquirer gain when the acquirer gain is negative. 
In the above equation if ß1 is positive but ß2 is negative it will imply coexistence of 
both synergy motive and hubris behind M&A. This is because by definition of 
synergy a positive ßl implies that there is a positive correlation between target gain 
and acquirer gain. A negative ß2 on the other hand implies negative correlation 
between target gain and acquirer gain for the subsample of acquirers with negative 
gain. So under negative B2 there is a transfer of wealth from acquirer to target 
shareholders. By definition of hubris total gain from M&A is zero. Thus under hubris 
a positive target gain is generated from a transfer of wealth from acquirer to target 
shareholders. Hence negative ß2 entails hubris hypothesis. Thus when ßl is positive 
but ß2 is negative it suggest coexistence of both synergy motive and hubris behind 
M&A. 
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Given this hypothesis the result in Panel B shows that there is a positive correlation 
between target gain and acquirer gain for both the subgroups of acquirers with 
positive and negative total gains. The estimate of ß, is 0.137 (t = 1.2) and ß2 is 134.73 
(t = 0.29). However both the estimates of ßl and ß2 are not statistically significant. So 
the result clearly indicates that there is no simultaneous presence of synergy motive 
and hubris in the sample of M&A of European utility sectors. 
In the negative total gain subsample the correlation between target gain and acquirer 
gain is positive. This is examined with the equation: Target gain =a + ßl (Acquirer 
gain). The estimate of ßl is 0.043 (t = 1.4) which is again not statistically significant. 
Hence presence of synergy motive cannot be confirmed in the negative total gain 
subsample. This in turn rejects the possibility of simultaneous presence of both 
synergy and agency motive (since there is presence of agency motive in the negative 
total gain subsample by its definition). 
The interpretation of the results based on the motives behind M&A of European 
utilities as reported by Table 6.1 and 6.3 is given in the Section 6.3 below. 
6.3 Synergy, Agency or Hubris? - Summary and Implication 
The result based on the combined gains method showed that the median combined 
gain is positive and statistically significant. This clearly suggests presence of synergy 
motive behind M&A of European utility sectors. Moreover the fact that 61 percent of 
the total gains are positive (as shown in Table 6.1) also strengthens this conclusion. 
The presence of synergy motive is also reinforced in the regression results reported in 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 6.3. Particularly the regression result showed that there 
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is a significant positive correlation between target gain and total gain both in the 
entire sample as well as in the subsample of positive total gain. Hence presence of 
synergy motive behind M&A of European utility sectors is evidenced from both the 
combined gains method as well as from the regression analysis. 
The sources of synergy in the context of M&A of European utility sectors could be 
due to operational synergy, financial synergy or strategic realignment. This synergy 
motive might have stemmed from the deregulation itself. This is because deregulation 
removed the barriers for the utility companies and allowed them to embark in 
takeovers which generate synergies. This point has also been posited by Leggio and 
Lien (2000) and Becker-Blease et al, (2008) in the context of M&A of US utilities. 
The combined gains method further reported that the mean combined gain and 
percentage combined gains are both negative. However these figures are not 
statistically significant. Since these negative combined gains are not statistically 
significant so presence of agency motive cannot be confirmed with certainty. The 
correlation result in panel A of Table 6.3 also does not support agency motive. But 
since two-fifth of total gains and half of the acquirer shareholders' gains are negative 
so presence of agency motive cannot be ruled out. 
The presence of agency motive implies that there is a fraction of utility companies 
which embarked in M&A due to the self interest of the acquirer firm managers 57 at the 
cost of their shareholders. However there is no negative correlation between target 
gain and acquirer gain in any sub samples. Hence it can be concluded that the agency 
problem is not very severe. 
57 See definition of agency motive in chapter 2. 
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There is no evidence of presence of hubris from the combined gains method. As 
indicated in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 the hubris hypothesis implies that there will be 
zero correlation between target gain and total gain and negative correlation between 
target gain and acquirer gain. Clearly the result in Table 6.3 also does not support 
hubris. The absence of hubris also suggests that the acquirer managers of European 
utilities did not embark in M&A out of their overconfidence or over-optimism. 
Overall from the empirical evidence on the motives behind M&A it is clear that 
synergy is the predominant motive behind M&A of European utility sectors. However 
since the mean combined gain and half of the acquirer gains are negative so presence 
of agency motive cannot be ruled out. But clearly there is no managerial hubris in the 
context of M&A of European utility sectors. This is apparent from both the combined 
gains method as well as from the regression analysis. 
The strong evidence of synergy motive and some presence of agency motive behind 
M&A of European utility sectors are consistent with other studies on motives behind 
M&A that have been reviewed in Tables 2.6 and 2.8 of Chapter 2. Moreover all the 
studies reviewed in Chapter 2 showed presence of more than one motive behind M&A 
(e. g. Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al, 2000; Fernandez and Baixauli, 
2003; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Therefore the presence of both synergy and 
agency motive behind M&A of the European utilities is consistent with these 




Summary, Conclusions and Implications 
7.0 Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 1 traditionally finance literature on M&A is based on the 
examination of two broad questions. First it focuses on analysing the shareholder 
value creation following M&A and second it rests on examination of the motives 
behind M&A. The evidence from extant studies reviewed in Chapter 2 suggested that 
empirical evidence on the motives behind M&A is not very conclusive. Most studies 
suggested synergy as the predominant motive however presence of other motives like 
hubris and agency are not ruled out. The empirical evidence on impact of M&A on 
valuation of firms is less ambiguous. The general consensus in finance literature is 
that M&A usually result in loss for the acquirer shareholders and gain for the target 
shareholders in the short run following the announcement of M&A (Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008). Finance literature also documents that the combined firm 
shareholders have suffered losses in the post merger period. 
This thesis contributes to this debate in finance in the context of M&A of European 
utilities. Specifically I set out to investigate the impact of M&A on the valuation of 
European utilities and the rationale that explains the motives behind M&A decisions 
in European utilities. The choice of situating the research in the context of European 
utilities was inspired by many factors. These factors are: the increasing number of 
M&A deals in the European utility sectors following privatisation and liberalisation, 
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the presence of economic regulation of these utilities and the size and importance of 
these utilities for the economy in general and for the consumer welfare in particular. 
Therefore M&A in utilities is a subject of interest to policy makers, investors and 
consumers. All these factors have prompted this research. 
Given these rationales the aim of this thesis is to examine the causes and 
consequences of M&A of European utility sectors from a finance theory perspective. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to gauge the extent to which these aims have been 
addressed. 
In the light of this discussion as presented in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 the following 
three research questions were identified: 
Q1: What are the (a) short run and (b) long run wealth effects of the European 
utility companies that were engaged in M&A? Specifically wealth effect of the 
utility companies will be examined (a) in the short run following the 
announcement of M&A and (b) in the long run following the completion of 
M&A. 
Q2: What are the determinants of the shareholder returns following M&A? 
Q3: What are the motives of the utility companies to engage in M&A? 
Results in this study confirm some of the claims about motives behind M&A and the 
likely impact of the M&A on the firm valuation around announcement period. 
However, there are also some important differences in the findings of this study in 
comparison to earlier studies. I will discuss these findings and their implications in 
detail in Sections 7.1 and 7.2 below. 
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In this final Chapter, Section 7.1 summarises the main empirical findings of this 
thesis. In Section 7.2 I discuss the findings of my research from theoretical and policy 
perspectives. Section 7.3 presents the limitations of my research and possible future 
developments of my work. 
7.1 Summary of empirical findings of this thesis 
This Section summarises the main empirical findings of this thesis. The implications 
of this result will be discussed in Section 7.2. 
7.1.1 Summary of results on shareholder wealth creation following M&A of utilities 
Sections 5.1 to 5.3 of Chapter 5 present the results on the question of shareholder 
value creation following M&A of European utilities both in the short run following 
the announcement of M&A as well as in the long run post acquisition period. The 
findings of this study shows that in the short run the target shareholders have earned 
positive returns while the acquirer shareholders have suffered losses. These findings 
are consistent to the numerous empirical studies on short run shareholder wealth 
creation following M&A that I have reviewed in Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2 (e. g. 
Maquieira et al, 1998; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Houston et al, 2001; Fuller 2002; 
and Moeller, 2004, Conn et al., 2005). However there is a notable difference in the 
results of this study and earlier empirical evidence which has looked at M&A of non- 
regulated industries. This difference lies in the fact that this study documents that 
levels of gains accrued to the target shareholders and the level of losses suffered by 
the acquirer shareholders are both lower in comparison to those reported in the 
literature on non-regulated industries. This finding has important policy implications 
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for the regulated utility sectors. I will discuss this in Section 7.3 below. This result is 
also consistent with the empirical studies of . 
M&A in the regulated US electricity 
sector as indicated in the studies of Leggio and Lien (2000) and Becker-Blease et al 
(2008). 
The long run post acquisition result showed that the combined firm shareholders have 
earned significant losses in the one year post merger period following the completion 
of M&A. This is evidenced from the statistically significant 1 year average BHAR. 
This negative long run average BHAR is also consistent with the studies of 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), Conn et al (2005), Gregory and McCorriston (2005) 
and Antoniou et al (2007) in the context of M&A in non-regulated industries in the 
UK. Moreover the long run results of this thesis are also consistent with the long run 
results reported by Becker-Blease et al (2008) in the context of M&A of the US 
electricity sector. Thus the findings of this thesis provide support for a variety of 
existing studies across a range of sectors. 
7.1.2 Summary of results on the determinants or drivers of shareholder returns 
The second part of Chapter 5, particularly Section 5.4, has looked into the 
determinants of shareholder wealth creation following M&A. Specifically I have 
examined whether short run target and acquirer returns and long run post merger 
returns are explained by different explanatory variables, which were privatisation, 
deregulation, degree of relatedness, cross-border versus domestic M&A, value versus 
glamour M&A and relative size of acquirer to target firms. This is the first study that 
has examined the change in shareholder returns with respect to the explanatory 
variables privatisation and deregulation. In Section 3.2 of Chapter 31 have outlined 
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the testable hypotheses pertaining to the impact of the different explanatory variables 
on shareholders' returns. 
The findings suggest that none of the explanatory variables have any statistically 
significant impact on the short run target and acquirer shareholder returns. This result 
is inconsistent with the majority of empirical studies on M&A in non-regulated 
industries which have reported that the short run target and acquirer returns could be 
determined by the different M&A characteristics. This is a significant finding as I will 
discuss in the next Section. 
When multiple regression is conducted on the long run combined firm BHARs the 
result shows that only the coefficients of the dummy variables privatisation (PRN) 
and domestic (DOM) are statistically significant. Specifically the result reveals that 
the coefficient of the privatisation (PRIV) dummy is positive and significant in the 1 
year post merger period. This result clearly indicates that the potential for synergy is 
higher for the newly privatised utility firms in comparison to those firms which were 
in private sector since their inception. This is a very interesting and significant result 
which might influence the investors of utilities in taking important strategic decisions 
on M&A. The possible inference of this outcome will be discussed in the next 
Section. 
The result on the determinants of shareholder returns further shows that the 
coefficient of the dummy variable `domestic' is positive for the 1 year post merger 
period but negative for the 3 years post merger period. Both of these are statistically 
significant. This suggests that for the initial 1 year post merger period the utility firms 
in domestic M&A earned higher returns compared to the utility firms in cross-border 
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M&A. This clearly indicates that the initial obstacle that the utility firms faced in 
reaping profits from cross-border M&A were overcome as the length, of the post 
merger integration period increased. 
Overall the results demonstrated that contrary to empirical evidence on M&A in non- 
regulated industries most of the explanatory variables do not have any statistically 
significant impact on shareholder returns. This result indicates that shareholder value 
creation following M&A in European utility sectors is not explained by the same 
factors that explain the shareholder wealth creation following M&A in non-regulated 
industries. Moreover one of the distinguishing findings of this study is that in the post 
merger period shareholder wealth creation is greater for the newly privatised utility 
sectors. Another significant finding of this study is that in the 1 year post merger 
period the shareholders in cross-border M&A earned lower returns compared to the 
shareholders in domestic M&A. But this result is revised in the 3 years post merger 
period where the shareholders in cross-border M&A earned higher returns in 
comparison to shareholders in domestic M&A. 
7.1.3 Summary of results on the motives behind M&A of utilities 
This thesis has particularly examined the ex ante motives behind M&A based on the 
ex post announcement period results. The findings, based on the total gains figure, 
provide evidence of the presence of synergy motive behind M&A of utilities. This is 
evidenced from the fact that the median total gain is £46.03 million, which is 
statistically significant. Moreover 61 percent of the sample M&As reported that the 
total gain is positive which further suggests the presence of synergy motives behind 
M&A in the European utility sectors. But the absolute mean total gain and percentage 
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mean total gain are reported to be negative. So an agency motive behind M&A cannot 
be ruled out. However these figures are not statistically significant so any agency 
motive behind M&A of European utility sectors cannot be confirmed by this study. 
The fact that the median total gain is positive but the mean total gain is negative also 
suggests that a few utility companies have accrued huge losses which have wiped out 
the gains earned by the other utilities resulting in a negative mean total gain. 
Moreover neither the combined gains result nor the correlation result provided 
evidence on hubris hypothesis behind M&A of European utility sectors. Hence 
presence of hubris is ruled out in the context of M&A of European utility sectors. 
The correlation result between target gain and total gain, and target gain and acquirer 
gain, also suggests that synergy is the predominant motive behind M&A. Hence the 
presence of synergy motive behind M&A of European utility sectors is robust across 
both the combined gain result and the correlation result. Hence from these results it 
can be concluded that synergy is one of the predominant motives behind M&A of 
European utility sectors. 
The findings of this study add support to the extant literature as most of the empirical 
studies to date have reported that synergy is the predominant motive behind M&A 
(Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al, 2000; Fernandez and Baixauli, 2003; 
Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). 
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7.2 Implication of results and contribution 
The findings of this thesis have several implications not only for research in utility 
sectors but also for existing M&A literature in finance. Moreover as discussed in the 
beginning of Chapter 1 the importance of utility sectors for the consumers and for the 
economy at large cannot be overstated. Hence the findings of this study also have 
important implications from the perspectives of the regulators and policy makers. 
Furthermore the findings of this study also have important implications for the 
investors of the utility sectors in taking significant strategic decisions of M&A in 
utility sectors. This section summarises the key implications of the findings reported 
in the previous section. 
First this thesis attributes the lower level of target gains and acquirer losses in the 
short run announcement period to the regulatory nature of utility sectors. Since one of 
the key objectives of privatisation was to encourage competition so consolidation of 
utility sectors following privatisation and deregulation may reduce the level of 
competition in these sectors. This is because M&A of European utilities may shift the 
market power in the hands of few large dominant utility companies. As outlined in 
Section 1.3 of Chapter 1 due to economic regulation, M&A in utility sectors may have 
to pass the additional58 hurdle of regulatory approval from the specific regulators of 
utilities. Therefore due to this threat to competition the regulators of utilities are very 
careful in approving M&A. In addition in Section 1.1 of Chapter 1I have indicated 
that one of the objectives of the regulators is to balance the interests of the producers 
and consumers (Parker, 2003). Hence after the merger completion the regulators may 
S$ As discussed in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1 M&A in utility sectors has to pass the hurdles of getting 
approval from the antitrust authorities as well as from the specific regulators of utility sectors. 
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disallow the recovery of premiums paid to targets by not allowing the acquirer 
shareholders to earn supernormal profits. So it is highly likely that due to this 
regulatory intervention the acquirers of utility sectors have little incentive to bid for a 
target firm at a significant premium above the market value. This argument has also 
been put forward by Leggio and Lien (2000) in the context of M&A of the US 
electricity sector. All these factors contribute to a finding which suggests that the 
target shareholders from M&A in European utility sectors have earned lower returns 
compared to their counterparts in non-regulated industries. 
Second the lower level of acquirer losses in utility sectors can be attributed to the 
specific characteristics of utility sectors and economic regulation of these sectors. 
Particularly since utility sectors provide essential services, so the regulators of these 
sectors make sure that these sectors are able to earn a stable rate of return. This is 
because the regulators need to ensure that important sectors like utilities do not suffer 
from market failure, which will have serious social and economic consequences. For 
this reason the market might have reacted less severely towards the acquirers of 
utilities following M&A in comparison to acquirers in other non-regulated industries. 
Third the implications of negative long run returns as evident from the findings of this 
thesis are as follows. 
1. ) The negative long run result in this thesis can be attributed to the lack of prior 
experience of European utilities in the acquisition process to acquire other utility 
companies. Ray and Thompson (1990) and Bertunek et al (1993) also suggested a 
similar line of reasoning in the context of M&A of the US utilities. This lack of 
experience in pursuing a strategy of M&A has arguably led to a poor ability to 
achieve integration and thereby synergy in the post merger period. 
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2. ) As discussed in Chapter 5 the post merger negative returns also suggest that M&A 
is not a good strategy for the investors in utility firms to flourish in the long run 
(Leggio and Lien, 2000). 
3. ) The negative long run returns in this study may also suggest that if synergies 
existed in M&A of utilities they were passed to other industry stakeholders. For 
instance, if the mergers bring in lowering of prices then that might be beneficial for 
the consumers. This point has also been put forward by Becker-Blease et al (2008) in 
the context of M&A of the US utilities. However further research is required to 
support this argument in the context of M&A of European utility sectors. 
4. ) The general consensus from short run announcement period results on M&A is 
that the returns of the target and acquirer firms taken together are positive. In other 
words the combined gain is positive. I have documented this in Table 2.6 of Chapter 
2. The review of extant studies on post merger performance in Section 2.3.3 of 
Chapter 2 revealed that most of these studies reported negative returns accrued to the 
shareholders in the long run post merger period. Extant literature has termed this 
variance in the short run and long run results as post merger `anomaly' (Agrawal et al, 
1992; Fama, 1998). In this study I find statistically significant negative 1 year post 
merger average BHAR in the context of M&A of European utility sectors. Hence the 
findings of this thesis re-establishes the post merger `anomaly' in the context of M&A 
of European utility sectors. 
Overall my results with respect to shareholder wealth creation following M&A in 
utility sectors are consistent with the extant literature. However the extent of wealth 
losses is not very severe due to economic regulation of these sectors. This is apparent 
specifically from the lower level of losses suffered by the acquirer shareholders in the 
short run following the announcement of M&A. Moreover the long run result also 
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shows that only the 1 year post merger average BHAR is negative and statistically 
significant. Hence it can be concluded that the findings of this thesis on shareholder 
value creation is in line with the findings of the empirical literature on M&A in non- 
regulated industries. 
Fourth in the context of the determinants of shareholder returns the findings suggest 
that the shareholders have earned lower returns in cross-border M&A, compared to 
domestic M&A, for the initial 1 year post merger period. This result is consistent with 
the empirical literature on M&A in non-regulated industries in Europe which reported 
that domestic M&A generate higher returns compared to cross-border M&A (Cybo- 
Ottone and Murgia, 2000; Corhay and Rad, 2000; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004 and 
Campa and Hernando, 2004). This is possibly due to the cultural, legal or transaction 
barriers that exist between different countries in Europe. Due to these barriers to entry 
the utility companies in cross-border M&A are unable to reap any possible synergy 
from M&A. This point has also been raised by Campa and Hernando (2004) in the 
context of M&A of European* companies in non-regulated industries. 
However in the 3 years post merger period there is a revision of this result and the 
shareholders in cross-border M&A have earned higher returns compared to those in 
domestic M&A. This is a very significant and distinguishing finding of this thesis. 
The result possibly implies that as the length of post merger period increases the 
utility companies in cross-border M&A have overcome the initial barriers to entry in a 
foreign land. This is evidenced from the negative coefficient of the dummy variable 
domestic (DOM) in the regression of the 3 years post merger BHAR. In fact in the 
context of M&A of European utility sectors, Loredo and Suarez (2000) pointed out 
that the small size of many European markets will prevent the generation of synergy 
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for domestic mergers that might evolve in cross-border mergers. In addition Goergen 
and Renneboog (2004) suggested in the context of M&A in non-regulated industries 
that higher returns in cross-border M&A could be attributed to imperfections in the 
product and capital market. As a result of these imperfections firms under cross- 
border M&A exercises a competitive advantage over local firms (Kang, 1993; cited in 
Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). These are the likely factors that resulted in the 
generation of higher returns for the shareholders under cross-border M&A compared 
to domestic M&A in the 3 years post merger period. 
Moreover the positive coefficient of the dummy variable privatisation for the long run 
combined firm BHAR indicates that shareholder returns are higher for the newly 
privatised utility sectors. This is a very significant finding of this study in the context 
of M&A of European utilities. In addition this is the only study that has found that 
shareholder wealth creations following M&A are affected by the explanatory variable 
`privatisation'. This result possibly suggests that post merger integration is better for 
the newly privatised utility companies in comparison to those companies that were in 
private sector since their inception. One likely reason for this outcome is that 
privatisation led to increase in efficiency of the utility companies. This is revealed by 
the extant literature on the outcomes of privatisation that I have reviewed in Section 
2.1 of Chapter 2 (Newbery, 1997; Parker, 1997; Parker, 2003; Florio, 2007). As a 
result of this increase in efficiency the newly privatised utility companies possibly are 
more accomplished to the strategy of M&A compared to the ones which are under 
private control since their inception 
Fifth in the context of the motives behind M&A of European utility sectors the 
presence of synergy motive can be attributed to the regulatory nature of the utility 
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sectors. Particularly in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1I have mentioned that M&A in utility 
sectors not only require the approval of the antitrust authorities but may also require 
approval of the specific regulators of utilities. So possibly this regulatory scrutiny has 
prevented companies from engaging in M&A where there were no clear expectations 
of synergy benefits. 
Taken together the empirical results obtained in this thesis provide mixed evidence on 
the performances of utility sectors following M&A. On one hand the findings suggest 
that the economic regulation of utilities acted as a good safeguard for these sectors 
from incurring severe losses from M&A. In addition the presence of the synergy 
motive behind M&A also implies that effective regulation of M&A of European 
utilities has prevented mergers that are not motivated by synergy. Therefore from an 
economic policy perspective this result bears important policy implications as it 
suggests that M&A in utility sectors should be passed through effective regulatory 
scrutiny. On the other hand the fact that acquirer shareholders in the short run and the 
combined shareholders in the long run have suffered losses triggers a negative signal 
for the investors in utilities. This also has policy implications as it suggests investors 
should be careful in entering into M&A as this could have a potential detrimental 
effect upon maintenance of standards of performance and appropriate investment in 
infrastructure improvement. 
The findings of this thesis bear important signals for the investors of utility companies 
not only in European countries but also for other utility companies across the globe 
who may intend to pursue the strategy of M&A. Specifically from the perspective of 
the investors the findings of this thesis suggest that M&A of European utilities is not a 
promising strategy, in order to generate higher returns. This is because although 
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presence of synergy motive has been reported but the level of gain is not very high. 
This point can also be confirmed by the post merger negative returns accrued to the 
combined firm shareholders. As indicated in the previous paragraph from the 
perspective of the regulators and policy makers the findings of this thesis suggest that 
regulators must be more vigilant in evaluating the potential synergy and thereby 
approval of M&A in utility sectors. This is an important contribution of this thesis 
given the economic and social welfare consequences attached to utility sectors. 
7.3 Contribution of this research from the perspective of governance and 
political economy of regulation 
In addition to the policy implications discussed in Section 7.2 the findings of this 
thesis may also have significant policy implications both from the perspective of 
corporate governance and the political economy of regulation. 
The findings of my thesis in terms of the presence of the synergy motive behind M&A 
of European utility sectors have significant implication from a corporate governance 
perspective. The theory of market contestability suggests that competition brings in a 
disciplining effect among the firms which in turn generate internal and allocative 
efficiency. In the context of the market for corporate control, synergy from M&A is 
generated through market discipline, where the market forces replace weak target 
management with a more competent acquirer management (Sudarsanam et al, 1996). 
So the evidence of synergy motive in my thesis suggests that the market for corporate 
control is proving effective market based governance mechanism in the context of 
European utility sectors. However further research is required to examine whether 
there is any relationship between corporate governance and performance of the 
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European utility sectors following M&A. Particularly future research can be directed 
to examine whether the factors related to corporate governance like board 
composition, board size and directors' share ownership had an impact on shareholder 
wealth creation following M&A of European utility sectors. 
The findings of my thesis can also be extended to current debates concerning the 
political economy of regulation. Vickers and Yarrow (1988, Chapter 4) put presence 
of asymmetric information as key reason to argue for need of economic regulation. 
This is because the managers are much better informed about industry conditions than 
the firms' owners and regulators. Due to this information asymmetry the regulators 
can only monitor the firms' activities imperfectly (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, Chapter 
4). Market power enjoyed due to natural monopoly conditions and low price elasticity 
of demand for utilities increases the chances of consumer welfare loss. In the context 
of such regulatory challenges, any additional information about potential efficiency 
gains and performance could help mitigate the problem of information asymmetry. 
The findings of my thesis on shareholder wealth creation following M&A and 
motives behind M&A provide a key insight into the causes and consequences of 
M&A in the context of European utility sectors. 
Moreover as I have discussed in Chapter 1 the M&A activity requires regulatory 
approval. In Europe the European Community Merger Regulation is responsible for 
approving all M&A. In addition the UK has its own M&A regulatory bodies which 
are the Office of Fair Trade and the Competition Commission. Given the social and 
economic significance of the utility sectors the regulators of M&A need to be very 
vigilant to approve M&A in utilities. This is because any consolidation of utilities that 
may significantly increase market power of the utility companies may be anti- 
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competitive. This anticompetitive behaviour of the utility companies may in turn be 
detrimental for the welfare of the consumers. In this context the presence of synergy 
motive behind M&A of utility sectors may provide the regulators with guidance about 
whether any prospective M&A meet public interest criteria. However further research 
is required to understand the different criteria on the basis of which the regulators 
approve M&A in utility sectors. 
7.4 Limitations and issues for future research 
This section discusses the limitations of this thesis and suggests some areas of future 
research. 
First this thesis is based on M&A of European utility sectors and hence the results 
could be specific to these environments only. Hence one of my agenda for future 
research is to examine whether M&A in utility sectors has taken place in any other 
country or countries on such a significant scale and thereby to extend this analysis in 
the context of M&A of utilities in other countries. 
Second this research has examined the M&A of utility sectors from a finance theory 
perspective. There are alternative perspectives on M&A such as economic and 
strategic theories behind mergers. Therefore further research can be directed towards 
an examination of M&A of utility sectors from these alternative perspectives. Earlier 
extant literature reviewed in Chapter 2 on M&A of European utilities based on 
strategic perspective is based only on the electric utility sector. 
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Third in this research I have broadly examined the motives behind M&A of utilities 
by examining whether these M&A were motivated by synergy, agency or hubris. 
However each of these three motives could be subdivided further in various 
subgroups. For instance there are several sources of synergy like operational synergy, 
financial synergy and managerial synergy (Sudarsanam et al, 1996; Weston et al, 
2001). Similarly agency motives could be either due to managerialism motive or free 
cash flow problem (Weston et al, 2001). Therefore future research on M&A of 
utilities can be directed to examine the precise source of synergy or agency motives 
behind M&A in utility sectors. 
Fourth another area of future research that I wish to pursue is to extend the analysis of 
determinants of shareholder returns following M&A by including some more 
explanatory variables such as method of payment (cash versus stock) and mode of 
acquisition (hostile or friendly). 
Fifth this study can be further extended to study the issues of corporate governance 
like managerial compensation in the context of M&A of utility sectors. 
Despite these limitations of this thesis it is the first piece of empirical research that has 
examined the M&A of regulated industries specifically M&A of utilities by European 
acquirers. Drawing upon traditional methods used in finance literature to analyse 
M&A this thesis has applied these methods in the context of M&A in the utility 
sectors. This study therefore has contributed both to the study on utility sectors as well 
as in the field of finance literature on M&A. 
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